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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
VANESSA IARIA, PhD IN MIGRATION STUDIES 
IRAQI REFUGEES’ ASSISTED AND SPONTANEOUS RETURN FROM 
SYRIA AND JORDAN 
SUMMARY 
 Summary  
The thesis investigates the causes and nature of return in the context of the Iraqis 
displaced to Syria and Jordan after the 2003 US-led war in Iraq. It combines critical 
International Relations theories with transnational approaches in Migration Studies to 
investigate: (1) how regional and international geopolitics have shaped asylum and 
migration regimes in the Middle East; (2) how Iraqi forced migrants have interacted with 
such regimes in order to reach safety, sustainable livelihoods and personal development 
opportunities and; (3) the decision-making processes and transnational migration 
practices of Iraqi individuals and families. 
 
It finds that Iraqis’ returns result from the uneasy interaction between international and 
national asylum and migration regimes and the lack of agreement on a common legal 
framework for durable solutions to the Iraqi displacement.  The presence and mobility of 
the Iraqis in Syria and Jordan are regulated within national immigration systems. The 
immigration and residency policies of the home and host governments confirm the 
historical importance of voluntary and involuntary population movements as a nation-
building and governance tool in the Middle East.  
 
Regional governments and international agencies manage the Iraqi displaced and steer 
their return through the provision, or the lack thereof, of assistance and information. The 
Iraqis respond to the limited institutional assistance and information by developing 
independent coping strategies and informal information and communication systems 
based on the use of information and communication technologies and on their 
transnational mobility and social networks.  
 
Transnational mobility and livelihoods therefore constitute a precondition for Iraqis’ 
sustainable return and reintegration in home societies undergoing political and socio-
economic transition. In this context, return is a complex process that takes time and 
entails various degrees and modalities of transnational mobility, social networks and 
livelihoods connecting host and home societies.   
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction: background and aim of the study 
In March 2003, the US and the UK waged war against the Ba’athist regime of Saddam 
Hussein with the stated aim of disarming Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), eradicating systematic human and minority rights violations and establishing a 
democratic Iraqi society. However, as Patrick Cockburn (2006) describes in his book The 
Occupation, the ‘liberation’ war progressively turned into an ethno-sectarian conflict 
which led to the death and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Estimates of 
Iraqi civilian casualties ranged from 116,409 to 655,000 people (O’Hanlon and 
Livingston, July 2012; The Lancet, 2006). These figures contrast with the reported 4,804 
coalition soldiers’ fatalities since 2003 (Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, 2013).  
 
The increasing number of victims of violence results from military or paramilitary action 
and the breakdown in civil security following the 2003 invasion. The US-led military 
operations aimed at countering insurgency and establishing regional security more than 
coordinating a peaceful reconstruction effort. The mismanagement of the reconstruction 
process has been exacerbated by an internal conflict over access to political power and 
national resources, which affects all Iraqis regardless of their ethnic, religious and 
sectarian affiliation. Although the manifestations of this conflict seem religious and 
ethnic, its underlying motives are primarily economic and political (ICG, 2006). Pre-
existing ethnic resentments and religious divisions have been heightened and manipulated 
by local party leaders to achieve political goals (Al-Marashi, 2007; Barakat, 2008). In the 
aftermath of the US-led invasion, Iraq has been subject to a process of ethnically-based 
territorial polarisation followed by the establishment of a US-backed federal government 
through the elections of January and December 2005 (ICG, 2005a; 2005b). Cockburn 
(2006:184) warned that ‘the structure of the new government risks crystallising rather 
than eliminating divisions between the three main communities: the Shi'a, the Kurds and 
the Sunni’. The post-2003 Iraqi governments and the US military failed to prevent a low-
intensity conflict from turning into a full-blown civil war, which at its 2006-2007 peak 
resulted in the disintegration of Iraqi society and inevitable spillover effects into other 
countries in the Middle East. 
 
The humanitarian crisis in Iraq caused the displacement of an estimated 4 million Iraqis, 
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including some 2.2 million inside Iraq and over 2 million in neighbouring states 
(UNHCR, 2009). In particular, it is estimated that the Syrian Arab Republic hosted 1.5 
million refugees and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan between 750,000 and 500,000 
people (UNHCR, 2009). According to an Oxfam/NCCI report ‘at least 40 per cent of 
Iraq’s professional class, including doctors, teachers, and engineers, have left since 2003’ 
(Oxfam/NCCI, 2007:15). The majority of the Iraqis hosted by neighbouring countries are 
professionals, intellectuals, former civil servants and politicians whose contribution in the 
peace-building process and the reconstruction of social and economic institutions in post-
war Iraq is deemed essential (Weiss Fagen, 2007).  
 
The international community is neither willing to resettle thousands of Iraqi asylum 
seekers to the West, nor to promote their repatriation to Iraq as a durable solution. Jordan 
and Syria, the two main host countries and neighbours of Iraq, have not granted refugee 
status to Iraqi forced migrants, and host them instead as guests who will have to be 
resettled elsewhere or return home. As a result, ten years on from the end of the US-led 
war on Iraq, the Iraqi refugee crisis has turned into another case of protracted 
displacement in the Middle East. In these circumstances spontaneous returns have begun 
and by 2010 an estimated 77,117 Iraqi families or 433,696 individuals had returned 
mainly unassisted (UNHCR Iraq, February 2010). By February 2012, estimated returns 
reached 98,537 Iraqi families or 527,186 individuals (UNHCR, February 2012), an 
increase of 21.5% since 2010. The increase in Iraqis’ returns started before the beginning 
of the unrest and violence in Syria, which has contributed to the rising return trends 
(UNHCR Syria, 2012). Despite the growing visibility of return movements, the UNHCR 
has not promoted or encouraged the return of Iraqi refugees from neighbouring countries 
due to continuing security concerns (UNHCR Syria, 2012). The UN refugee agency has 
maintained this cautious position since the beginning of the Iraqi humanitarian crisis and 
therefore has not organised any large-scale information or other assistance campaigns for 
prospective returnees (Kagan, 2006).  
 
The degree of voluntariness of Iraqis’ returns is questionable given that the other two 
durable solutions of ‘local integration’ and ‘third country resettlement’ promoted by the 
UNHCR have not been seriously explored as solutions by the host countries and the 
international community. Yet concerns about the voluntariness of Iraqis’ returns should 
not divert attention from the fact that large-scale returns to Iraq have taken place 
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‘regardless of the parameters used by humanitarian assistance providers to establish when 
it is appropriate to return’ (Walsh et al., 1999:113). Iraqis are going back mostly 
spontaneously and unassisted, to regions affected by low-intensity conflict and to areas 
marked by poverty, food insecurity, and lack of basic infrastructure and services which 
are indispensable for the wellbeing of returnees and members of receiving communities 
(Barakat, 2008). Under these circumstances a significant but unknown number of 
returnees have therefore re-migrated and engaged in transnational livelihoods and 
activities between Iraq and neighbouring Syria and Jordan. The unassisted returns and 
circular migration of Iraqis have been scarcely researched and documented by academics 
and practitioners. This study, therefore, aims to fill this knowledge gap by investigating 
the causes and nature of return in the context of the Iraqis displaced to Syria and Jordan 
after the 2003 US-led occupation of Iraq. By exploring this topic this research engages 
with, and attempts to have an impact on, ongoing academic and policy debates on refugee 
return in conflict and post-conflict situations. In addition it enriches the body of 
theoretical and empirical knowledge on refugee return and transnationalism in the 
southern hemisphere in general and in particular in the Middle East.  
 
The next section situates the case study of Iraqi refugees’ return in the broader academic 
and policy literature on refugee return in situations of conflict and post-conflict 
transformation. It concentrates on how international and regional geopolitics shape the 
asylum and migration regimes that determine the conditions of Iraqis’ displacement and 
return. Section three connects this research to existing studies on the relationship between 
return and transnational migration in developing countries, particularly in the global 
South, and supports the incorporation of legal transnational migration opportunities in 
traditional policy frameworks aimed at providing protection and solutions to refugee 
predicaments. Section four presents the outline of the thesis.  
1.2 Assisted refugee return to conflict and post-conflict situations 
The return of refugees under circumstances of conflict or post-conflict transformation is 
an increasingly frequent phenomenon, which in the past decades has attracted growing 
academic and political attention. According to the estimates compiled by the UNHCR, 
between 1991 and 1996 global refugee return movements increased to 9 million returnees 
(Loescher, 2001:282), and between 1997 and 2005 to 11.6 million returnees (UNHCR, 
2006). By 2010, however, refugee returns have gone down while IDP returns have 
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increased to reach 27.5 million IDPs (UNHCR, 2010). The decrease in refugee returns in 
the last decade coincides with the escalation of regional and internal protracted 
displacement problems in the southern hemisphere and with western donors’ growing 
political disinterest in finding solutions to displacement crises affecting the distant global 
South. 
   
Towards the end of the Cold War, the need for extra labour force in booming economies 
in Europe decreased and western governments started building barriers to prevent the 
inflow of asylum seekers generated by post-independence conflicts and proxy wars in 
Africa and Asia (Chimni, 1999; Crisp, 2003). Concurrently, western countries started 
narrowing their understanding of responsibility towards the large number of refugees and 
internally displaced people (IDPs) generated by natural and man-made disasters in the 
global South. In order to reduce the financial and political costs of global refugee 
protection, the dominant countries in the humanitarian regime increasingly endorsed 
regional containment policies and the return of refugees to areas facing low-intensity 
conflict or post-conflict transition as the optimum durable solution to displacement crises 
(Cuny and Stein, 1989; Rogge, 1994). The UNHCR progressively changed its operational 
approach from ‘voluntary repatriation’ to ‘safe and dignified return’ in response to the 
political pressures of western donors convinced that the right to seek asylum was being 
exploited by economic migrants to obtain easy access to residency rights and social 
welfare benefits (Hammar, 1994; Harvey, 2000). The operational definition and 
humanitarian standards of voluntary repatriation have since then been modified to 
accommodate donor  and host states’ more pragmatic political and financial interests, 
leading to refugees being ‘voluntarily’ repatriated despite highly unsafe conditions in 
home countries (Loescher and Monahan, 1989; Chimni, 1999).  
 
Studies of assisted return programmes implemented as part of highly complex UN-
managed peace-keeping and state-building missions abound in different regions and 
displacement contexts.  In most cases since the end of the Cold War, governments and 
international organisations have sponsored and implemented large-scale refugee 
repatriations to achieve political and economic goals more than to protect the human 
rights of forced migrants (Harrell Bond, 1989; Loescher and Monahan, 1989). In many 
cases, the return of refugees has been a key issue in bilateral and multilateral peace 
negotiations and a crucial component of peace-building and reconstruction processes, 
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accompanied by the deployment of international security forces, the undertaking of 
national elections and the establishment of new government institutions (Hendrie, 1991; 
Ogata, 1997; Juergensen, 2002; Stigter, 2006). The voluntary repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced persons is interpreted as an indicator of restored security and political 
stability, improved civil-state relations and public confidence in reconstruction efforts in 
war-torn countries (Petrin, 2002; Black and Gent, 2006b). Large scale repatriations have 
been regarded as necessary to legitimate fledgling national governments, whose authority 
is openly contested since they are often brought to power by international political 
coalitions (Turton and Marsden, 2002; Zorbas, 2004). The implementation of peace 
agreements often comprised specific provisions for the repatriation and reintegration of 
refugees, enforced through trilateral agreements with the UNHCR and other regional 
players (Dumper, 2006).   
 
For example in Mozambique, the UNHCR implemented one of the largest-scale assisted 
repatriation programmes ever undertaken following the 1992 peace agreement between 
the FRELIMO government and the RENAMO national resistance movement. Between 
1992 and 1994, the UNHCR assisted the repatriation of around 1.7 million Mozambicans 
displaced in Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Only 
375,000 returning refugees received the UNHCR transportation and reintegration 
assistance (Crisp, 1996). The assisted return and reintegration of Mozambican refugees 
before the 1994 national elections mirrored the political commitment of western donors, 
the UN system and international civil society to support the peace process through 
generous allocations of humanitarian relief and development aid (Crisp, 1996; Koser, 
1997; Juergensen, 2002).   
 
Similarly in Ethiopia, following the overthrow of the Derg government in 1991, the 
governments of Ethiopia and Sudan and the UNHCR signed a repatriation agreement; the 
refugee status cessation clause was invoked and around 250,000 Ethiopians were induced 
to return between 1993 and 1995, despite protests from refugees who feared going back 
and being again target of persecution and violence (Hammond, 2006).  
 
Around the same time, as part of the 1989 International Conference on Central American 
Refugees (CIREFCA) process around 50,000 Guatemalan refugees, out of the estimated 
200,000 who found refuge in Mexico, negotiated the conditions of their return in trilateral 
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negotiations with the UNHCR and with the Guatemalan government. Those not 
registered with the UNHCR went back unassisted and before and after the conclusion of 
the peace accords between the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Movement in 1996 (Stepputat, 1994; 2006). The UNHCR’s repatriation 
programme was strengthened by refugees’ participation in the planning and 
implementation of their return (Arafat, 2000).   
 
Also in Cambodia the UNHCR sponsored and organised the repatriation of 360,000 
Cambodian refugees, who fled and found refuge in camps at the Thai border during the 
conflict caused by the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime and the Vietnamese invasion 
in 1979. The repatriation programme started again in response to international political 
calls to speed up the peace-building and reconstruction process through the inclusion of 
refugees in national elections in 1993 and to bring to an end a long and costly border 
relief operation. The process was more driven by external actors and factors than by 
beneficiaries’ expressed desire to return and participate in the national political dialogue 
and reconstruction (McDowell and Eastmond, 2002).   
 
Few years later, in Bosnia the repatriation of refugees was endorsed in the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Agreement and the return of refugees, particularly ethnic minority returns, was 
seen as fundamental to reverse the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing that occurred during 
the war in the Balkans (Phuong, 2001; Black, 2002; Black and Gent, 2006a). Yet the 
repatriation initiatives also reflected a desire of western donor countries to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers and forced migrants who applied for refugee status in their 
territories (Walsh et al., 1999).   
 
The subsequent UNHCR assisted repatriation of Afghani refugees from Pakistan and Iran 
in 2002 began with a planning target of 400,000 returnees from each country but by the 
end of the year more than 1.5 million Afghanis had returned from Pakistan and more than 
220,000 people from Iran. This remains the largest post-conflict repatriation of modern 
times, although political pressures from international donors and from neighbouring host 
states led to the implementation of a programme arguably more in the interests of donor 
and host governments than in those of the beneficiaries (Turton and Marsden, 2002; 
Stigter, 2006; Monsutti, 2008). Institutional actors failed in providing the returnees with 
the reintegration assistance needed to improve their living conditions and those of 
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receiving communities (Turton and Marsden, 2002). 
 
More recently, in East Timor, the UNHCR assisted the return of around 240,000 refugees 
living on border camps in West Timor, whose absence could have weakened the 
legitimacy of the election outcomes and therefore represented a destabilising factor in the 
nation-building and reconciliation process in the newly independent Timor East.  The UN 
refugee agency was criticised for invoking the cessation clause at the end of 2002 and for 
its contentious position regarding the tension between justice and reconciliation in the 
negotiations between the newly formed East Timorese government and the refugees, 
collaborators of the repressive Indonesian regime (McDowell and Eastmond, 2002).  
 
In the post-2003 Iraqi displacement, however, ten years after the end of the war Iraqi 
refugees’ repatriation has yet to be addressed as part of a comprehensive peace agreement 
or as part of US or UN-backed reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. Moreover, 
Iraqis’ return has occurred outside formal international and regional refugee protection 
and assistance frameworks. Why Iraqi refugees’ return has not been the centre of peace-
building and reconstruction processes like in other post-conflict contexts? What are the 
international and national attitudes and policies towards return as a solution to the Iraqi 
displacement? What international and national regimes operate to find solutions to this 
protracted refugee problem in the Middle East?   
 
This study attempts to answer these questions by analysing the global and regional 
geopolitics shaping migration and asylum regimes in the Middle East and, in particular, 
the impact of such regimes on Iraqis’ displacement and return. It finds that Iraqis’ return 
and transnational livelihoods between Iraq, Syria and Jordan result from the uneasy 
interaction between the international refugee regime and the national migration regimes, 
which have yet to reach an agreement on a common legal framework for durable 
solutions to the Iraqi displacement. Unresolved geopolitical disputes in the Middle East, 
particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the politically sensitive question of 
Palestinian refugees’ right to return (Plascov, 1981; Aruri, 2001; Abu Sitta, 2001; Morris, 
2004, Akram, 2004; Peled and Rouhana, 2004; Dumper, 2006; Knudsen and Hanafi, 
2011; Richter-Devroe, 2013), have influenced the Syrian and Jordanian reception and 
incorporation of the international refugee protection norms and procedures into national 
asylum and migration systems. The lack of a political solution to the Palestinian refugee 
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problem influences Arab states’ interaction with the international refugee regime, 
perceived as highly discriminatory institutional arrangement created and established by 
western powers to further their political and economic interests in the region (Hathaway, 
1997). The two Arab states have therefore not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol and have adopted a non-conforming behaviour towards the 
international refugee regime by adopting alternative normative and policy systems to deal 
with refugee problems in the region.   
 
The analysis of the interaction between the international and national migration and 
asylum regimes in this case study highlights the relevance and usefulness of regime 
theory for investigating the legal and normative environment which affects the provision 
of protection and durable solutions to refugee problems in different regional contexts. 
The study stresses the importance of the historical and geopolitical context on the 
emergence and implementation of specific international regimes (Young, 1980; 1989; 
1991), and on the possible causes of actors’ non-cooperation within certain international 
social institutions. Perhaps the principal contribution of this research to existing neo-
liberal approaches to regime theory is that in order to examine Iraqis’ displacement and 
return from Syria and Jordan it requires neo-liberal regime theories to expand their 
explanatory power to cases of actors’ non-adherence and resistance to international 
regimes.  The main conclusion drawn from the empirical case study is that actors’ 
interaction with international regimes is not solely the product of the distribution of 
power in the international state-system or in terms of absolute and relative gains (Grieco, 
1988; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1994). Actors’ more or less cooperative 
interaction with the principles, norms and operational procedures of a specific regime 
may stem from their different moral and political stance on specific international and 
regional geopolitical issues and disputes. As well as to power politics and rational 
calculations of self-interest, non-aligned behaviours may result from cognitive reasons 
(Jönsson, 1995) such as actors’ diverging identities, historical experiences, local socio-
cultural values and knowledges (Keeley, 1990; Hurrell, 1995).   
1.3 Spontaneous refugee return and transnational migration 
The western conception of the modern nation-state is underpinned by a ‘sedentary’ bias, a 
feeling of attachment and belonging to a territory where national communities cultivate a 
system of homogeneous traditions and socio-cultural values that distinguish them from 
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other nations (Stepputat, 1994). The establishment of ‘citizenship’ served to consolidate 
the relationship between people, state and territory, and to define the responsibility of the 
state to protect the territory of sovereign and exclusive nation-states (Kibreab, 1999; 
2003). This politics of fixation and attachment of people to places makes displacement 
problematic: refugees become subject to control and limitations by states because 
crossing national borders they challenge host governments’ sovereign right to control 
population movements and activities within the territory under their jurisdiction (Kibreab, 
1999; 2003). Thus in juridical terms, repatriation is seen as the natural solution to refugee 
problems because it entails the physical return to the homeland and the re-establishment 
of the interrupted legal relation between the state and the refugee, who, going back, is 
entitled to seek the restoration of his lost citizenship rights (Hathaway, 2005). Because of 
this conception of permanent and sedentary repatriation, refugees’ secondary and circular 
movements have been perceived as evidence of the failure and the non-sustainability of 
the repatriation experience (Black et al., 2004). Much attention and effort has been 
concentrated on helping people to go back home but little investigation was conducted on 
what it means to return home and its implications for the various stakeholders in the 
process (Bakewell, 2000).  
 
This western sedentary bias, however, has been criticised by a number of scholars. 
Stepputat (1994) highlights that the imposition, during the colonial and imperial eras, of 
the western nation-state as a model for ‘homogeneous’ societal organisation is 
responsible for the creation of many refugee crises. Decolonisation and modern state-
building, often concomitant with the rise of nationalist and separatist movements, also 
provided fertile ground for refugee movements to occur (Zolberg, 1993). The term 
nation-state is based on assumptions of ethnic-homogeneity and political 
representativeness that, in empirical terms, do not mirror the social reality of the old and 
modern world (Warner, 1994). The relation between the individual and the group is not 
grounded in physical spaces; it is the relations between people that form the grounds of 
human existence.  
 
In light of this, the study of refugee return needs to take into account that during exile 
refugees and other migrants undergo profound socio-cultural changes and acquire new 
identities, experiences, and conceptions of home that inform the interaction with the 
homeland and their societies of origin (Hammond, 1999). Temporary visits to the 
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homeland help refugees' in renegotiating their relationship with and their reintegration in 
their home countries (Muggeridge et al., 2006; Oeppen, 2013). The refugee experience 
may over time exhibit features of voluntary migration patterns and create new 
opportunity structures that influence refugees' decisions to remain and integrate in the 
host society or to seek better opportunities elsewhere (Richmond, 1993; Zetter, 1999). In 
the era of globalisation the time and distance between peoples and cultures has been 
dramatically reduced thanks to technological advancements and reduced prices in 
communication and transportation. Forced migrants are exposed to a constant flow of 
multi-media information picturing extreme inequalities of wealth, resources and 
opportunities between different countries and regions of the world, that aliment their 
aspirations and plans for better living conditions and personal development. New 
information and communication technologies allow refugees to develop and maintain 
social networks, relationships of various nature and purpose that transcend territorial 
borders and spaces (Faist, 2000; Massey, 2005; Vertovec, 2008).   
 
In policy-making, solutions to refugee crises have been dominated by the sedentary bias 
(Van Hear, 2006). In contrast, refugees’ experiences have demonstrated that sustainable 
return can be neither permanent nor sedentary and requires time and significant 
psychological, socio-cultural, economic and material adjustments. (Stepputat, 2006; 
Eastmond, 2006; Monsutti, 2008). Return is a tentative and gradual process, which entails 
returnees’ failed and successful attempts to negotiate their presence and active role in 
their home communities, which since they left, have undertaken profound economic and 
socio-political transformations (Iaria, 2012). Refugee secondary, circular movements and 
transnational livelihoods do not necessarily take place when refugees have failed to re-
establish livelihoods in the country of origin. Rather, returnees’ engagement in cross-
border mobility and activities is often an indicator of progressive stabilisation and 
normalisation of living conditions in war-affected societies, where seasonal and 
international migration was a livelihood long before the conflict generated mass exodus 
(Bakewell, 2002; Horst, 2006; Monsutti, 2008). Under favourable conditions, refugees 
can contribute to the reconstruction of economic infrastructures and the socio-political 
fabric of their home country through circular migration and transnational social networks, 
by exposing the areas of origin to a constant flow of economic and social remittances 
(Levitt, 2001).  
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In the search for durable solutions to refugee displacement, and in particular in the 
development of return and reintegration assistance, it is necessary to consider that the 
'sustainability' of return goes beyond the long-term outcomes for the individual returnees, 
to collective outcomes for people in the receiving communities and countries of origin 
(Black and Gent, 2006b). The absorptive capacity of the receiving community and local 
economy must be placed against prospective returnees' demand for basic services and 
employment opportunities (Cassarino, 2004).  
 
In 1989, Cuny and Stein observed that despite the great efforts and resources employed in 
organised repatriations, each year tens or hundreds of thousands of refugees returned 
outside the framework of international protection and assistance (Cuny and Stein, 1989). 
This observation is still valid today (Stigter, 2006; Monsutti, 2008; Long, 2010). People 
decide to go back spontaneously without an amnesty, a change of regime or an end to the 
causes of the mass exodus, without peace and repatriation agreements, without 
international knowledge.  The scope of spontaneous return flows is often a hundred to 
two hundred times greater than the UNHCR assisted returns (Cuny and Stein, 1989; 
Rogge, 1994). This difference in scale between spontaneous and assisted repatriations 
highlights that the parameters and criteria used by the refugees to determine when and 
how it is appropriate to return often differ from those used by international humanitarian 
assistance providers and other institutional stakeholders (Cuny and Stein, 1989; Rogge, 
1994). The bureaucratic and technical parameters applied by institutional actors derive 
from complex and enduring practices of forced migration governance, which construct 
refugees as helpless victims and passive recipients of external interventions (Hyndman, 
2000) living a state of uprootedness until their re-integration into the ‘national order of 
things’(Malkki, 1995; 1996).   
 
Yet, the fact that most refugees return outside major international legal frameworks 
exposes the erroneous assumptions and structural contradictions of donor-managed 
repatriation programmes, and highlights the agency and resilience of forced migrants who 
rely on their own independent means to device solutions to their problems, regardless of 
the decisions and actions of governments or supra-national institutions (Hendrie, 2001). 
In the past decade different studies have investigated the spontaneous returns and 
transnational livelihoods of refugee populations in the global South (Bakewell, 2002; 
Eastmond, 2006; Hammond, 2006; Stepputat, 2006; Horst, 2006; Monsutti, 2010). The 
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growing body of empirical and theoretical knowledge on the interaction between migrant 
return and transnationalism poses a number of questions to dominant institutional 
understandings and operational approaches to refugee return. Is return a sedentary and 
permanent end-state or a process that takes time and entails various degrees and forms of 
transnational mobility and livelihood strategies? Is it possible to establish absolute and 
exclusive distinctions between voluntary and involuntary migration? Should the refugees 
accommodate the bureaucratic categories adopted by the international refugee regime or 
should institutional approaches be revised to be more responsive to the experiences and 
needs of forced migrant populations? The discrepancy between assisted and unassisted 
returns is glossed over for political reasons, leading to inadequate knowledge and 
understanding of spontaneous return movements, their nature and dynamics, and their 
impact on the reconciliation and reconstruction of war-affected societies. Instead of 
ignoring or dismissing refugee spontaneous returns and other independent livelihood 
strategies as “unauthorised” or “irregular” activities because they go against states’ 
political and economic agendas (Hendrie, 1991), they could be included among the 
lessons to be learned in order to assist refugees to find durable solutions to their 
protracted displacement.  
 
This study of Iraqi refugees’ assisted and spontaneous return wishes to inform the 
academic and policy debates described above by demonstrating that in the absence of 
sufficient external assistance and institutional permanent solutions, the Iraqi forced 
migrants resort to transnational livelihoods as alternative survival strategies that allow 
them to overcome their immediate problems and explore opportunities for the future. 
Iraqi refugees’ transnational mobility and livelihoods constitute a precondition for their 
sustainable return and a means to better not only returnees’ living conditions but also the 
socio-economic wellbeing of home and host communities through the continuous flow of 
economic, social and human capital.  The home and the host governments and the 
international refugee regime should facilitate instead of deterring or preventing refugees’ 
transnational mobility, especially if such movements are the expression of forced 
migrants’ informed and free will and their response to unbearable structural forces and 
barriers that impinge on their fundamental human rights.  This is one of the key 
arguments presented in greater depth in the chapters of the thesis outlined below. 
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is organised in eight chapters. Chapter two presents the theoretical framework 
built to answer the main research question of this thesis.  The framework combines 
International Relations theories with transnational approaches in Migration Studies to 
develop a multi-level analysis of Iraqis’ return. From International Relations and 
Geography the framework borrows the macro-scale analytical concepts of regional 
geopolitics, regimes and governamentaliy to examine the structural and normative 
context of Iraqis’ displacement and return. It draws upon transnational approaches in 
Migration Studies to explore the nature and dynamics of refugee return through a micro-
level analysis of individual and collective actors’ reactions to existing structural and 
normative factors, their decision-making processes and transnational migration patterns.  
 
Chapter three introduces the methodological approach that has been adopted in the design 
and implementation of the research. The methodological discussion includes the choice 
of research question, the sources of qualitative and quantitative data used in the study, the 
research settings in Syria and Jordan, access to and recruitment of research participants, 
sampling techniques and the profiles of the Iraqi research participants, and the main 
research methods adopted for the study. The chapter concludes with a reflection of the 
ethical and methodological challenges faced in the research including my own experience 
of expulsion from Syria.  
 
Chapter three sets the historical context of the displacement and return of Iraqi refugees 
generated by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. It reviews the last four decades of Iraqi 
history and argues that population displacement has been systematically used as a nation-
building and governance tool in Iraq. Understanding the causes and nature of refugee 
return in the post-2003 Iraqi context requires a detailed analysis of the multiple patterns 
of displacement of various Iraqi social groups over the past four decades of Saddam 
Hussein’s Ba’ath regime (1968-2003). These more recent episodes are directly related to 
the post-2003 political and economic transformations in Iraq and have forged the life 
experiences and migratory patterns of the Iraqi participants in this study.  
 
Chapter five examines the interaction between the international refugee regime and 
regional and national asylum and migration management regimes within which the Iraqi 
refugee displacement takes shape. The chapter finds that the Jordanian and the Syrian 
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governments govern refugee populations in their territories through a migration 
management regime which developed out of past experiences with refugee flows in the 
region and traditional practice and custom. The two host states have not ratified the 1951 
Geneva Convention and have limited resources to provide protection and assistance to 
high numbers of forced migrants. Consequently the Syrian and the Jordanian authorities 
have incorporated ‘selective’ mobility in their strategic management of the Iraqi 
protracted displacement, treating the Iraqi people as ‘guests’ or ‘migrants’ with 
temporary humanitarian needs. The two host states have not adhered to and incorporated 
international refugee law standards in their national normative systems partly due to the 
historical geopolitical disputes surrounding the formation of the international refugee 
regime, and partly due to differences between the dominant actors in the international 
refugee regime and regional state actors in terms of strategic interests in related foreign 
and domestic policy areas such as national security, economic growth and development.   
 
Chapter six explores the relationship between refugee return and transnationalism, in the 
context of the Iraqi refugees’ protracted displacement in Syria and Jordan. The analysis is 
theoretically informed by transnational migration approaches that challenge sedentary 
and permanent conceptions of return and conceive it as a complex process that unfolds 
over a long period of time and entails various degrees and modalities of transnational 
mobility, identities, social networks, and livelihoods, influencing the socio-economic 
development of the ‘transmigrants’ and of their host and home societies. The findings 
confirm previous studies stressing the importance of transnational migration to ensure the 
sustainable return of forced migrants to war affected societies undergoing profound 
political and socio-economic transformations and supports calls for the incorporation of 
legal international migration opportunities into traditional policy frameworks aimed at 
facilitating the safe and dignified return of refugee populations.   
 
Chapter seven investigates the role of communication and information in the context of 
Iraqi refugees' displacement and return from Syria and Jordan. The chapter argues that 
the lack of institutional information in the Iraqi refugees’ context is partly due to the 
limited institutional presence and operational capacity in Iraq as well as to problems of 
cross-institutional information-sharing and cooperation. The provision of institutional 
information, or the lack thereof, can also be seen as a governance tool adopted by state 
and non-state actors to control and manage the Iraqi displaced and indirectly steer their 
15 
 
 
 
unassisted return and cross-border mobility in the region. The field evidence presented in 
this chapter lends critical empirical content to address theoretical questions about 
processes of production and communication of knowledge and information in situations 
of conflict and displacement. The findings highlight the agency of refugees and 
beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance, who, compensated for the lack of reliable 
institutional information and advice, with their informal information and communication 
systems based on the use of modern information and communication technologies and 
their transnational mobility and social networks.  
  
Chapter eight summarises the key research findings and proposes answers to the various 
questions addressed in this research. It syntheses the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of this multi-disciplinary study, discusses its most evident strengths and 
limitations and concludes with some suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Explaining refugee return and transnationalism 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework developed to answer the main research 
question of this thesis: what are the causes and nature of refugee return in the context of 
the Iraqi refugees displaced to Syria and Jordan after the 2003 US-led occupation of Iraq? 
To address this question the framework combines International Relations theories with 
transnational approaches in Migration Studies, to develop a multi-level analysis of: (1) 
the global and regional geopolitics shaping migration and asylum regimes in the Middle 
East; (2) the impact of such regimes on Iraqis’ displacement and return (3) Iraqis’ 
reactions to existing policy interventions, their decision-making processes and practices 
of return. 
 
International Relations and Geography lend to the framework the macro-scale analytical 
concepts of regional geopolitics, regimes and governmentality to examine the structural 
and normative context of Iraqis’ displacement and return. Transnational approaches in 
Migration Studies are employed to explore the nature and dynamics of refugee return 
through a micro-level analysis of individual and collective actors’ reactions to existing 
structural and normative factors, their decision-making processes and migratory 
behaviours.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section two provides a definition of the concept 
of regionalism and a discussion of regional inter-state cooperation on refugee issues. 
Section three is dedicated to the concept of regimes and to the complex interaction 
between international and national asylum and migration systems. Section four presents 
the notion of governmentality and explores the application of this concept to study the 
policies and practices adopted by state and non-state actors to manage migrant and 
refugee groups in different contexts.  Section five introduces transnational approaches in 
Migration Studies, and their conceptual and empirical contribution to understanding the 
nature and dynamics of return migration. The transnational turn in Migration Studies 
challenges sedentary and permanent understandings of return and highlights the links 
between migrant return and transnationalism. Another important contribution made by 
transnational migration perspectives is the emphasis on the blurred distinction between 
‘voluntary and ‘involuntary’ migrants and the mixed motivations driving migratory 
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behaviours in an increasingly globalised world. Section seven offers some concluding 
remarks. 
2.2 Regionalism and transnational migration 
Both 'region' and 'regionalism' are fuzzy concepts and the definitions of these terms have 
been subject of academic debates since the late 1960s. As Hurrell explained (1995:39) 
geographical proximity and contiguity are helpful criteria to distinguish regionalism from 
other forms of 'less than global' organisation but they do not provide a useful tool to 
understand the more social and cultural aspects and dynamics of regions and regionalism:  
 
There are no 'natural' regions and definitions of 'region' and indicators of 'regioness' vary 
according to the particular problem or question under investigation. Moreover it is how 
political actors perceive and interpret the idea of a 'region' and notions of 'regioness' that 
is critical: all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested. This makes 
it especially important to distinguish between regionalism as description and regionalism 
as prescription - regionalism as a moral position or as a doctrine as to how international 
relations ought to be organised.  
 
Regionalism has often been analysed in terms of the degree of social cohesiveness 
(ethnicity, race, religion, culture, history, consciousness of a common heritage); 
economic cohesiveness (trade patterns, economic complementarity), political 
cohesiveness (regime type, ideology), and organisational cohesiveness (existence of 
formal regional institutions). Hurrell (1995) lists five variants of regionalism based on the 
processes that lead to the emergence of different regional arrangements and on the nature 
of those arrangements: 1) regionalisation, 2) regional awareness and identity, 3) regional 
inter-state cooperation, 4) state promoted regional integration and 5) regional cohesion. 
 
Regionalism is also examined in terms of patterns of economic and political 
interdependence, and the extent to which that interdependence (and the real or perceived 
possibility of its disruption) leads to the establishment of institutions that facilitate inter-
state cooperation and reduce the potential costs on the regional and international actors 
involved (Keohane and Nye, 1989). For actors outside the region, regionalism is 
significant both in economic and political terms. In economic terms regionalism could be 
detrimental if regional actors develop preferential arrangements with some extra-regional 
partners to the detriment of others. At a political level changes in regional geopolitics can 
bring about a redistribution of political power at an international level. For those inside 
the region, regionalism matters when exclusion from regional arrangements results in 
costs, either at an economic or political level (such as reduced economic interactions or 
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limited foreign policy options and influence in the region), or when the region becomes 
the organising unit for policy making for states within the region across a range of 
important issues.  The high degree of complex interdependence among states within a 
region drives states’ attempts and efforts to cooperate in a number of policy areas of 
common concern (Keohane and Nye, 1989). In the experience of various supranational 
institutions such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional integration 
is driven by economic interests and interactions. As flows of goods, capital, services and 
people across regional borders increase, so states' political performance and actions 
assume greater reciprocal influence and impact.  In most regions, cross-border flows of 
goods and economic capital are the first to be welcomed by states, while the transnational 
movement of people is usually the final, and often the most controversial stage of 
regional integration processes (Betts, 2009).  
 
The Middle East, however, seems to be an exception to the rule, in that transnational 
mobility of labour has been a powerful driver of regional economic integration (Shafik, 
1998). The financial remittances generated by migrant workers in periods of economic 
boom in the 1970s and 1980s have been a critical determinant of integration by providing 
a mutually beneficial mechanism for sharing the oil wealth of the labour-importing oil-
rich states across the region, while creating employment opportunities for the 
underutilised human resources from the oil-poor labour-exporting countries (Birks et al., 
1986; Shafik, 1998; Thiollet, 2011). Moreover voluntary and involuntary population 
movements in the Arab Muslim world have factored in the development of trans-regional 
and transnational awareness and identities like pan-Arabism and a sense of belonging to 
an Islamic community that transcends nation-state borders (Shami, 1993; 1996; Mufti, 
1996; Barnet, 1996; Sheikh, 2003). These transnational socio-cultural structures were 
built and consolidated over the centuries, long before the advent of colonial rule in the 
Middle East, and have survived and evolved in reaction to processes of nation-state 
formation and de-colonisation (Shami, 1993; 1996; Jankowski and Gershoni, 1997). 
Studies of conflict, dispossession and forced migration in the Middle East highlight how 
transnational linkages such as those created by Arab nationalism, are salient in shaping 
identity, attributing mutual responsibility and informing geographical trajectories of 
migration flows (Suhrke, 1999; Chatty, 2010; Phoenix, 2012). As will be discussed in the 
following section the predominantly regional nature of forced and voluntary migration in 
19 
 
 
 
the Middle East places it among the key areas of institutional interaction and joint 
intervention among states and other actors in the region.  
2.3 Institutional cooperation in the area of asylum and migration 
Forced migration is an inherently regional phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold War, 
the majority of the world's refugees are produced in developing regions of the global 
South and remain confined within the same region, in neighbouring countries of asylum. 
Developed countries in the north have increasingly adopted restrictive asylum and 
migration policies to prevent and control the inflow of asylum seekers and refugees in 
their territories. Refugee and IDP movements are generally a manifestation of conflicts 
with regional dimensions and spill-over effects. For instance, the conflicts in the 1990s in 
the Balkans, in West Africa and the Great Lakes region cannot be analysed in isolation 
from the broader regional context (Loescher et al., 2007). Refugee flows are increasingly 
perceived by host and home states, as a source of regional insecurity and a socio-
economic burden on host societies (Loescher and Milner, 2005; Loescher et al., 2007).  
  
Some scholars regard the provision of protection and durable solutions to refugees and 
IDPs as a global public good since the security benefits stemming from one state's 
provision of protection and material assistance to the forced migrant population accrue to 
the international community as a whole, irrespective of whether international donor states 
share the responsibility and the economic burden of protection (Suhrke, 1999; Hathaway, 
1997; 2003). Other scholars, however, argue that the provision of protection and durable 
solutions to refugee problems may be more appropriately considered a regional rather 
than a global good because the security and humanitarian benefits that result from a given 
state's contribution to refugee and IDP protection are usually specific to a given region 
and enjoyed mainly by neighbouring states, regardless of whether they share the 
responsibility and the costs of refugee protection (Betts, 2008; 2009).  
 
Given the regional character of forced migration, states within a region often attempt to 
cooperate and establish shared asylum and migration policy frameworks. Regional 
cooperation in the area of forced migration has generally emerged as a result of pre-
existing structures of regional cooperation in other issue-areas such as trade and the cross 
border flow of capital, goods and labour. Different regions and regional actors establish 
different cooperative arrangements and achieve various degrees of cooperation in the area 
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of asylum and migration management depending on the degree of regional integration 
and the level of institutionalisation and centralisation of authority. Betts (2009) identified 
five main varieties of regional cooperation in the area of forced migration: 1) common 
legal frameworks, 2) ad hoc cooperation 3) policy harmonisation, 4) informal dialogue 5) 
and coalition bargaining. Regional actors such as the European Union (EU), the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have played an increasingly critical role in influencing international refugee 
policy frameworks and providing funding and technical expertise in humanitarian and 
relief interventions in regional refugee crises.  The international refugee regime is based 
on the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees, an international legal 
instrument that was originally conceived as a regional treaty, with its geographical and 
temporal coverage limited to the refugees generated in Europe before 1951.  The spatial 
and temporal scope of this treaty was expanded by the 1967 Protocol that extended the 
right to seek asylum to refugees generated outside Europe after 1951. The recognition 
that forced migration patterns vary in different regions, led to the creation of additional 
regional instruments to supplement the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In 1969 
the OAU adopted a refugee treaty for Africa, which differs from the 1951 Convention as 
it grants refugee status to those fleeing not only persecution but also generalised violence. 
The African Union has also developed an African Union Convention on Internally 
Displaced Persons, the first form of regional multilateral legal framework on IDP issues 
that draws on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Betts, 2009). Another 
regional refugee treaty is the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, a non-binding agreement 
which was adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in 
Central America, Mexico and Panama, and which incorporates all of the aspects of the 
1951 Convention but also includes a range of detailed commitments to peace, 
democratisation, regional security and economic co-operation. In 2004, the European 
Council passed a directive on asylum, which went beyond the 1951 Convention, by 
ensuring access to protection for people who are persecuted by non-state actors and 
people fleeing gender-based violence. Furthermore, regional human rights instruments 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) sets standards that require 
the European states to ensure the protection of a range of people who may not necessarily 
fall under the category of political refugees. These regional legal frameworks and 
arrangements usually complement and reinforce – but sometimes also contradict and 
clash with - international principles and legal and normative frameworks for refugee and 
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IDP protection.  
 
The interaction between international and domestic norms and the mechanisms by which 
international norms are incorporated into domestic normative systems have been 
researched by some constructivist scholars in International Relations.  For instance, 
Checkel (1999) argued that states’ differential responses to the same international norms 
depend on the different processes of internalisation of such norms. Risse-Kappen et al. 
(1999) developed a comparative methodology to explain the variation of states’ 
commitment to and compliance with international human rights norms by focusing on the 
domestic political (e.g., regime type) and social (e.g., liberal democratic, totalitarian 
autocratic) structure of ten countries under investigation. In a study of states’ responses to 
international refugee norms, Gurowitz (2006) argued that states with insecure 
international identities such as Japan, are more responsive to international norms than 
countries with secure international identities such as Germany.   
 
Some other constructivist scholars have focused on the role of international organisations 
in producing and disseminating international norms and models of behaviour and political 
organisation in specific issue areas (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; 2001). For these 
scholars, international organisations constitute key agents of social construction and 
powerful promoters of particular normative views because they are commonly conferred 
authority, moral legitimacy, credibility and political neutrality. As a consequence, the 
normative standards and social models that they promote are received as efficient and 
effective.  Barnett and Finnemore (1999), however, have researched the 'pathologies' of 
international organisations, and shown how international organisations can become 
captives of bureaucratic inertia and conservative actors that resist institutional change and 
normative reform, making their organisational structure repressive, ineffective and even 
counterproductive. Finnemore (2001) argues that the constructivist research agenda in IR 
has mainly focused on the diffusion of so-called ‘good’ norms such as respect for human 
rights and for the environment and the promotion of ‘democracy’, while less research has 
focused on the disconnect and often tension between western-sponsored international 
norms and demands and local socio-cultural processes and normative structures.  
 
This study builds upon this line of inquiry but instead of limiting the analysis to the 
interaction between international and domestic ‘norms’ – shared expectations about 
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appropriate behaviour held by a collective of actors – (Checkel, 1999), it uses the broader 
concept of ‘regime’ as an analytical tool to investigate the interaction of international and 
national legal and normative frameworks for refugee protection and durable solutions, 
which determine the causes and nature of Iraqi refugees' return from Syria and Jordan. 
The next parts of this chapter will therefore offer a definition of regime and reflect on 
how this analytical tool is useful in investigating how international normative structures 
and arrangements for the protection and assistance of refugee populations have been 
incorporated into Syrian and Jordanian national policy frameworks to address refugee 
problems in their territories. The examination of the interaction between the international 
and regional regimes governing forced migration in the Middle East, and their impact on 
Syrian and Jordanian migration and asylum laws and policies, is essential to explain Iraqi 
refugees' return and transnational livelihoods. 
2.4 Regimes  
Compared to the concepts of region and regionalism, the definition of regime is less 
ambiguous and different academics offer compatible definitions of ‘regime’. Krasner 
(1983:2) has collated and consolidated the various understandings of regimes into the 
following definition:  
Regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
and implementing collective choice. This usage is consistent with other recent 
formulations. Keohane and Nye, for instance, define regimes as "sets of governing 
arrangements" that include "networks of rules, norms and procedures that regularise 
behaviour and control its effects".  Haas argues that a regime encompasses a mutually 
coherent set of procedures, rules and norms. Hedley Bull, using a somewhat different 
terminology, refers to the importance of rules and institutions in international society 
where rules refer to "general imperative principles which require or authorise prescribed 
classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways". Institutions for Bull help to 
secure adherence to rules by formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, 
interpreting, legitimating, and adapting them.  
 
Krasner (1983:4-5) stresses the distinction between principles and norms on the one hand, 
and rules and procedures on the other. Principles and norms constitute the defining 
characteristics of a regime. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes 
within regimes, while changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself. 
When norms and principles are altered or abandoned, the old regime either disappears 
from a given issue area or is replaced with a new one. A regime is weakened when 
principles, norms and decision making procedures become less coherent, or when the 
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regime-governed behaviours and practice are inconsistent with its principles. For 
instance, special or differential treatment of specific states within a regime is an indicator 
of the weakening of the regime, even if it has not been replaced by another structure.  
 
From a neo-realist structuralist perspective (Grieco, 1998; Mearsheimer, 1994) regimes 
have no independent causal impact on states’ behaviours and inter-state cooperation in 
specific issue areas. The concept of regime is criticised as misleading because it 
obfuscates the real drivers of state behaviour: interests and power relations. International 
regimes are dependent on the prevailing balance of power and state self-interest in the 
international system (Mearsheimer, 1994). As soon as there is a shift in power relations 
or in perceptions of national interest the arrangements negotiated by states within the 
regime are easily upset. As interests and power change, state behaviour changes too.  
 
Critics of the realist approach (Young, 1980; 1989), however, argue that regimes must be 
understood as more than temporary arrangements and ad hoc agreements. Indeed, 
regimes are established to facilitate a form of longer-term inter-state cooperation that is 
not driven by short-term calculations of self-interest. Regime-governed behaviour is not 
solely based on short-term calculations of interest because regimes encompass principles 
and norms that are the product of the social environment in which states interact and can 
constitute the basis of enduring inter-state cooperation out of a sense of mutual 
obligation, commitment, interdependence, and expectations of reciprocity. Young 
(1980:93-113) stresses that: ‘regimes are social institutions, […] and therefore human 
artifacts, whose distinguishing feature is the conjunction or convergence of expectations 
and recognised patterns of behaviour or practice’.   
 
Yet the question remains as to whether the concept of ‘regime’ is useful for investigating 
the causes and nature of Iraqis’ return from Syria and Jordan. This thesis argues that it is, 
because Iraqis’ return is taking place within a dynamic normative environment formed by 
the international refugee regime and the Syrian and Jordanian national migration regimes. 
To explain Iraqis’ return, therefore, it is necessary to understand how these regimes 
emerged, how they interact, and the consequences of their interaction for Iraqis’ return.  
 
These questions can be pursued by applying Young’s (1980) typology of regime 
formation: (1) regimes that emerge as spontaneous orders, (2) regimes that emerge as 
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negotiated orders and (3) regimes that emerge as imposed orders.   
 
(1) Regimes that emerge as spontaneous orders do not involve the conscious consent and 
agreement of participants, and are not formally expressed in the form of a contract. This 
typology of regimes is more common at a domestic than at an international level (Young, 
1980). Regimes that emerge as negotiated or imposed orders are instead prevalent in the 
international realm and are therefore discussed in greater length below.  
 
(2) Negotiated regimes result from conscious efforts to achieve an agreement among 
different participants and can take either the form of constitutional contracts or legislative 
bargains. Constitutional contracts imply the development of regimes that are directly 
negotiated by the actors affected by such regimes. Legislative bargains instead are not 
directly negotiated by the affected actors who are only represented, more or less 
effectively, in the negotiations. The effectiveness of the representation depends on the 
existence of mechanisms to ensure high levels of accountability and transparency in the 
relationship between the affected actors and their representatives. The analysis of 
negotiated regimes requires a special focus on the institutional bargaining process 
(Young, 1989; 1991), especially on potentially disruptive dynamics such as disputes 
regarding participants’ position and role in the negotiations, the contents and agenda of 
the negotiations, problems of free riding and the absence of effective enforcement 
mechanisms that can lead to disagreements on the terms of a negotiated order and 
therefore prevent the formation or the efficient implementation of regimes.  
 
(3) Regimes emerged as imposed orders, instead, are designed and promoted by a 
dominant actor or a group of dominant actors, often without the explicit consent of 
subordinate actors and in the absence of a unanimous formal expression of legitimacy. 
Young (1980) divides the category of imposed regimes into two sub-categories: overt 
hegemony and de facto imposition. Overt hegemony entails one or more dominant actors 
openly and explicitly formulating institutional arrangements and forcing the subordinate 
actors to comply with them.  
 
De facto imposed orders occur when the dominant actors establish self-serving 
institutional arrangements and induce other actors to conform to the terms of these 
imposed orders through a combination of co-option and through the manipulation of 
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political and economic incentives. Young (1980:101) observes that the analysis of 
imposed regimes relies on the traditional power-politics paradigm, which is theoretically 
and empirically contested by some critical International Relations theorists who assert 
that imposed regimes are not necessarily sustained through the use of military power but 
through other mechanisms of hegemonic power (Cox, 1983; O’Meara, 1984; Keeley, 
1990). From his part, Young clarifies that imposed regimes are not necessarily sustained 
through the use of force. Once imposed orders have been established they are 
consolidated trough institutionalisation processes: actors’ obedience and subordination 
can be nurtured through less coercive forms of hegemonic power relying on the structural 
and cognitive components of institutionalised social relationships (Young, 1980). Cox 
(1983:172) explains that the naturalisation of hegemonic world orders takes place, inter 
alia, through international organisations, which constitute powerful mechanisms of 
hegemony because they:  
 
(1) embody the rules of the expansion of the hegemonic world order; (2) they are 
themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they ideologically legitimate 
the norms of the hegemonic world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral and 
developing countries and (5) they absorb and inhibit counter-hegemonic ideas.  
 
Similarly to other social institutions, regimes take on a life of their own and develop 
feedback mechanisms that reproduce and reinforce the interests and power-dynamics that 
led to their creation and persistence (Young, 1980). The predominance of negotiated 
orders in the international system should not divert attention from the fact that the most 
successful imposed orders have not been necessarily characterised by the continuous use 
of force (Young, 1980). Hegemonic power entails significant costs in terms of creating 
sufficient resources and incentives to ensure subordinate actors’ conformity and to 
prevent deviant behaviours that could upset the established order and undermine the 
interests and power base of the dominant actors (Young, 1991). The typology of regimes 
and orders identified by Young are not mutually exclusive and overtime imposed regimes 
may become less expensive as they are absorbed and accepted by the subordinate actors 
and eventually codified into a negotiated regime.    
 
Why is it important whether international regimes emerge as spontaneous, negotiated or 
imposed orders? It is important because it has implications in terms of the degree of 
actors’ adherence and conformity to the regime and ultimately in terms of the outcomes 
of the interaction between international and national normative systems. Young’s theory 
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of regime formation and his typology of regimes are a useful analytical tool to explain the 
emergence and interaction of the regimes shaping Iraqis’ displacement and return from 
Syria and Jordan. Perhaps the greatest merit of this explanatory framework is that it 
emphasises that regimes are social institutions, which may not necessarily function as 
places of cooperative and voluntary interactions but may be sites of non-cooperation, 
contestation and struggle.  Young also offers an important contribution by highlighting 
that the actors involved in the design and implementation of international regimes are not 
only states but also non-state actors such as UN agencies and other transnational private 
entities (Young, 1980). His explanatory framework, however, does not offer further 
guidance to identify the actors participating in international regimes and the patterns and 
outcomes of their interaction, especially in cases of actors’ non-adherence to international 
regimes.  
 
This gap in the explanatory framework could be filled with the categories of actors that 
Keeley (1990) developed in his Foucauldian analysis of neo-liberal regimes. He argued 
that neo-liberal institutionalist approaches assume, and to a large extent prescribe, that 
international regimes are benevolent and legitimate institutional arrangements and that all 
actors see as the most desirable and legitimate the interests of the dominant actors in the 
international regime (Keeley, 1990:84). This approach does not allow for the existence of 
disagreement, for alternative and competing views, and obscures how regimes may 
actually be perceived by non-conforming actors. His alternative approach to regime 
theory instead identifies four groups of actors which have different status and exhibit 
different degrees of conformity to a certain regime: the conformist and accepting actors, 
the free riders, the non-conformist and deviant actors, and the outsiders (Keeley, 
1990:97).   
 
1) The first group comprises actors who willingly accept and cooperate with the regime. 
Their disputes may be of technical nature or over relative positions. Although they accept 
both the hegemonic power and its discursive and physical apparatus, their disputes with 
other actors in the regime may lead to its erosion. If the hegemonic power fails to provide 
a convincing discourse and its techniques prove ineffective in managing a specific issue-
area, this will lead to the emergence of new discourses and pressures to change the 
regime or to save it through revision and transformation of some of its components.  
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2) The second group is formed by the so-called free riders, the actors who recognise the 
regime as legitimate but who want others to bear the costs of supporting it, while they do 
not help maintain it themselves. These actors may undermine the regime by reducing its 
capability to manage a specific issue-area or by creating the conditions for disputes over 
problems of burden-sharing both in terms of costs and responsibilities.  
 
3) The third group is constituted by the non-conforming and deviant actors, who resist 
and challenge the order on the basis of subjugated or alternative forms of knowledge and 
networks of relations. Although these actors refuse to participate or want to break free 
from the regime, they are contained within the regime’s community and they are 
vulnerable to pressures from the dominant actors to comply with the regime 
requirements. If they do not conform they risk being punished or isolated by the 
supporters of the regime.    
 
4) The fourth group is formed by the outsiders, communities organised in other public 
spaces and spheres of influence. These actors may strain a regime by providing 
alternative resources and associations for freedom-seeking actors, or competing forms of 
knowledge that can destroy or alter the dominant regime. These actors are also targets for 
regime expansion.  
 
These four-fold typology of actors can be used in the case of Iraqis’ displacement and 
return to identify the key actors, the dynamics of their interaction, and the outcomes and 
consequences in terms of the level and modalities of cooperation between different actors 
in the implementation of the principles, norms and procedures of the international refugee 
regime in a specific geopolitical context. Keeley (1990) indicates that the same actors 
may be simultaneously members of different but overlapping regimes, and that this could 
lead them to pursue contradicting policies, whether because of domestic policy 
incoherence or because the regimes are incompatible and the actors do not conform with 
one regime while they support the other. The existence of regime complexity, with 
multiple, overlapping, parallel or nested institutions (Betts, 2010) allows states to engage 
in cross-institutional strategies (Alter and Meunier, 2009), such as strategically choosing 
between multiple competing institutions. Alter and Meunier (2009) identified three types 
of cross-institutional strategies facilitated by regime complexity: regime shifting, forum 
shopping and strategic inconsistency. Regime shifting occurs when states move from 
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addressing problems through a regime to addressing the same problems through an 
alternative parallel regime, possibly relocating the most relevant policies for a given 
issue-area from one regime to another. Forum shopping occurs where actors select the 
international venues based on where they are best able to promote specific policy 
preferences. Strategic inconsistency occurs where contradictory rules are created in a 
parallel regime with the intention of undermining a rule in another institutional 
arrangement. These different forms of strategic behaviour will be applied in the empirical 
investigation of the interaction between the international refugee regime and the national 
migration and asylum systems of Syria and Jordan, two states non- signatories of the 
1951 Geneva Convention Related to the Status of Refugees.  
 
The theoretical framework developed above is useful in investigating why and how 
international and regional actors interact more or less cooperatively to deal with refugee 
problems in the Middle East. Yet this framework is less helpful in investigating the forms 
of knowledge that inform states and other institutional actors’ attitudes, policies and 
practices towards refugee and migrant populations. Institutional attitudes and practices 
towards the refugees can be better investigated using the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality that has been applied in recent years to highlight the subtle modes of 
migration governance used by states and other institutional and non-institutional actors 
that exercise forms of power other than physical coercion and laws to manage migrant 
populations (Foucault, 1991). The concept of governmentality and its application to the 
Iraqi case study is discussed in the following section.  
2.5 Governmentality  
The notion of governmentality was developed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault 
in a series of lectures given at the Collège de France in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 
governmentality Foucault (1991:102) meant three things: 
 
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and techniques that allow the exercise of this specific albeit complex form of 
power, which has as its target population, as its principal  form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.  
 
2. The tendency which, over a prolonged period and throughout the West, has steadily led 
towards the pre-eminence over all other forms of this type of power which may be termed 
government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific 
governmental apparatuses and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of 
savoirs.  
 
29 
 
 
 
3. The process, or rather, the result of the process, through which the state of justice of 
the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalised'.  
 
In his investigation, he used the term ‘governmentality’ interchangeably with the 
expression ‘governmental rationality’. He referred to government as ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ (Gordon, 1991:4) or as the power of shaping, guiding and steering the conduct 
of individuals and populations through the use of a set of non-coercive and non-violent 
activities, practices, techniques and technologies that ‘without the full awareness of the 
people, will make possible the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of population flows 
into certain regions and activities, etc.’ (Foucault, 1991:100). The idea of government in 
its broad sense comprises any form of control and guidance at the level of the self or the 
individual, at the level of relations and interactions within social institutions and 
communities as well as civil-state relations. The aims of government are not necessarily 
achieved through laws but through a range of direct or indirect multi-form tactics and 
techniques and the aim of government rests in the things it orders and manages and in the 
perfecting of the processes which it directs (Foucault, 1991:95-96). Rationality 
corresponds to a way of knowing and thinking about the nature of government, including 
questions about who can govern and how, and what governmental practices consist of 
and who is the object of government.  
 
The conceptualisation of government as ‘conduct of conduct’ emerged from Foucault’s 
observations and reflections about the interplay between power and knowledge and its 
connection with the idea of political sovereignty. For Foucault the state is not the source 
but the end product of decentred power relations that traverse the whole social body. 
Power does not emanate from a single centre and government is not exercised only by 
state apparatuses, but by a range of other social actors, including religious and civil 
society organisations, professional and voluntary associations, the market as well as 
individuals themselves. Moreover power is not only exercised over others, it is also self-
discipline and control. Foucault identified forms of oppression and domination generally 
associated with manifestations of power, but he argued that power has not only a negative 
and violent nature it is also productive. In an interview with Fontana and Pasquino, he 
asked this rhetorical question (Foucault 1980:119): 
 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you 
really think that people would be brought to obey it? What makes power be accepted is 
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not simply is prohibitive force but that it traverses and produces things, it induces 
pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a 
productive network that runs through the whole social body and, much more than a 
negative instance whose function is repression.  
 
Power is productive in the sense that certain discourses – understood as modes of 
interpretation and representation of reality (Campbell, 1992) - prevail over others 
constituting some subjective positions as the natural ones. Actors and actions therefore do 
not exist outside discourse, they are produced through discourse. The production and 
dissemination of specific forms of knowledge is an integral aspect of power. Power is 
exercised when states and other institutional actors manage to establish themselves as the 
main repositories of knowledge, which enables them to govern a specific issue. Speaking 
from a position of knowledge means exercising authority over a given issue (Kalm, 
2010).  
 
This implies that power can also be exercised through the shaping of ways of knowing, 
understanding, thinking and behaving in a way that is consistent with the will of those 
who govern. Hence, governmentality as the 'conduct of conduct' comprises not only the 
measures of influence that affect behaviours directly by force or by law, but also indirect 
and less visible techniques that work on individuals' self-regulation (Kalm, 2010). The 
study of these less visible and indirect techniques is critical because it is often through 
these implicit governmental practices that enduring forms of domination are established 
and maintained (Foucault, 1991).  
 
A common objection that Foucault has received from exponents of the Marxist left is that 
his concept of governmentality focused on power relations and on the detailed techniques 
and practices of power over individuals and failed to address or shed light on global 
politics or the relations between the state and the wider society (Gordon, 1991). 
Foucault’s response to this criticism was that there was no methodological discontinuity 
between the micro- and macro-physical dimensions of power and that the same analytical 
approach used to study techniques and practices for governing individuals within 
particular local institutions such as prisons and clinics could also be used to study 
techniques and practices used for governing populations of subjects and over an entire 
society (Gordon, 1991). The concept of governmentality has indeed been applied by a 
number of scholars to study the less visible and yet extremely powerful practices of 
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government devised by states and other institutional actors to govern migrant and refugee 
populations.  
2.5.1 The governmentality of forced migration 
A number of social scientists have built upon the work of Foucault on governmentality 
and offered interesting theoretical and empirical applications of this concept in their 
studies of voluntary and forced migration. Painter (2006) problematises the essentialised 
conception of the state and the oppositional relationship between state and society and 
advocates for an anti-essentialist approach that critically assesses dominant 
understandings and conceptions of the state that influence methodologies in migration 
research. Hyndman and Mountz (2007) investigate the strategic 'absence' of the state as 
an explicit strategy of refugee control and exclusion through the systematic positioning of 
the migrants 'outside' official categories, where moral and legal protection mechanisms 
are ambiguous or suspended. The strategic non-presence of states enables government 
authorities to simultaneously commit to a range of international agreements concerning 
the rights of migrants (so as to be recognised and applauded by the international 
community) while at the same time avoiding the responsibilities inherent in these 
agreements through the maintenance of zones of legal ambiguity and uncertainty.   
 
The focus on the strategic 'absence' of the state opens new lines of inquiry concerning the 
interaction between migrants and other actors involved in migration governance whose 
identities, subjective positions and decision making processes are constituted as sites of 
social struggle, dispute and resistance and are affected by everyday societal processes of 
inclusion and exclusion (Silvey, 2007). The subjective positions, identities and 
experiences of migrants and refugees are discursively produced and contested by 
institutional knowledge and culture (Duvell and Jordan, 2003) through the language used 
to discuss and debate asylum and migration-related issues (Malkki, 1996); through media 
depictions of asylum seekers and refugees and their representation in policy documents 
(Cwerner, 2004; Finney and Robinson, 2008) as well as the spatial, temporal and 
bureaucratic management of refugee and migrant populations (Hyndman, 2000; Weber, 
2003; Gill 2010). 
 
The constitution of subjectivities is not only a discursive process; it has also material 
aspects and empirical manifestations observable in physical surroundings. 
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Poststructuralist researchers (Epstein et al., 1999; Epstein, 2007) have studied how 
biometric passports, visa restrictions, and the way entry is regulated at airports govern 
who gains access and how one should look and act to gain such access. Material 
technologies such as the incorporation of chips into passports, online applications for 
entry into a country, large data bases containing huge amounts of information function 
together with discourses and policies in migration governance to affect the decision-
making processes and behaviours of migrant and refugee populations. The combination 
of these political rationalities, techniques and technologies can elicit the emergence and 
dominance of certain forms of knowledge and interpretation of the asylum and migration 
experience over others (Kalm, 2010) and can prompt the migrants and other stakeholders 
to conducting themselves in ways consistent with the agendas of powerful interest groups 
that control national and international migration and refugee regimes (Lippert, 1999).  
 
The notion of governmentality offers a way to explain how individual and collective 
subjectivities and behaviours in asylum and refugee contexts can be elicited by the state, 
not through legal or coercive activities, but by creating within subjects the desire to 
conduct themselves in a specific manner. Such an ability goes beyond the conventional 
forms of governance that rely upon legal and coercive means and financial incentives to 
direct the self-disciplining of individuals, to encompass forms of power such as 
persuasion, seduction and ideological indoctrination, which generate a deeper degree of 
self-identification and regulation among subjects (Gill, 2010).   
 
The concept of governmentality can be applied to investigate the non-coercive and 
indirect techniques and mechanisms characterising the national and international regimes 
that govern the Iraqi refugee displacement in Syria and Jordan. From a governmentality 
perspective not only governments but the whole range of actors, who can be both 
individuals and institutions, produce discourses that inform policies and structure 
behaviour. Behaviour is partly determined by legal and normative structures but it is also 
the product of a set of informal assumptions, beliefs and attitudes that nourish legal and 
policy frameworks. Hence, to understand the causes and nature of Iraqi refugees’ return 
from Syria and Jordan it is necessary to explore the governmental techniques of the 
migration and asylum regimes in these two countries and in the rest of the Middle East.  
 
In the Iraqi displacement context, the home and host states and the international aid and 
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development organisations have managed the Iraqi displaced and steered their return and 
cross-border mobility in the region through the provision, or the lack thereof, of 
assistance and information. Institutional actors have played a critical role as producers 
and disseminators of particular understandings of the Iraqi forced migration experience 
and such ‘expert’ knowledge and information have been the basis of policies and 
practices. The Iraqi people have been discursively constituted by the home and host states 
and the international refugee regime as ‘refugees’ ‘guests’, ‘brothers’ and ‘temporary 
residents’ and these bureaucratic categories formed the vocabulary not only of 
government officials, policy-makers and international humanitarian actors but also of the 
Iraqi people themselves who, more or less consciously, identify with the categories 
constructed for them, reproduce and perpetuate them, but can also manipulate such 
categories to achieve personal aims.   
 
In his 1978 lectures on biopolitics and governmentality, Foucault presented the idea of 
the ‘strategic reversibility of power relations’ and argued that modern biopolitics generate 
a new kind of counter-politics. As governmental practices exercise themselves in 
everyday life by shaping and steering individual conduct, individuals have the agency and 
capacity to turn around the terms of prevailing governmental practices and reformulate 
these terms to render them consistent with the needs and imperatives of their lives. This 
strategic reversal of power relations is the basis for political and social resistance and 
counter-demands. Thus those forced migrants who have conventionally been depicted in 
a subordinate position of power as voiceless victims and passive recipients of external 
'assistance' (Malkki, 1996), can instead find the way to instrumentalise the refugee and 
migration discourses and policies created to manage them to pursue their interests and 
needs, and doing so they actively participate in the transformation of existing power 
structures that affect their lives and behaviours.   
 
The analytical instruments of governmentality, regimes and regional geopolitics 
presented above serve to produce a macro-level explanation of the causes and dynamics 
of Iraqi refugees’ return by focusing on the relations and interactions between states and 
international institutional actors which govern global asylum and migration regimes and 
the meso-level legal and normative environment within which refugees’ lives unfold in 
the host countries.  
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The great challenge in the study of migration in general, and refugee return in particular, 
is to develop a theoretical and empirical research linking the macro-structural context (i.e. 
state and supra-state actors and processes) to micro-level phenomena (i.e. individual 
agency, choices, experiences and actions). This research addresses this difficulty by 
complementing the analysis of the regional geopolitical context and the national and 
international migration and asylum regimes shaping Iraqi refugees’ displacement and 
return, with transnational migration perspectives, developed by anthropologists and 
geographers, which offer a micro analysis of forced migrants’ individual choices, 
experiences and responses to normative and structural factors. The next section 
introduces transnational approaches in migration research.  
2.6 Migrant transnationalism 
Migrant transnationalism is a conceptual framework that was developed by scholars of 
Anthropology in the United States (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Glick Schiller et al., 1999) 
following the fall of the Soviet Union and the concomitant global expansion of the 
capitalist economic system rejoining the western and eastern blocks. However, it has 
rapidly gained ground as a theoretical lens both within British and European 
Anthropology (Vertovec, 1999; Faist, 2000; Kivisto, 2001).  
 
In Anthropology, Nina Glick Shiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton were 
among the first to use the term 'transnationalism' to describe immigrants' way of life 
across-borders and their maintainance of sustained 'ties to home, even when their 
countries of origin and settlement are geographically distant' (Glick Schiller et al., 
1992:ix). They coined the term ‘transmigrants’ to refer to ‘migrants who establish and 
maintain a multiplicity of familial, economic, social, organisational, religious, and 
political relations that span borders’ (Glick Schiller et al., 1992:ix). This definition was 
followed by a number of conceptualisations that capture variations of transnationalism 
such as:  transnational social fields (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004), transnational 
communities (Vertovec, 1999) , transnational social formations (Smith and Guarnizo, 
1998) transnational social spaces (Faist, 2000; Pries, 1999) and transnational social 
networks (Koser, 1997).    
 
Migrant transnationalism was initially presented as a new phenomenon distinguishable in 
scope and nature from previous migration experiences (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; 
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Schiller et al., 1992). Other scholars, however (Foner, 1997; Kivisto, 2001) recognised 
the growing scope and density of contemporary migration flows but also highlighted 
significant continuities with migration patterns in earlier eras. The various views have 
finally concurred that transnationalism is not a new phenomenon but a new analytical 
framework that allows overcoming some deep rooted biases in the study of international 
migration (Portes, 2003).  
 
One of the biases confronted by transnational approaches is methodological nationalism.  
Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003:576) define methodological nationalism as ‘the 
naturalisation of the nation-state by the social sciences’. The epistemological and 
methodological positions prevailing in western social sciences in general and Migration 
Studies in particular have been strongly influenced by processes of modern nation-state 
formation. As a result, populations were studied as sedentary, bounded units, 'rooted' in 
the soil of the homeland where they cultivate a specific system of traditions and socio-
cultural values institutionalised through the status of citizenship (Levitt and Nyberg-
Sørensen, 2004). The hegemony of the nation-state project is evident in the 
predominantly sedentary, territorially-bounded and homogenising perceptions of culture, 
society and migration, which underlined theories of migrant assimilation and ethnic 
pluralism dominant in Europe and in the US until the late 1980s (Wimmer and Glick 
Schiller, 2003). This reasoning underpinned the assumption that migrants’ gradual 
integration in the host countries coincided with the abandonment of ties with the 
homeland (Park, 1950; Cassarino, 2004). The state-centric view has led to the creation of 
exclusive and dichotomous categories such as ‘citizen’ or ‘denizen’ or ‘alien’; ‘emigrant’ 
or ‘immigrant’, ‘temporary migrant’ or ‘permanent migrant’; and ‘settler’ or ‘returnee’ 
depending on the formal status, place of final destination and the duration of the 
migration experience.  
 
Transnationalism, in contrast, examines social reality from above the nation-state box and 
acknowledges the growing economic, socio-political and environmental 
interconnectedness and interdependence between migrant source and destination 
countries (Smith, 1999). It redirects the focus of analysis from place to mobility (Portes, 
2003), designates the expansion of nations, societies and cultures across state borders 
(Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Mahler, 1998; Faist, 2000) and understands the migration 
experience as a complex social process in which immigrants develop multi-focal 
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identities and multifarious feelings of belonging (Rouse, 1995; Vertovec, 2001; Al-Ali 
and Koser, 2002) and establish social ties and networks that cross political, geographic 
and cultural frontiers in multiple directions (Koser, 1997).   
 
Understanding the causes and nature of transnationalism and its impact on migrant 
adaptation in host societies has been the primary objective of most studies of 
transnational migration (Portes et al., 1999; Faist, 2000; Riccio, 2001; Levitt and Glick 
Schiller, 2004; Vertovec, 2008). A more recent and less explored component of the 
research agenda investigates how migrant transnational lives influence understandings  
and practices of return ‘home’ and the impact of return and transnational migration on the 
development of home and host societies (Black and Koser, 1999; Ghosh, 2000; 
Cassarino, 2004; Black and King, 2004; King and Vullnetari, 2009; King and Christou, 
2010; Christou, 2010). The following section concentrates on transnational 
understandings of return migration.   
2.6.1 Transnational understandings of return migration 
From a transnational perspective return is not the end of the migration cycle (Black and 
Koser, 1999) and does not entail the breaking of contacts and relations with former host 
societies (Black and Gent, 2006b). As Faist (2000:198) explains: ‘the reality of 
transnational social spaces indicates, first, that migration and re-migration may not be 
definite, irrevocable and irreversible decisions - transnational lives in themselves may 
become a strategy of survival and betterment’. A number of studies have focused on 
circular migration and  return visits to home communities and have shown that 
transnational practices facilitate migrants’ informed decisions about physically resettling 
in the home societies (Koser, 1997; Duval, 2004; Oeppen, 2013). Migrants' notions of 
'home' may be extremely complex: they may have more than one local referent and the 
original home may have become a myth, a place of nostalgia compared to other more 
practical homes (Al Rasheed, 1994; Zetter, 1999). Transnational livelihoods have a 
profound impact on migrants’ identities, educational and social statuses and their 
relationship with the areas of origin. The term reintegration could be replaced with the 
term integration, which denotes the fact that migrants return occurs in the face of 
substantial changes in the economy, society and the environment (Hammond, 1999). 
Muggeridge and Dona (2006) explain that return visits provide an opportunity for 
individuals and families to compare their imaginings of ‘home’ with reality and to 
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negotiate new roles and sense of belonging and membership in home communities, 
especially for the second- generation returnees who ‘return’ to the ‘ancestral homeland’ 
where they were not born but where they have nevertheless established and maintain 
strong material, affective and cultural bonds (Christou and King, 2006; De Bree et al., 
2010; King and Christou, 2010).   
 
In recent years transnational migration research has also focused on the implications of 
international mobility and migrant transnationalism not only prior but also after return. 
Black and Gent (2006a; 2006b) have reflected on whether 'sustainable' return and 
reintegration indicators should include both long-term outcomes for the individual 
returnees and for people in the receiving communities and countries of origin. Long 
(2010) examine post-return mobility and its incorporation in policy frameworks for 
sustainable solutions to refugee problems. Levitt and Sørensen (2004) highlight the 
potential for migrants’ transnational livelihoods to contribute to the economic and socio-
political development in both home and host societies. In some refugee contexts refugees’ 
access to transnational livelihood strategies has proved to be a stabilising factor not only 
for the returnees but also for receiving societies with limited absorption capacity 
(Stepputat, 2006, Horst, 2006; Stigter, 2006; Monsutti, 2008). Cassarino (2004) correctly 
stresses that return has a more positive impact on both the returnees and the receiving 
communities if it takes place as a result of voluntary and autonomous decisions and if the 
migration experience constitutes an opportunity to acquire and mobilise the tangible and 
intangible resources necessary for a smooth reintegration. Migrants’ decision-making 
processes about return and their ability to prepare for this process are influenced by the 
causes of the initial movement and by historically contingent socio-economic and 
political dynamics in home and host countries that affect migrants’ real and perceived 
conditions, intentions and migratory behaviours especially in situations of conflict or 
post-conflict transformations.  
 
Transnational perspectives envision return in terms of the mutually transformative 
interaction between individual agency and external structural factors. The reasons for 
return are multiple and connect migrants’ personal motivations and projects to broader 
structures, norms and historically contingent events in home and host societies. 
Transnational migrants use the acquired assets, resources, skills and experiences to 
embark in the return process and try to integrate in home societies without forgoing the 
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skills and values acquired abroad and without denying the values and identities developed 
through the migration experience. In this way, transnational migration may influence the 
return and reintegration process and migrants with newly acquired resources and skills 
can act as catalysts of change and development in both home and host societies.  
 
Return and transnationalism may seem completely different and mutually exclusive 
trajectories of the migration experience. However, migrants’ transnational activity may 
increase proportionally with the possibility of return, since faced with the prospect of 
return migrants may start considering more seriously the potential benefits and costs of 
transnational mobility, networks and practices between home and host societies (Black 
and Gent, 2006b). Transnational approaches have stressed the mixed nature of migration 
motivations and the blurred distinction between ‘voluntary and ‘involuntary’ migrant 
categories. Over time, voluntary and involuntary population movements, individual or 
collective, interweave and overlap in dynamic ways giving rise to mixed migration flows. 
 
Transnational migration scholars have included in the exploration of the interaction 
between migrant agency and structure,  refugees and other forced migrant populations 
and stimulated interesting debates over the ‘voluntariness’ of return and transnationalism 
in specific refugee contexts (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Van Hear, 2006). Forced displacement 
often leads to labour migration as a coping strategy and the expulsion of labour migrants 
constitutes a type of forced displacement (Van Hear, 1995). In the following section, the 
complex continuum between reactive and proactive migration (Richmond, 1993) is 
examined in greater detail in relation to the interaction between refugee return and 
transnational mobility. 
2.6.2 Refugee return and transnational mobility 
It is generally assumed that refugees and other forcibly displaced persons desire to return 
to their place of origin as soon as the factors that caused their forced displacement cease 
to exist. Return is seen as the best way to overcome the feeling of instability, 
uprootedness and placelessness provoked by the forced migration experience and the 
associated loss of culture and identity (Cernea, 2000) and to promote peace-building and 
reconstruction in war torn affected societies (Petrin, 2002). A juridical state-centric 
perspective sees repatriation as the natural solution to refugee problems because it entails 
the re-establishment of the interrupted legal relation between the state and the refugee, 
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who through going back, seeks the restoration of his lost citizenship rights (Goodwin-
Gill, 1989).  
 
Long (2010:7), however, stresses the conceptual distinction between repatriation and 
return, explaining that return to a physical place does not necessarily correspond to 
repatriation since the reconciliation of national state sovereignty with individual rights 
and freedoms is easier to accomplish in theory than in practice. Indeed, under 
circumstances of conflict or post-conflict transformation the repatriation of refugees, 
intended as the restoration of their lost citizenship rights, may not be achieved through 
physical and permanent return. This is due to the fact that many developing societies that 
generate refugees are rarely able, or willing, to grant their people full citizenship rights.  
 
Kibreab (2003) concludes that the massive return movements that took place in 
developing countries in the past three decades are less driven by refugees’ nostalgic 
desire and expectation to recoup the lost rights through return than by inauspicious 
structural conditions and unfavourable host governments’ policies and practices, which 
render forced migrants’ existence abroad untenable and leave them with no alternative 
but to return to unsatisfactory conditions in their countries of origin.  
 
Kibreab’s analysis focuses on access to rights and hypothesises that after the cessation of 
the causes of displacement, in contexts where refugees achieve citizenship rights and 
decent living standards in the host societies the desire to return diminishes, while in 
contexts where refugees' living conditions in exile are unbearable and there is no 
opportunity to achieve the sought rights the tendency towards return increases. This is a 
powerful analytical framework to explain why millions of refugees in the developing 
South have been 'voting with their feet' homewards, while the ‘lucky’ refugees who have 
obtained asylum in the developed north have no interest in return.  
 
Such a perspective, however, links access to rights and resources to permanent settlement 
in a place and overlooks opportunity structures engendered by mobility and 
transnationalism and their impact on migrants’ attitudes and decision-making processes 
about return. In other words, some migrants may perceive the right to freely move across 
international borders and established livelihoods wherever they wish, as vital as all the 
other rights attached to citizenship. As Richmond (1993:15) eloquently explains:  
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There is a contradiction between the long run trend of the global economy toward a 
'borderless world', which Ohmae (1990:xii-xiii) describes as 'ensuring the free flow of 
information, money, goods and services as well as the free migration of people and 
corporations', and the reality of a world of 'closed borders' and 'reluctant hosts', shutting 
the doors to refugees and all but a select few economic migrants (Dowty 1987; Joly and 
Cohen 1989; Matas and Simon 1989; Richmond, 1991). There is a similar contradiction 
between the right to emigrate which is entrenched in the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights and the lack of any corresponding obligation on the part of states to admit anyone 
seeking entry. On the contrary, the right to refuse entry is regarded as inherent in the 
concept of sovereignty. 
 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that ‘Everyone has the 
right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state (1) and that 
everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country’ 
(2). The highly discriminatory application of this universal principle, however, causes 
unequal access for nationals of developed and developing societies to fundamental rights, 
resources and personal development opportunities. In light of this, it is unsurprising that 
refugees and migrants from developing countries prioritise their freedom of movement 
and attempt to secure this right through the attainment of permanent residence or 
citizenship status in a country whose citizens are not subject to restrictive international 
migration regimes. Thus access to residence and citizenship rights in a third country, 
either through asylum or regular migration opportunities, becomes instrumental to 
exercising the right to freedom of movement across international borders without 
discrimination. The reactive behaviour of forced migrants, whose original movement is 
the product of coercion or severe restrictions on individual freedoms, may, over time and 
under favourable structural conditions, evolve into a more proactive rational choice 
behaviour, seeking to maximise the net advantages derived by the original forced 
displacement. This approach posits a complex continuum between causes and effects of 
migration, and the existence of a feedback mechanism whereby ‘effects’ can become the 
new ‘causes’ or drivers of migration decisions and behaviours (Richmond, 1993; Zetter, 
1999).  
 
This perspective also highlights the heterogeneity of actors' responses to same or similar 
structural conditions. The real significance of specific predisposing factors, structural 
constraints, precipitating events and enabling circumstances changes among the social 
actors involved. A more resonant approach with social reality emphasises the diversity 
and multiplicity of migrants' profiles, circumstances, interests and projects and envisages 
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differential patterns of behaviour and action, arising within similar structures (Richmond, 
1993). Chapter six applies the conceptual exploration of the continuum between reactive 
and proactive migratory behaviours and the relationship between return and 
transnationalism to understand the nature of refugee return in the context of the protracted 
Iraqi displacement in Syria and Jordan.  
2.7 Conclusion  
One of the great challenges in the study of migration in general, and refugee return and 
transnationalism in particular, is to develop an explanatory framework that adequately 
links different scales and levels of conceptual and empirical research, the macro-
structural context and the micro-level realities of individuals and families. This research 
seeks to overcome this difficulty by combining the analysis of the regional geopolitical 
context and the national and international migration and asylum regimes shaping Iraqi 
refugees’ displacement, with a transnational migration perspective which offers a micro 
analysis of individual choices, experiences and reactions to external interventions and 
contextual factors.  
 
Taking a regional approach is useful in investigating the geopolitical dynamics that 
influence refugee return and transnationalism in situations of conflict or post-conflict 
transformations in the Middle East. Refugees’ returns take place within a dynamic 
environment characterised by the interaction between the international refugee regime 
and regional and national migration and asylum legal and normative frameworks which 
determine Iraqi refugees’ condition of protracted displacement. The emergence and 
evolution of international and regional migration regimes are influenced by international 
and regional geopolitics which link them to other policy areas such as national and 
regional security, economic exchanges and political relations between states and other 
actors in the region and in wider international community.  
 
The concept of governmentality is used to explore attitudes and practices of governance 
adopted by state and non-state actors involved in the management of migrant and refugee 
communities. Governmentality approaches highlight that migration governance is 
exercised through forms of power other than physical coercion and legislative 
instruments. In the Iraqi displacement context, the home and host states and the 
international refugee regime represented by the UNHCR have engaged in the production 
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of particular forms of bureaucratic knowledge and information as a migration 
management tool and have constituted the Iraqi people as ‘refugees’ ‘guests’, ‘brothers’ 
and ‘temporary residents’. These categories and their underlying assumptions formed the 
basis of policies and practices towards the Iraqi migrants living in Syria and Jordan. The 
institutional construction and dissemination of particular forms of knowledge and 
understandings of the ‘identity’ ‘status’ and ’real conditions’ of the Iraqi people in 
neighbouring countries, is one of the management strategies adopted by institutional 
actors to elicit desired behaviours among the Iraqi forced migrants and to facilitate the 
governance of this highly mobile population.  
 
Forced migrants resist oppressive power structures and react to institutional policies and 
interventions by playing around with official immigration and asylum statuses created for 
them in order to enhance their freedom of movement and engage in transnational mobility 
and livelihoods as alternative solutions to their protracted displacement. The 
methodological instruments offered by transnational approaches are useful in producing 
an in–depth qualitative study of the nature and dynamics of Iraqis’ return. They are 
crucial in producing empirical findings about refugees’ expression of agency, decision-
making processes and practices of return and their responses to contextual factors and 
existing policy interventions that have a direct impact on their well-being and life 
projects. 
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Chapter Three: Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodological approach that has guided the design and 
implementation of the thesis. The chapter is organised into eight sections. Section two 
starts with the choice of research question. The sources of qualitative and quantitative 
data used in the study are presented in section three. The main research settings, Syria 
and Jordan, and particularly their respective capital cities, are the focus of section four. 
The access to and recruitment of research participants in Syria and Jordan are discussed 
in section five followed by the description of the sampling criteria and the profiles of the 
Iraqi research participants in section six. The main research methods adopted for the 
study are examined in detail in section seven. Section eight provides a critical reflection 
on the ethical and methodological challenges faced in the research including my 
experience of expulsion from Syria. Section nine offers some conclusive remarks.   
3.2 Choosing a research Question 
In addition to the academic justification for research on Iraqi refugees’ return from Syria 
and Jordan outlined in chapter one, the choice to research Iraqi refugees’ return from 
Syria and Jordan was personally influenced by a desire to continue working with 
members of migrant and refugee communities and to broaden my knowledge and 
understanding of the complex realities of forced migration and displacement in the 
Middle East.  
 
In the academic year 2005-2006 I studied Arabic at the Language Centre of the 
University of Jordan, Amman. While learning Arabic, I worked with the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) as a volunteer English teacher for Palestinian 
children and women in Madaba Refugee Camp. During the time I lived in Amman I 
encountered several Iraqis who crossed into Jordan in search for protection from the 
escalating conflict and ethno-sectarian violence in their country. The Iraqis’ accounts of 
devastation, violence and dispossession that they experienced back home were shocking 
and saddening and prompted me to investigate and better understand the political causes 
and socio-economic consequences of the Iraqi humanitarian crisis provoked by the 2003 
US-led invasion of Iraq and to offer possible solutions to the Iraqi refugee displacement. 
The search materialised two years later, in 2008, in the form of a proposal for a doctoral 
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research project.   
 
At the time of the writing of the research proposal, the Iraqi displacement in the Middle 
East had evolved into a situation of protracted refugee displacement ‘with no solution in 
sight’ (Crisp, 2005). The spontaneous return of the Iraqi refugees to their homeland under 
circumstances of low-intensity conflict or post-conflict transformation seemed the most 
likely scenario given that the other two durable solutions of ‘local integration’ and ‘third 
country resettlement’ promoted by the UNHCR had been scarcely explored by the host 
countries and the international refugee regime. One of the motivations of the study was 
therefore to contribute to finding ways to assist Iraqis’ spontaneous returns and the 
populations in the host and home areas. The provision of effective return and 
reintegration assistance required studying and understanding the causes and nature of 
Iraqi refugees' assisted and self-returns from Syria and Jordan. This was and still is the 
principal question and concern of this research project.  
3.3 Qualitative and quantitative data sources 
The intention in this thesis was to develop an interdisciplinary research project with a 
methodological approach that complements quantitative data with qualitative evidence 
(Creswell, 2007). Such an approach derives from a need to triangulate and corroborate 
statistical information provided by institutional agents with detailed qualitative 
information on Iraqi returnees' profiles, decision-making processes and lived experiences. 
However, the balance of the project lies with qualitative data and sources for the reasons 
outlined below.  
 
The production, analysis and dissemination of statistical information is an essential 
component of migration and refugee research, as the data are used to attract and justify 
donor funding and to plan and allocate financial budgets for the implementation of 
humanitarian and development programmes (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). In the Iraqi 
displacement context, however, there are no accurate official statistics about Iraqis’ 
displacement and return movements. The data sets produced and disseminated by Syrian, 
Jordanian and Iraqi ministries and government agencies are often inaccurate and 
incomplete, sometimes retroactively changed and even contradicting. Data generated by 
UNHCR and other INGOs, however, should not be deemed necessarily more accurate 
and reliable than those provided by national authorities. (Perthes, 1997; ICG, 2008). The 
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absence of accurate official data is due to the lack of funding and methodological, 
infrastructural and organisational limits which cause delays in the returnee registration 
process, and local border authorities’ inability to track and distinguish permanent returns 
from circular migration and routine cross-border movements (e.g. contractors and 
businessmen, taxi and track drivers, officials and visitors).  
 
Moreover imprecise data may stem from political interests in withholding or disguising 
particular facts or developments. In the case of the Iraqi refugees’ humanitarian crisis, for 
instance, there is a discrepancy between the estimates of Iraqis hosted in neighbouring 
countries, as reported by UNHCR and IOM, and the claims of independent researchers 
working in the field. According to Chatelard (2008),  the Iraqi refugee crisis, as presented 
by official reports and the press is a construct (a fictitious crisis) meant to attract funding 
for UNHCR, NGOs and host governments and to reinforce human rights advocates’ 
discourse on the illegitimacy of the American invasion of Iraq. Moreover, she claims that 
the incredibly high figures presented to the public opinion have no sound and scientific 
bases. The only figures that can be regarded as accurate are those compiled through the 
UNHCR’s registration system; such figures are much lower (i.e., 55,000 Iraqis in Jordan 
and 140,000 Iraqis in Syria) than those presented in official reports (i.e., 500,000 Iraqis in 
Jordan and 1.4 million Iraqis in Syria) (UNHCR, 2008). A possible explanation of the 
enormous difference between the competing data sets could be the failure of state and 
international agencies’ counting systems to differentiate between the number of Iraqis 
who arrived in Jordan and Syria following the 2003 war and the Iraqis who have left or 
were displaced before the last conflict in Iraq (Chatelard, 2008).  
 
The lack of accurate statistical data, however, should not lead to the assumption that no 
relevant statements on the Iraqi refugees’ displacement and return can be made. Rather, 
the idea that more quantitative data would necessarily lead to a deeper understanding of 
the phenomena under scrutiny, represents too deep a faith in figures (Perthes, 1997). 
Statistical data can be useful to grasp the scale and socio-economic aspects of refugees’ 
repatriations, but they cannot fully represent the complex individual and societal 
processes and transformations involved in refugee return. Being aware of such 
quantitative deficiencies this research handled available statistical information with care 
and triangulated and complemented it with unofficial and unpublished information and 
with qualitative evidence and findings generated through various qualitative research 
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methods discussed in detail in the following sections. Such research methods were tested 
during a pilot study in Amman and Damascus, in April 2008 (Iaria, 2010) and proved to 
be valuable tools in collecting a range of information: 
 participants’ bio-data and demographic features 
 information about the nature of participants’ settlement in exile and in 
areas of origin; length of time in exile; frequency, duration, reasons and 
outcomes of their visits in the home areas 
 refugees' intentions and projects regarding return to Iraq 
 refugees' transnational livelihoods and spontaneous cross-border activities 
 return and reintegration information generated and disseminated by (non) 
institutional actors 
 institutional attitudes, opinions and practices regarding Iraqi refugees' 
return 
 qualitative and quantitative data on voluntary return policies and projects, 
and return and reintegration assistance, opportunities and challenges 
 
The qualitative findings generated by this study do not constitute an objective and 
statistically generalizable representation of the social phenomena observed. Rather, the 
research findings have been contextually, inter-subjectively and cross-culturally 
constructed and are therefore susceptible to constant revision and reinterpretation (Angen, 
2000; Whittemore, 2001). The scholarly contribution of this research project is the result 
of the researcher's cross-cultural dialogue (Kvale, 1996) and collaboration with numerous 
research participants and colleagues who have contributed their time, knowledge and 
experiences for the successful completion of this research.  
 
This interpretative and reflexive methodological approach is in line with the 
constructivist (Young 1980; 1989; Hurrell, 1995a; 1995b; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; 
2001) and critical epistemological and ontological approaches (Foucault, 1980; 1991; 
Cox, 1983, Keeley 1990; Richmond, 1993; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003; Kalm 
2010) employed to build the theoretical framework of this research. From a constructivist 
perspective social phenomena and structures are ‘ontologically dependent upon (although 
they are not reducible to) the practices and self-understandings of agents, […] and the 
causal powers, interests and identities of agents, in their turn, are constituted and 
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therefore explained by social structures’ (Wendt, 1987:359). Similarly, a poststructuralist 
approach emphasises the relationship between power, language and knowledge (Faucault, 
1991) stressing that: ‘the world exists independently of language, but we can never know 
that (beyond the fact of its assertion), because the existence of the world is literally 
inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation’ (Campbell, 
1992:6).  
 
This methodological approach also sustains the mutually constitutive and transformative 
interplay between structure and agency and recognises the central role of human action 
and consciousness in social change. All forms of external intervention enter the existing 
life worlds of the agents and the social groups affected, and in this way they are mediated 
and transformed by these same actors (Long, 2001). This type of analysis looks into the 
power relations between various social actors, who negotiate to expand or maintain their 
room for manoeuvre, often exploiting and transforming structural conditions. Hence, it is 
essential to take account of the ways in which social actors engage in struggles over 
power and negotiate the attribution of social meaning to specific events, interventions and 
socio-cultural norms (Long, 2001).  
 
Therefore, from a constructivist and postructuralist point of view it would be mistaken to 
explain dynamic social phenomena such as forced migration only within the framework 
of external structural conditions. While accepting that external forces permeate all levels 
of society and may have effects on actors' social reality, there are also individual 
dynamics operating at the level of the human agency which cannot be ignored (Long, 
2001). The real significance of certain social structures varies among the actors involved. 
For this reason, it is unsatisfactory to assume that all actors subject to same or similar 
structural constraints react in the same manner. While some agents are constrained by 
certain structures, others are empowered by them. Structures constitute an important set 
of constraining/enabling possibilities that encroach upon different actors' projects 
generating various responses and outcomes (Wendt, 1987). 
3.4 Syria and Jordan: multi-sited research setting  
Given the impossibility of conducting fieldwork in Iraq and collecting first-hand 
information about Iraqi returnees' experiences after return, the research was based on an 
extensive period of fieldwork in Jordan and Syria, the main recipient countries of Iraqi 
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refugees (UNHCR, 2009). The fieldwork, which took place between January 2010 and 
March 2011, was multiply situated and organised in two phases. The first phase was in 
Damascus, the Syrian capital (five months) and the second phase in Amman, the 
Jordanian capital (seven months). Research activities in Syria were abruptly interrupted 
five months into fieldwork due to my expulsion from the country, a key event in the 
research process and an intense personal experience discussed in greater detail in the last 
section of this chapter.  
 
Returning to the research setting, Damascus and Amman governorates were selected as 
the main fieldwork sites because the majority of refugees displaced after the 2003 Iraq 
conflict originated from urban areas in Iraq and have taken up residence in major urban 
areas in the countries of asylum instead of being allocated spaces in appositely built 
refugee camps (Crisp et al., 2009). The refugee population investigated in the two 
capitals does not include the Palestinian refugees who fled Iraq after 2003, who were not 
allowed to enter Syria and Jordan and were instead stranded in the Al-Waleed and Al-
Karama camps situated respectively near the Iraqi borders with Syria and Jordan.  
 
Most Iraqi families met in Amman and Damascus have experienced downward socio-
economic assimilation and have settled in peripheral neighbourhoods of the two capital 
cities. In Damascus, the less advantaged families were found in neighbourhoods such as 
Jaramana, Saida Zainab, Duma and Harasta and in the Palestinian refugee camp of Al-
Yarmouk. Wealthier Iraqi participants in Damascus lived in rented apartments in Kafar 
Sousah, Mezzeh, Mouhajirin, Masaken Barza and Al-Qudsya areas. In Amman, 
disadvantaged Iraqi families resided in Al-Hashemi Al-Shamali, Marka and Zarqa' 
refugee camp on the outskirts of Amman. More affluent Iraqi households were found in 
middle-class neighbourhoods such as Jabal Amman (Dawar Al-Thani and Dawar Al-
Thaleth), Al-Ashrafiyah, Garden Street, Shmisani, Um Uthayna and Al-Jubeiha. Figures 
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the distribution of fieldwork sites in the main research settings, 
the cities and outskirts of Damascus and Amman.  
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Fieldwork sites in the city of Damascus 
                                   
Fig. 3.1 -   Fieldwork sites in the city of Damascus      Source: Map data © Google 2013, Orion-ME 
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         Fieldwork sites in the city of Amman 
 
                                Fig. 3. 2 - Fieldwork sites in the city of Amman                                              Source:  Bing Maps, © Nokia 2013 Microsoft  
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Fieldwork sites in Amman and Zarqa’ 
 
   Fig.3. 3 - Fieldwork sites in Amman and Zarqa’          Source: Bing Maps 2012, © Microsoft  
 
Previous research reported that the Iraqi families in Jordan are wealthier than those living 
in Syria (Crisp et al., 2009). The field observations conducted for this study verified this 
claim and found that many of the Iraqi families living in Damascus come from a poorer 
socio-economic background compared to the Iraqis who found refuge in Amman. The 
lower socio-economic profile of the Iraqis in Syria is confirmed by the fact that the Iraqis 
resident in Jordan had the financial resources to meet stringent entry and residence 
requirements including the deposit of large sums of money in local bank accounts while 
the Iraqis in Syria obtained residence rights without meeting similar financial 
requirements.  
 
In this thesis, a comparative analytical approach has been useful in exploring the impact 
of contextual factors on Iraqis’ living conditions in exile, their decision-making processes 
and migratory behaviours. The two host countries, present important contextual 
commonalities and differences that affect Iraqi refugees' living conditions in the host 
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societies and their migratory plans. Iraq and its neighbours share socio-cultural features 
deriving from the historical nomadic and tribal lifestyle of the Arab people in the Middle 
East (Al-Wardi, 1995; Fattah, 2009). The Iraqi people and the members of the host 
societies co-exist and interact within important transnational social spaces of 
identification and belonging based on kinship, ethno-cultural, linguistic, and religious 
identities (Matar, 1997; Chatelard, 2009). The migration dynamics and trajectories of the 
Iraqi refugees are influenced by the fact that neither host country is signatory of the 1951 
Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol (Olwan, 2009). The host governments have 
limited experience in working with UNHCR and they lack developed refugee legislation 
and institutions (Crisp et al., 2009). Syria's and Jordan's socio-economic and political 
systems have developed in different directions and their historical and present relations 
with Iraq and with western states are complex and diverging (Bin Talal, 1993; Perthes, 
1997; Lasensky, 2006; Hinnebusch, 2006). These geopolitical and socio-economic 
factors affect Iraqis' decision-making processes and contribute in shaping refugees' 
differential livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms in the two host countries.  
 
The comparative perspective has guided the empirical analysis and discussion of the 
regimes and geopolitics that shape the Iraqi displacement and return from Syria and 
Jordan in chapter five; and the exploration of Iraqi refugees’ transnational livelihoods and 
information and communication systems in chapters six and seven. Jordan’s and Syria’s 
attitude towards the Iraqi refugees has been influenced by international politics and by 
past and current political and economic relations between Iraq and its neighbours. The 
analysis included the policies and types of intervention adopted by the Iraqi government, 
and the relevant UN agencies in the two host countries to facilitate the return and 
reintegration of Iraqi refugees and their participation in the national political dialogue and 
reconstruction process. A comparative approach offered the opportunity to identify 
similarities and inequalities in refugees' demographic and socio-economic profiles, pre-
flight histories, livelihood strategies and coping mechanisms in the two host countries and 
their differential reactions to more or less favourable return and reintegration policies 
implemented by the Iraqi government and the international refugee regime. 
3.5 Access to and recruitment of research participants 
Gaining access to Iraqi refugees’ social settings and recruiting research participants was a 
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challenging but rewarding task that entailed overcoming logistical and methodological 
problems including time limitations, difficulties in reaching out participants in remote 
areas, lack of formal clearance from the host authorities and gatekeepers’ and 
participants’ distrust of the research motivations and activities. These field constraints 
have inevitably limited the generalizability of findings, as it was impossible to gain full 
and equal access to all members of the Iraqi refugee communities in Syria and Jordan. A 
more comprehensive study of Iraqis' migration experiences, attitudes and practices of 
return would need better access to the researched groups, a larger sample and greater 
operational support with data collection.  
 
The original aim of this qualitative research, however, was not to achieve statistical 
representativeness but to follow many access points and trails so as to generate a less 
biased sample of informants (Atkinson et al., 2001; Rapley, 2007). The initial access 
points included contacts provided by friends, colleagues and Iraqi nationals living in the 
UK and Iraqi refugees who participated to the pilot study in 2008. Interviews and casual 
conversations with representatives of national authorities, UNHCR, IOM and other 
INGOs were arranged through telephone and email appointments and conducted in 
embassies, INGO field offices and local community centres.   
 
The inability to obtain a research visa from the Syrian and the Jordanian governments 
was an obstacle in accessing Syrian and Jordanian state officials and institutional 
information produced by the host governments. Compared to their Jordanian counterparts 
Syrian national authorities were inaccessible; the Syrian government’s views about the 
research topic are thus underrepresented in this study. The lack of direct access to state 
authorities was partly redressed through in depth analysis of the official and legal 
documents produced in Arabic and in English by these very institutions. The 
documentary analysis concentrated on the immigration and residency policies and 
executive regulations adopted by the Syrian and the Jordanian governments towards the 
Iraqi nationals. Prolonged observations in Iraqi high concentration areas in Damascus and 
Amman, was also critical to directly investigating measures and practices adopted by the 
host authorities to manage the Iraqi communities in their territories.   
 
Given the lack of any viable route for formal authorisation to conduct independent 
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research in Syria and Jordan, and on the advice of scholars in both countries and in the 
UK, I sought and obtained affiliation with local and international research institutes and 
humanitarian organisations in order to secure institutional backing, protection and 
logistical support. These institutions facilitated networking opportunities with other 
INGOs working with the Iraqi displaced in Amman and Damascus but were also 
powerful gatekeepers controlling access to the Iraqi research participants.  
3.5.1 Syria 
In Syria I worked as an Intern in the Registration Unit of the UNHCR, based in the UN 
compound in Kafer Sousah, Damascus, and in the Registration and Food Distribution 
Centre in Duma, near Damascus. The collaboration with the UNHCR entailed both 
methodological opportunities and constraints (Rapley, 2007). The UNHCR facilitated 
access into one of the most important interactional settings of the Iraqi refugees, the 
registration and aid distribution centre co-managed by the UNHCR the World Food 
Programme (WFP) and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), where I conducted 
interviews and casual conversations with Iraqi refugees and returnees and with INGO 
staff, and investigated the UNHCR voluntary return assistance policies and practices 
from the privileged position of an “intern”. Wearing a UNHCR badge and being seen as a 
UN staff was often the key to Iraqis’ trust and consent to participate in interviews and 
other research activities. Yet conducting research under the auspices, and control, of the 
UNHCR was at times constraining.  
 
The support of a UN agency to the research project came at the cost of restrictive 
conditions being imposed on research activities, especially given the politically sensitive 
nature of the study. For instance, the use of recording equipment and digital cameras 
inside the Registration and Food Distribution Centre in Duma was restricted to authorised 
staff. The dissemination and publication of “internal” information, documents, audio and 
video material is protected by UNHCR privacy and confidentiality regulations and 
requires official clearance by the head of the UNHCR Information and Communication 
Unit. Perhaps the major constraint arising from the collaboration with the UNHCR was 
my inability to share critical assessments of the UNHCR protection and assistance 
policies and practices with the relevant UNHCR Syria management and staff. This was 
partly due to the fear of causing problems between UNHCR colleagues and their line 
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managers but also by the increasing awareness that the UNHCR managers did not 
welcome outsiders’ critical assessments of their work and performance. Faced with my 
request for greater access to UNHCR assistance programmes for the Iraqi refugees, the 
UNHCR Syria Country Representative made it clear that I was not a member of staff and 
that I did not have the clearance to access certain locations and pieces of information and 
make evaluations of UNHCR Syria projects. The UNHCR’s resistance in granting access 
to and disclosing information about its activities may be due to security concerns, or may 
be aimed at concealing operational and organisational problems which are not supposed 
to emerge in independent reports, or an attempt to avoid the pressures stemming from 
local authorities’ monitoring and restrictions on the presence and operations of the 
UNHCR in Syria. Gaining access through a powerful gatekeeper such as the UNHCR 
required adopting a “flexible” approach to fieldwork and entailed significant 
methodological limitations (Bloch, 1999). Recruiting research participants in the Duma 
Centre, for instance, limited the scope of the sample to Iraqis registered as prima facie 
refugees with the UNHCR. To control for this bias and include in the sample Iraqis who 
were not registered with the UNHCR it was necessary to access and recruit research 
participants outside of the UN premises and without using the status of UNHCR intern.   
 
An alternative strategy adopted to meet Iraqis outside of the UNHCR environment, was 
establishing contacts with a number of Iraqi socio-cultural groups and associations in 
Damascus. Soon after my arrival in Syria, I joined the AIKIDO club in Jaramana, one of 
the neighbourhoods of Damascus highly populated by Iraqi nationals. The AIKIDO 
trainer was an Iraqi man who participated in the pilot study of this research project in 
2008 and who invited me to go to the AIKIDO practice every Friday and engage with a 
group of young Iraqi men and a Russian woman. Over time, the relationship with the 
AIKIDO fighters developed outside of the gym and the young men introduced me to their 
families and friends, some of whom accepted to participate in the research activities. 
Despite using a snow-balling method, the recruitment of participants was done following 
different access points and trails so as to meet the desired variety in the sampling process 
(Atkinson et al., 2001). Alongside the AIKIDO training, I regularly visited and engaged 
with various Iraqi associations in Damascus including the Iraqi artists café in Jaramana, 
the Journalists Club and the Iraqi Cultural Centre in Al-‘Afef area and the Iraqi Youth 
Assembly, all of which organised regular social and cultural gatherings and events where 
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new Iraqi participants were approached and encouraged to participate in the research. 
 
In the recruitment process, my personal features, socio-cultural background and 
behaviour did not constitute major obstacles to establishing good relationships with 
potential informants and inviting them to participate to the interviews (Hamzeh and 
Oliver, 2010). Rather, the Iraqis demonstrated curiosity and sympathy towards the young 
Italian researcher who could speak Arabic and who was interested in their lives and 
opinions. Iraqis from a middle-class intellectual background who had lived in the US or 
Europe and were more familiar with western education, cultural values and practices 
were more willing to participate; they did not perceive me and the research activities as a 
potential threat. The recruitment of less educated participants, with little knowledge and 
experience of western academic research, proved sometimes more problematic. Some 
Iraqis harboured suspicion towards the inquisitive Italian woman who wanted to use a 
voice-recorder and take notes about them; they probably associated my methods with 
those used by the state bureaucracies and security agencies that they dreaded and escaped 
from in their country of origin. In order to encourage the participation of worried Iraqis, I 
stressed the independent nature of my research, that I did not work for any state or non-
state institution and I sought to reassure them that the information that they shared would 
have been treated as confidential and anonymous.  
3.5.2 Jordan  
In Jordan I was a Research Fellow sponsored by the Council for British Research in the 
Levant (CBRL) based at the British Institute in Amman. The affiliation with the British 
Institute was essential in achieving the personal protection, financial and logistical 
support necessary to conduct fieldwork and network with a range of local institutions and 
NGOs implementing research, assistance, development projects and other socio-cultural 
activities involving the Iraqis in Jordan. The British Institute is connected with Iraqis in 
Amman through the Iraqi Research Fellowship Programme sponsored by the UK-based 
Council for Assisting Refugee Academics (CARA). The Iraqi academics beneficiaries of 
this programme work with local and international research institutions in Amman and 
Iraqi universities for the implementation of research projects focusing on various aspects 
of contemporary Iraqi society. In September 2010 CARA organised a five-day workshop 
where I had the opportunity to meet Iraqi researchers based inside and outside of Iraq and 
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some of them accepted to be interviewed. The contributions of the Iraqi academics met 
through CARA were essential but represented only one group of Iraqis displaced in 
Jordan. The group of participants had to include less advantaged and qualified members 
of the Iraqi migrant community in Amman.  
 
The sample was expanded by establishing contacts with a number of INGOs providing 
assistance and services to less skilled and wealthy Iraqis living in various areas in 
Amman. In particular working as a voluntary teacher of English, was the main strategy to 
access Iraqi beneficiaries of free vocational training classes sponsored and managed by a 
number of humanitarian and charity organisations. The gatekeepers were the Jesuit 
Refugee Service running evening non-formal education classes in a Christian school in 
Al-Ashrafyia; Terre Des Hommes Italy in partnership with the Jordanian Soldier Family 
Welfare Society implementing a UNHCR/UNICEF-funded project in a community centre 
providing assistance to vulnerable women and children in Zarqa’; and the Japanese-
funded Women's Federation for World Peace offering vocational training classes for Iraqi 
refugees in Al-Hashemi Al-Shimali.  
 
Both in Syria and Jordan, establishing and maintaining good relations with the Iraqis 
presented several difficulties. In some cases research participants required their 
contributions to be anonymous and preferred not to be voice-recorded, as they were 
afraid that the information they disclosed could be used against them and their families. 
Some participants had negative perceptions or violent memories of previous interviews 
with state bureaucracies and social control agencies, and therefore had become ‘question-
wise’ (Hynes, 2003) and resorted to concealment, obfuscation or deception to prevent me 
from observing and understanding their personal circumstances and intentions (Lee, 
1993).   
 
On the other hand, some Iraqis participated to research activities, simply out of curiosity 
or because they appreciated the therapeutic qualities of interviews (Dyregrov et al., 
2000). A number of interviewees considered the interview process as an opportunity to 
express their sadness and disappointment towards state institutions and humanitarian 
agencies which fail to assist them. For others, conversations with the young female 
researcher helped them making sense of their dramatic experiences, come to terms with 
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their conditions in exile and try to devise solutions to their problems. The trust-building 
process entailed the establishment of a relationship of reciprocity and mutual 
understanding between me and the research participants (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). 
Speaking Arabic and being familiar with Arab and Muslim culture and society, I could 
directly introduce myself and the research project in the language of the participants and 
engage in effective cross-cultural communication by minimising potentially irritating 
aspects of my personality and accommodating to the cultural diversity and moral values 
of the research subjects (Lietz et al., 2006). Teaching English in various classes of mixed 
age and sex students on a weekly basis, I established lasting and trustworthy relations 
with Iraqi women and men with very different pre-and post-flight histories. The next 
section presents the sample of respondents, which both in Damascus and Amman was 
heterogeneous in terms of participants' ethno-religious background, demographic features 
and socio-economic status. 
3.6 Research participants 
Research activities were conducted with 40 Iraqi participants in Damascus and 51 Iraqi 
participants in Amman. The number of participants in Syria is lower because interviews 
in Damascus were abruptly interrupted due to my expulsion from the country. All 
participants in Syria and in Jordan met the following initial sampling criteria: 
 fled Iraq after 2003 
 are or are not registered with the UNHCR  
 sought or did not seek resettlement to a third country of asylum 
 have or have not adopted transnational livelihood strategies  
 come from any ethno-religious, educational or socio-economic background 
 have resided (legally or illegally) in the host country for at least six months 
 have returned to any area of Iraq 
 
The respondents arrived in the two host countries between 2003 and 2009; many of them 
had already been in Syria and Jordan before 2003, for various reasons and periods of 
time. The existing knowledge and connections facilitated their arrival and initial 
settlement in the host societies. Before flight, 72 participants resided in different areas of 
Baghdad; 8 in Mosul, Ninawa; 3 in Al-Emara, Misan; 3 in the governorate of Basra, 2 in 
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Al-Falluja, Al-Anbar; 1 in the governorate of Karbala, 1 in Samara’, Salah Al-Din, and 1 
in the governorate of An-Najaf. Their length of stay abroad before their first return varied 
from six months to over three years. The following charts graphically illustrate the sex, 
age, ethno-religious background, legal status of the participants in Syria and Jordan.  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
                
 
 
 
In Syria the interviewees were 27 men aged between 22 and 69 years and 13 women aged 
between 22 and 64 years. In Jordan interviews were conducted with 33 men aged 
between 22 and 63 years and 18 women aged between 30 and 60 years. Most female 
participants embarked in the return process with their families and some of them were 
interviewed in the presence of their husbands, who, conforming to Iraqi socio-cultural 
customs, tended to talk on behalf of the whole family. This has reduced the women's 
freedom to express their opinions and discuss in more depth their personal experiences.   
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Fig. 3.4 - Sex of Iraqis in Syria Fig. 1.5 - Sex of Iraqis in Jordan 
Fig. 3.6 –Age of Iraqis in Syria Fig. 3.7 – Age of Iraqis in Jordan 
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Despite the high average level of education among the Iraqis interviewed in Syria and 
Jordan, only a few managed to find regular work opportunities in the host countries due 
to restrictions in obtaining work permits. Their welfare depended on transnational family 
ties and networks of solidarity and financial support, money transfers and savings from 
sales of land and properties in Iraq, INGOs cash and in-kind assistance, informal work in 
the local labour market and, for the wealthiest, the establishment of private businesses 
and cross-border trade between Iraq and the neighbouring host countries. Iraqi refugees’ 
pre and post-flight socio-economic circumstances determine their ability to secure legal 
status in the host countries and consequently enhance their cross-border mobility. The 
inability to freely move across-borders reduces Iraqis’ access to resources and 
opportunities available in Iraq and in other countries, thereby impeding their socio-
economic betterment. The asylum and immigration status of respondents is therefore a  
key factor influencing their living conditions in exile and their decisions about return.  
                                                                             
 
 
 
 
In Syria, 29 participants held a short-term residence permit and 11 participants had an 
annual residence permit. Among the respondents in Syria, 30 registered with the UNHCR 
and sought resettlement, 1 registered but did not want to be resettled, 3 did not register 
with the UNHCR, 2 returned from resettlement in the USA, and 2 accepted UNHCR Vol. 
Rep. assistance to return. In Jordan, 32 participants obtained an annual residence permit, 
6 held a short-term residence permit and 13 overstayed. Among these, 24 respondents did 
not register with the UNHCR, 18 registered and sought resettlement to a third country, 4 
registered and their application for resettlement was rejected, and 5 registered but did not 
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Fig. 3.8 - Legal status of Iraqis in Syria Fig. 3.9 – legal status of Iraqis in Jordan 
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seek resettlement to another country. Holding a valid residence permit is a source of 
security because it facilitates going to Iraq and re-entering Syria and Jordan at any time, 
without facing immigration restrictions and expensive visa fees. In Syria both holders of 
short- and long-term residence permits can engage in cross-border movements while in 
Jordan cross-border mobility is allowed only to holders of long-term residence permits. 
Without a valid residence permit Iraqis’ cross-border mobility is restricted thereby 
impeding their socio-economic betterment through access to resources and opportunities 
available in Iraq and in other countries (Mason, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another important determinant of decisions and practices of return is the ethno-religious 
background of the Iraqi individuals and families in this study. Most interviewees in Syria 
and Jordan are Arab Muslims. In Syria 62% of the participants were Muslim Sunnites, 
33% were Muslim Shiites and the remaining 5% were members of the Assyrian Christian 
Chaldean minority. In Jordan 51% of the participants were Muslim Shiites, 37% were 
Muslim Sunnites, 6% were Assyrian Christians, 4% Christian Orthodox and 2% 
Turkmen. Members of the ethno-religious minorities are better represented in the sample 
62% 
33% 
5% 
Arab Muslim
Sunnite
Arab Muslim
Shiite
Assyrian
Christian
Chaldean
Fig. 3.10 - Ethno-sectarian background of  
Iraqis in Syria 
51% 
37% 
2% 
6% 
4% 
Arab muslim
Shiite
Arab Muslim
Sunnite
Turkmen
Muslim Sunnite
Assyrian
Christian
Chaldean
Syriac Christian
Ortodox
Fig. 3.11 - Ethno-sectarian background of 
Iraqis in Jordan 
62 
 
 
 
 
of participants in Jordan, because the Jesuit Refugee Service encouraged some members 
of these communities to take part in the research. Some of the Muslim participants 
disclosed their sectarian membership only after expressing their disapproval and 
condemnation of the ethno-sectarian identity politics that have caused divisions and 
violence in their country. The migratory trajectories of refugees' return and their 
reintegration experiences have been affected by the phenomenon of ethnically-based 
territorial and administrative polarisation that has forced some participants to abandon 
their houses and jobs and move from religious and ethnically mixed areas to 
homogeneous ones in search of safe havens.   
3.7 Research Methods  
The qualitative research techniques employed for this study included: extensive 
participant observation of refugees’ interactional settings, transnational networks, 
movements and cross-border activities; open-ended and semi-structured interviews and 
casual conversations with Iraqis, members of host communities, INGO staff, local 
authorities and other key research participants. These field research methods were 
accompanied by qualitative analysis of documents, literary works and media sources 
concerning the research topic. A more detailed assessment of the merits and flaws of the 
principal methods used in the research is provided below.  
3.7.1 Participant observation  
Prolonged engagement and participant observation in the two main research settings, 
Damascus and Amman, enabled the collection of first-hand information on Iraqi 
refugees’ humanitarian conditions and livelihood strategies in the host countries, and the 
direct observation of the causes, nature and scale of Iraqis’ return and cross-border 
activities from Syria and Jordan. Being in the field for over one year was essential to 
achieve good knowledge and understanding of the economic and socio-political 
developments in Syria and Jordan, to become thoroughly familiar with the host cultures, 
improve my linguistic and communication skills in Arabic, find key informants and 
research participants and establish trustful relationships with them. During the first three 
months of the fieldwork, I concentrated on learning the Iraqi Arabic dialect necessary to 
communicate and conduct interviews.  
 
In Damascus I was initially hosted by a Palestinian family who left Haifa during the 
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Nakba of 1948 and relocated in Damascus, in the predominantly Palestinian and Kurdish 
working class area of Rukn Ad-Din. Spending time with the Palestinian family and their 
social networks was crucial in observing the ambivalent attitude of solidarity and 
suspicion of some Palestinians towards the Iraqi refugees in Syria. Their perceptions and 
practices towards the Iraqis and other migrant communities are influenced by their 
personal histories and circumstances and by the fact that despite many of them having 
been born and having grown up in Syria and despite their enjoyment of similar rights and 
duties to Syrian nationals, they consider themeselves as second class citizens because the 
Syrian authorities only grant them temporary residence permits. As mentioned in chapter 
two, denying the Palestinian refugees citizenship rights and permanent integration 
opportunities, Syria, Jordan and the other Arab states take the political stance that the 
only acceptable solution to the Palestinian refugee problem is return to their homeland.  
 
The Palestinian family demonstrated exceptional generosity by offering to host me for the 
entire duration of the fieldwork in Syria. However, living with a family entailed 
respecting the rules of the household and observing the gendered social and cultural 
norms of the conservative host community. Being a woman, I would have not been 
allowed to remain outside of the house until late at night to conduct fieldwork, for 
instance. In order to maintain my autonomy without disrespecting the needs and gendered 
socio-cultural expectations of the family I decided to move to a more independent 
accommodation.  
 
Both in Syria and Jordan, my decision not to live in a neighbourhood where fieldwork 
took place stemmed from the need to create a balance between the research activities and 
other aspects of life in the host countries.  On various occasions being able to exit the 
research sites and go home was a necessary break from the tiring and emotionally 
wearing encounters and experiences of fieldwork and an opportunity for preliminary 
reflections and analysis. In Damascus, ‘home’ was a rented room in a two storey 
Damascene house in the old Christian quarter of Bab Tuma.  That was an ideal 
accommodation because the other tenants led separate lives and did not interfere with my 
research activities. The house is also centrally located and relatively well connected 
through public transport to the UNHCR compound in Kafer Sousah, and to Jaramana and 
Saida Zainab, the areas of Damascus with the highest concentration of Iraqis.   
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In Amman, as part of the CBRL Research Fellowship grant, I was offered shared 
accommodation in the hostel of the British Institute, in Tala’ Al-‘Ali. Living in the 
British Institute was an opportunity to interact with Iraqi, Jordanian and international 
researchers and practitioners connected to the CBRL in Amman and broaden my 
knowledge and understanding of migration and refugee realities in Jordan and in the 
Middle East. Having the institute as a base was also logistically convenient to reduce 
fieldwork expenses and live in a clean environment with twenty-four hour access to a 
well-furnished library, free wireless internet connection, workspace and printing 
facilities.  
 
On the other hand, living in a gated expatriate community in a residential area of Amman 
was an obstacle to my full participant observation of refugees’ living conditions and 
interactional settings. To overcome this obstacle I spent entire days outside of the 
institute, working as a voluntary English teacher in the humanitarian projects run by the 
Jesuit Refugee service in Al-Ashrafiya, by Terre Des Hommes and the Jordanian Soldier 
Family Welfare Society in Zarqa’ and by the Women's Federation for World Peace in Al-
Hashemi Al-Shimali. While the number of Iraqi beneficiaries in the vocational training 
programmes in Zarqa’ and Al-Hashemi Al-Shimali did not exceed 40 students, the 
courses organised by the Jesuit Refugee Service received every two months an average of 
two hundred Iraqi students from various ethno-religious  and socio-economic 
backgrounds.  
 
The classrooms where the vocational training courses took place were key fieldwork sites 
where I learnt about the Iraqi students, their histories and life projects while facilitating 
learning activities aimed at developing their conversation skills in English. Every week 
three mixed classes of men and women of ages ranging between fourteen and sixty years, 
would engage in group discussions surrounding the situation in Iraq, life in exile, 
resettlement opportunities, return intentions and experiences and the factors affecting 
their ability to re-establish livelihoods back home. From their contributions in debates it 
was possible to identify the Iraqis who met the sampling criteria of the research and who 
could subsequently participate in semi-structured interviews outside of the school 
context. All the students were informed since the very first lesson that the new teacher 
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was a doctoral student conducting research about Iraqis’ return from Syria and Jordan. 
This did not have a negative impact on rapport building, although, as it will be discussed 
later, some students accepted to participate in the research but preferred not to be voice 
recorded or to be named in the study.   
 
Throughout the period of fieldwork in Damascus and Amman, participant observation of 
refugees’ small-scale interactional settings and cross-border activities, and the 
simultaneous analysis of data generated from interviews with refugees and other key 
informants led to a constant test of initial theoretical assumptions and new emerging 
hypotheses (Morse et al., 2002). The fieldwork exercises equipped me with enough 
knowledge and confidence to detect discrepancies between my interpretations and 
understandings of the social phenomena observed and those presented in official 
documents and interviews generated with research participants. The next section will 
discuss in greater detail the interview techniques adopted for this research.  
3.7.2 Open-ended and semi-structured interviews   
The choice of open-ended and semi-structured interviews as a research tool for this 
project emphasises the importance of research subjects as “initiators” of information that 
guides the research rather than as passive “respondents” presented with a pre-established 
set of closed-ended questions and limited answers. Interviews combined with participant 
observation were a valuable instrument to explore Iraqis’ attitudes towards return, their 
desire and commitment to re-building their lives in the country of origin, and their 
spontaneous cross-border livelihoods. Interviews with institutional actors allowed the 
collection of quantitative and qualitative data on outcomes of official information 
campaigns, voluntary return policies and projects implemented by the home and host 
governments and the international refugee regime.  
 
In total 91 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Iraqi participants, in Arabic 
and in English: 40 interviews took place in Damascus and its outskirts and 51 in Amman 
and Zarqa'. In both research settings additional qualitative evidence about the broader 
research context was generated through interviews and informal conversations with a 
number of Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian nationals, staff of local and international 
organisations (e.g., UNHCR, UNDP, IOM, Caritas Jordan, Terre Des Hommes, Intersos, 
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Danish Refugee Council etc.) working in Iraq and in the countries of first asylum,  
personnel of the Iraqi embassies in Amman and Damascus and officers of other relevant 
authorities. The majority of the interviews with Iraqis and members of the host 
communities took place in family homes or in public spaces such as parks and cafeterias. 
The interviews with representatives of local and international NGOs and government 
officers were conducted either in offices or community centres where humanitarian 
assistance projects are implemented.   
 
Different interview schedules and recording techniques were used depending on the 
research focus, the interview setting, time constraints, and the position of the interviewer 
and the interviewee (Dunne et al., 2005).  The interview schedule (see appendix I) used to 
conduct interviews with the Iraqi participants was produced during a pilot study in Syria 
and Jordan in April 2008 and was structured around three sets of open-ended questions 
exploring 1) the migratory trajectories and livelihood strategies of the participants before 
and after flight 2) the information they had on return and reintegration challenges and 
opportunities and 3) their future life projects. The schedule was used in each interview as 
a reminder of the topics that needed to be covered. Often, however, the interview 
interaction did not follow the schedule because participants’ responses prompted follow 
up questions, changing the trajectory of the conversation in other interesting directions.  
 
The use of open-ended and semi-structured interviews created a balance between the 
need to control the direction of the investigation and allowing space for interviewees to 
freely express their thoughts, concerns and suggestions, thereby actively participating in 
determining salient – yet still unexplored - aspects of the topics discussed (Gubrium et 
al., 2002). Semi-structured and 'off the record' interviews were used to promote the 
participation of some knowledgeable informants (e.g. personnel of embassies and UN 
representatives) who had busy work schedules and were unwilling to talk 'on the record' 
about their employers' policies and practices. Rapley (2007) indicates that crucial 
information and contradictory talk is often produced off-tape. Some fearful and 
mistrustful Iraqi participants refused to take part in recorded research activities, even 
where confidentiality and anonymity had been ensured. To encourage their participation I 
avoided using the voice-recorder and employed alternative recording techniques, such as 
note-taking and relying on my subjective memory. Face-to-face interviews offered the 
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opportunity to observe interviewees' facial and bodily expressions and attitudinal and 
behavioural manifestations such as omissions, hesitation and anxiety. Interviewees' 
attitudinal and behavioural expressions constitute significant extra-linguistic items, which 
have been included in the analysis and interpretation of interview responses.   
3.7.3 Transcription and translation  
Most interviews with the Iraqis in Damascus and Amman were voice recorded, 
transcribed and translated in the field, usually within three days of the interview taking 
place. The presentation of interview material in the form of texts and transcripts entails 
the de-contextualisation of the data from the circumstances of their production (Kvale, 
1996). Transcripts in isolation are a poor basis for interpretation. The immediate 
transcription/translation of the interview material was therefore critical to incorporating 
the contextual, spatial, temporal and social dimensions of the interview-talk in the 
interpretation. Each interview was accompanied by a detailed description of the interview 
setting and time, respondents' personal details and socio-cultural background, researcher-
interviewees power and gendered dynamics during the talk and interaction, non-verbal 
communication items such as attitudinal and behavioural manifestations, vocal intonation 
and facial and bodily expressions.  
 
The average duration of voice-recordings is 50 minutes. Interviews conducted at the 
beginning of fieldwork, when I was still familiarising with the research setting and had 
less confidence in conducting interviews in Arabic, lasted around 30 minutes; while some 
of the open-ended interviews conducted towards the end of the field research lasted 
almost two hours. The voice recordings in Arabic were simultaneously translated and 
transcribed into English. It took around five hours to produce an accurate 
translation/transcription of an hour long interview and the final product was a relatively 
long piece of written text in English.   
 
More precisely, the meanings conveyed through a form of Iraqi colloquial Arabic, have 
been translated into standard written English. Each language shapes and delimits its own 
socio-cultural meanings and specificities in a different way. Speaking a language entails 
acquiring a particular view and understanding of social reality, which is reflected in the 
narratives of a specific culture or sub-culture. In order to increase the trustworthiness and 
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reliability of the translation/transcription of the interview material it was fundamental to 
pay special attention to the functional and structural differences between the oral and 
written versions of the two languages used in this research project, Arabic and English. 
For instance, rhetorical forms inherent in Iraqi Arabic dialect, (e.g. phrases, cultural 
allusions, idioms, metaphors and comical or ironical expressions) could have been easily 
overlooked and thereby lost during the translation/transcription of interview material into 
written standard English. 'What is said in the hermeneutical tradition of translators also 
pertains to transcribers: traduire traiitori – translators are traitors' (Kvale, 1996:166). For 
instance, during an interview Ahmed, a 25 year-old electrical engineer used two 
particular Arabic words, Imamah and Tarbush, which are the head coverings wore 
respectively by Shia and Sunni clerics in Iraq:   
 
People have begun to realise what the real role of the citizen is ehhh and that nothing can 
help a person but his work, not his Imamah or Tarbush [types of head covering used 
respectively by Shia and Sunni clerics, symbols of Iraqis' religious affiliations and 
convictions]. The work of a person is the root of human existence.  
 
In the translation/transcription of the interview these words have been purposely 
transliterated since they do not have an English equivalent.  The transliteration of Arabic 
sounds in Latin letters is accompanied by an explanation in square brackets, which 
facilitates readers' understanding of the meaning and use of these words in the context of 
the interview. Ahmed used these terms in a metaphorical sense to express that Iraqis have 
begun realising that their work, and not their religious convictions and affiliations, is the 
basis of their survival. Researchers’ ability to communicate in the language of the 
respondents and their familiarity and sensitivity towards the set of cultural and moral 
values and practices of their informants can represent crucial resources to achieve a deep 
understanding of the phenomena observed.  
 
In order to enhance the quality of the translation and the reliability of findings, the same 
recorded material, especially the more obscure passages of interviews were exposed to 
the check of three competent persons (Kvale, 1996). I conducted the interviews in Arabic 
and translated them into English. An Iraqi Arabic mother-tongue research assistant then 
checked the translation from Arabic into English and discussed with me nuances in the 
interpretation of the interview data. The inter-subjective agreement of two researchers on 
the same interview was desirable to counteract haphazard subjectivity and increase the 
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reliability of the translations/transcriptions of the interview material (Silverman, 1993; 
2004). Finally, the English translation of the interview was presented to an English 
mother tongue proof reader, who revised its quality. Overall, the three researchers 
reached a good degree of agreement on what has been said during the interview-talk and 
on the manner of its presentation in the form of a written English text. The translated 
interviews are therefore the result of the inter-subjective exchange between competent 
and committed persons from different socio-cultural and linguistic backgrounds, who 
collaborated for the production of cross-culturally constructed and shared meanings.  
3.7.4 Analysis and interpretation  
The theoretical questions of this research project were explored through analysis of both 
the content of interviews and the external contextual factors and circumstances of their 
production (Seale et al., 2007). A good part of this analytic work was undertaken during 
the interview itself (Kvale, 1996). The interview interaction is a moment of knowledge 
production through the negotiation of meanings and understandings between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. The interviewer co-generates together with respondents, 
meaningful locally-generated qualitative data about the topic under scrutiny. The 
interview material has been critical to strengthening - or of course to questioning – prior 
analytical assumptions. Follow up questions were essential to seek clarification about the 
meaning interviewees attributed to key terms and concepts discussed in previous 
interviews or that arose from the analysis of documents. Kvale (1996) calls such form of 
analysis  'interpreting as you go' and indicates that this research practice renders the final 
analysis of interview data more amenable and facilitates the production of more robust 
research findings.  
 
Field notes, including hundreds of minutes of interviews transcribed and translated into 
English text, photographs taken in the Damascus and Amman, and pdf documents and 
other textual material collected in the field were organised and analysed in further depth 
with the support of NVivo 9. This software allowed me to handle large amounts of 
qualitative data and provided an easier and more precise way to code and query the 
interview material by sorting it in tree nodes. The creation of initial tree nodes, or 
analytical categories for the analysis, followed the structure of the semi-structured 
interviews.  For  example, the root node named “information”, was divided in various tree 
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nodes including: ‘sources of information’, ‘means of information’, ‘access and use of 
information and communication technologies’ ‘nature and content of information’, 
‘reactions to available information’, ‘perceptions, expectations and dreams’, imaginings 
vs. realities of home’ among other analytical themes. Having set up the initial skeleton of 
nodes, all the interviews were browsed and searched and extracts, phrases and sentences 
were coded with the relevant nodes. Often, while reading the interviews empirical 
evidence stimulated new ideas, which were turned into new tree nodes through the ‘In 
Vivo’ function and stimulated further coding and deeper insight.  The computer software 
was helpful in managing the large amount of qualitative data but it provided little 
assistance in the creative work, the analysis, which totally depended on my subjective 
interpretative capacity (Gibbs, 2002).  
 
From a realist approach, researchers’ neutrality is an essential practice to guarantee the 
validity of the analysis and the resulting findings (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). If analysts 
are not neutral they will unduly contaminate the data with their personal judgments. In 
contrast, interpretative and constructivist approaches in social research criticise attempts 
at neutrality because they create asymmetrical relationships in which the research 
participants are seen as objects rather than as human beings (Gubrium et al., 2002). This 
research embraced interpretative and constructivist positions that see the interview as a 
cooperative and interactional event. The interview-talk is locally and collaboratively 
produced and emerges from the engagement of interviewers and interviewees in a 
communicative interaction oriented towards cross-cultural understanding and the 
production of more reflexive and in- depth knowledge of the phenomena discussed 
(Silverman, 2004). The analysis of the interviews and the production and dissemination 
of findings are mainly driven by the subjective knowledge, experiences and aims of the 
researcher, who affects the interviewees as much as the interviewees and the setting 
affects the researcher (Lee, 1993). This research project has had a short and long-term 
impact on both the participants and the researcher and has raised a series of ethical issues 
that warrant further exploration in the following section.  
3.8 Ethical considerations 
 Researching members of the Iraqi refugee communities in Syria and Jordan required the 
consideration of particular ethical issues. Working with vulnerable groups such as the 
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Iraqi refugees, I had to anticipate the repercussions of the research activities (Goodhand, 
2000). My presence and actions could have involuntarily caused harm by endangering the 
physical security, privacy, social status and psychological wellbeing of the research 
participants (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004).  For these reasons, I felt the responsibility to 
respect research participants’ privacy and anonymity and protect their wellbeing and legal 
right by obtaining their informed consent to participate in the study and by ensuring 
confidentiality and anonymity both during field exercises and in publishing and 
disseminating the research findings (Wiles et al., 2008).  
3.8.1 Informed consent  
 Both in Syria and Jordan, conducting research activities with the support of  institutional 
actors and gatekeepers including the UNHCR, Terre Des Hommes, the Jordanian Soldier 
Family Welfare Society, and the Jesuit Refugee Service, meant that participants’ 
informed consent was as a prerequisite to secure access to the researched groups.  A 
series of safety, privacy and confidentiality guidelines had to be respected in order to 
conduct observations, take pictures and carry out other research activities with 
beneficiaries in the INGO premises.  
 
To conduct fieldwork in the UNHCR Registration and Food Distribution Centre in 
Douma, for instance, I had to obtain the formal authorisation of the UNCHR management 
in Kafer Sousah. An outline of the research, in Arabic and in English, was circulated by 
email to all the foreign and Syrian UNHCR officers working in the registration and food 
distribution centre to inform them of the research project and to seek their collaboration. 
The registration officers were instructed to encourage Iraqi beneficiaries who met the 
sampling criteria (described in section 6) to participate in the study. In order to encourage 
Iraqis' participation in the research it was extremely important to provide them with an 
accurate explanation of the aims and nature of the research and to clarify that 
participation in the study had no impact on their access to UNHCR assistance. The 
UNHCR officers stressed that the UNHCR was only facilitating independent research on 
‘Challenges and Opportunities for Return to Iraq’ that focused on Iraqis' decision-making 
processes and the factors that affected their ability to return to Iraq.  The Iraqis were also 
informed that the research activities consisted in an interview with an Arabic-speaking 
Italian researcher who was going to ask them some questions about their current living 
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conditions and future plans. The Iraqis were aware that their participation in the study 
was on a voluntary basis and that the results of the interview would be confidential and 
anonymous. Before starting the interview, I would introduce myself personally, ask the 
participants to read the summary of the research, give them the opportunity to seek 
clarifications about the research project and about my role and then sign an interview 
consent form, drafted in Arabic and in English (see appendix II).  
 
A similar approach was adopted with Iraqis met outside of the UNHCR premises and 
with the research participants recruited in Jordan. In every appointment with institutional 
gatekeepers, Iraqi interviewees or other key informants, I showed an introductory letter in 
English and Arabic from the university, the outline of the research project in Arabic and 
in English, and the interview consent form to be signed by the participants.  Overall, this 
strategy combined with the provision of additional oral information and assurances 
regarding my background and institutional affiliation proved effective to achieve a higher 
level of informed consent among participants (Sin, 2005).   
 
In some cases, however informed consent was not achieved and participants refused to 
take part in the research. In one instance, a research participant with a high political 
profile decided to withdraw his participation and interrupt the interview process 
immediately after I introduced myself and revealed my affiliation to a British university. 
He did not clarify the reason for his withdrawal and summarily asked me to leave the 
interview setting. It is unclear what caused such a response from the interviewee. I was 
quite shocked and disappointed but accepted his decision to interrupt the interview. 
Insisting on continuing the interview would have been an imposition on his will, and 
could have put both the interviewee and myself in a difficult if not even unsafe position 
given the political sensitivity of the research topic.   MacDonald et al. (1998) highlight 
that researchers seek participants’ informed consent and are entrusted critical 
information, while they themselves cannot be completely aware of the potentially 
dangerous uses such information can have at the time they start fieldwork.  
3.8.2  Confidentiality and anonymity  
The consideration of both the immediate and long-term effects of Iraqi refugees' 
involvement in the research was one of my main concerns throughout the fieldwork in 
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Syria and Jordan. Iraqis’ participation in the research could have had a negative impact 
on their lives in their host communities, especially when and if representatives of Iraqi or 
host authorities or members of the Iraqi refugee community opposed the research project 
or its results. Should the institutional reaction to the study have been adverse, the Iraqi 
research participants might have faced harassment or even forms of retaliation and would 
have had nowhere else to turn for protection.  
 
In order to ensure the safety of research participants, field notes were anonimised, the 
names of key participants and interviewees were not spelled out in computer files. The 
field reports, pictures, interview material and other sensitive documents and evidence 
were stored in an NVivo project file protected by a password. As it will be explained in 
the next section, when faced with the risk of being expelled from Syria, I also took 
additional measures to ensure that the research material collected in Damascus, including 
the contact details of research participants stored on my mobile phone, did not end up in 
the hands of the Syrian authorities or other potentially dangerous actors.  
 
Few research participants expressed their desire to be named in the final reports and 
publications resulting from the research.  Most research participants accepted to 
participate in the study at the condition that their statements were kept anonymous. The 
anonymity of interviewees and other key informants in presentations and discussion of 
research findings and in written publications has been ensured through the replacement of 
their real names with pseudonyms and with the omission of other distinctive 
identification traits such as the former and current employment titles of high profile 
research participants.   
 
Given the lack of official research authorisation from the host authorities, I tried to ensure 
my own safety and wellbeing by avoiding questioning from strangers and introducing 
myself as a student of Arabic language on a temporary learning trip in Damascus and 
Amman.  The lack of authorisation to conduct research in Syria and Jordan was in itself a 
serious ethical concern, particularly given that Iraqi refugees' return can be perceived as a 
politically sensitive topic in the host societies and it is therefore hard to explore without 
attracting undesired suspicions and attentions. The final section of this chapter considers 
the consequences that I have faced for having conducted research without the 
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authorisation of the Syrian authorities: expulsion.    
3.8.3 Persona non grata: reflections on my expulsion from Syria  
The search for official authorisation to conduct research in Syria and Jordan started at the 
end of 2008. In an email exchange with the funding institution of the fieldwork for this 
project, the Research Director of the CBRL in Amman stated: ‘Our social science 
scholars usually just travel on tourist visas.  I am not even sure there are research visas!’ 
The academic supervisors of this research project were also not familiar with the research 
visa procedures in the two countries and had no contacts with Syrian and Jordanian 
academic institutions that could facilitate the field research.  Dozens of emails were sent 
to establish contacts with research institutes, universities and humanitarian organisations 
in Syria. Most agencies were able to provide neither financial assistance nor support to 
obtain an entry visa. Email discussions about collaboration were therefore fruitless until I 
arrived in Damascus and could personally attend meetings and interviews.   
 
Immediately after my arrival in Syria, I sought assistance from the Italian embassy in 
Damascus in order to gain permission from the Syrian authorities to conduct fieldwork. 
Research activities did not start until I had obtained a temporary residence and an 
institutional affiliation with the UNHCR in Syria. The affiliation with the UNHCR was 
not a real internship; it was a cover to carry out research activities with the Iraqi refugees 
in the relatively safer environment of Duma Registration and Food Distribution Centre. 
The UNHCR provided great logistical support but the UN agency could not guarantee my 
legal and personal security because the UNHCR management never informed their Syrian 
counterparts that the agency hosted an independent researcher studying the conditions of 
Iraqi refugees in Syria. Having some form of institutional support from the Italian 
embassy and from the UNHCR nevertheless provided a degree of safety enabling the 
research to proceed.  
 
In meetings with key informants I always presented myself and the research with a letter 
of introduction from the university and the outline of the research project in English and 
Arabic, and mentioned my affiliation with the UNHCR.  Being clear and honest with 
potential informants about my identity and activities was ethically correct, necessary to 
obtain participants’ trust and informed consent and to increase my personal safety. 
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Conducting overt research, however, entailed the risk of being identified by actors who 
could oppose and even impede the research activities. This risk became reality five 
months into the fieldwork in Damascus.  
 
At the beginning of May, I started a round of interviews with some Iraqi Ba’athists and 
members of the Iraqi political opposition groups in Damascus.  This was the most 
politically sensitive part of the research looking at the participation of Iraqi refugees’ in 
the political dialogue and national reconstruction process in Iraq. An interview with the 
head of the National Council of the Iraqi Tribes, Sheikh Al-Duleimi was scheduled for 
the 15
th
 of May. I went to the appointment at the office of the Council in Mezzeh area but 
the meeting never took place. After reading the letter of introduction from the university 
and the outline of the research project, Sheikh Al-Dulaimi asked me to reschedule the 
appointment for the following week as he claimed to have another commitment that 
afternoon.  
 
 On the 18th of May I received a SMS message from my Iraqi research assistant and son 
of a member of the Iraqi Ba’ath party in exile in Damascus. The young man apologised; 
he had found a job outside of Damascus and he informed me that he could no longer 
work for the research project. Surprised by the content and form of the message, I tried to 
call him but he would not answer the phone. My communication with the research 
assistant was totally interrupted since then.   I interpreted the sudden and somehow 
mysterious departure of the research assistant as an indication that the young man had 
been advised to stay away from me to avoid problems with the Syrian authorities. Three 
days later I received a phone call from the secretary of Sheikh Al-Dulaimi, who instead 
of rearranging an appointment, asked questions about me, my institutional affiliation and 
my activities in Damascus. The phone conversation was most probably monitored and 
recorded by the Syrian intelligence.  
 
Those events heralded the end of my research activities in Damascus. Being aware that 
the local authorities were watching me, I started thinking of possible ways to protect the 
participants, the evidence collected in previous months and my person. The appointment 
to renew my residence permit was at the beginning of June. In previous months, other 
foreign nationals had been ordered to leave the country without explanation or 
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clarification. There was a high possibility that I would receive a similar treatment, if not 
even worse, given that I had entered Syria on a tourist visa and I was found engaging in 
arguably illegal activities. In Syria, as in other Middle Eastern countries, holding 
politically sensitive information without official authorisation is tantamount to a public 
security crime and is punishable with imprisonment (Sholkami, 1999).  
 
Given the gravity of the situation, I decided to inform the UNHCR Country 
Representative and seek assistance from some friends working in the Italian embassy, 
who, in case I was arrested, agreed to take responsibility for collecting the laptop, the 
research material and my personal belongings and to keep them under the custody of the 
Italian embassy until it was possible to safely send them to Italy or to the UK.   
 
 On the morning of the 28 of May I left the laptop, my mobile and the most sensitive 
research material in the UNHCR compound and went to the Syrian Immigration Office in 
Baramke to renew my residence permit.  At the Immigration Office instead of renewing 
my residence permit I was stopped and told that the Syrian Intelligence ordered my 
immediate expulsion.  I spent fourteen hours under the custody of the Syrian immigration 
authorities and, at 4am of the following day, I was escorted in a military vehicle to 
Damascus airport to be repatriated to Italy.  Ironically, the hours spent under arrest were 
the only opportunity I had to engage in honest conversations about my research topic 
with the Syrian immigration officers, who treated me with respect and, following my 
request, informed the Italian embassy of my imminent expulsion from the country. A 
delegation from the embassy visited me at the Immigration Department to assess my 
condition and provide me with moral and material assistance. I requested one of the 
personnel of the Italian embassy to collect and transport the laptop and the other research 
material from the UNHCR compound to the embassy, in order to prevent its confiscation 
from the Syrian authorities.  The UNHCR purchased my flight to Italy and I subsequently 
refunded the UN agency the cost of the flight. The laptop, the mobile and the other 
research material flew back to Italy a month later in the luggage of an Italian Minister 
Plenipotentiary.  After a long stressful wait, I was informed that my belongings were 
waiting to be collected at the Foreign Ministry in Rome.  
 
The Syrian authorities never clarified the reasons of my expulsion; there may have been a 
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combination of reasons. I violated Syrian immigration regulations by entering the country 
and conducting research on a tourist visa.  The topic of Iraqi refugees' return from Syria 
and the approach adopted to investigate it was evidently felt too politically sensitive and 
intrusive by the Syrian intelligence. The expulsion of a foreign researcher could also be a 
demonstration of power by the Syrian authorities and a political statement against any 
form of unwelcome interference of international actors - including the Italian embassy in 
Damascus, the UNHCR and a British university - in Syrian internal affairs.  The 
consequence of conducting research activities in Syria without permission was 
unequivocal; I was expelled and I have been banned from re-entering Syria for the next 
five years.  
 
The expulsion from Syria constituted an extremely unpleasant precedent that could not be 
repeated in the second part of the research in Jordan.  In consultation with my academic 
supervisors and other scholars and practitioners with experience of research and work in 
Jordan, it was decided that in the absence of legal mechanisms to obtain a research visa 
from the host authorities, the best way to proceed was to request affiliation to a Jordanian 
research centre with official connections and some interest in the issue of Iraqi refugees 
in Jordan. After engaging in a long email exchange, I pursued a research affiliation with 
the Regional Human Security Centre in Amman and at the beginning of August I 
travelled - again on a tourist visa - to Jordan to start the second phase of the field 
research. 
 
 My expulsion was a shaking experience and a critical event in the research process that 
induced me to reflect about a number of questions. Is it ethically correct to conduct 
research without having the permission of host governments? On what grounds can 
governments refuse to allow research to be conducted, especially when governments’ 
performance in specific policy areas is the focus of research? Why is the production and 
dissemination of certain knowledge and information restricted? Why are researchers, 
journalists and other professionals obliged to infringe the law and incur personal risks in 
order to generate knowledge about certain social realities? Who benefits from the 
production and dissemination of such knowledge?  What are the political and social 
implications of research activities, for the various participants and stakeholders? These 
are some of the critical ethical and methodological concerns which have far-reaching 
78 
 
 
 
 
implications well beyond my personal experience of fieldwork and expulsion from Syria, 
and which have been taken into account in the production of the findings presented in the 
following chapters.  
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methodological approach and research techniques adopted 
to investigate Iraqi refugees’ return from Syria and Jordan. Prolonged engagement and 
participant observation in the field combined with open-ended and semi-structured 
interviews proved to be effective research tools to gather a wide range of information on 
the research topic.  Embracing constructivist and interpretative perspectives in the 
sampling of participants, in the interview process, in the transcription/translation of 
interview material and in the analysis and interpretations of the data allowed self-
reflexivity and the acknowledgement of both the merits and limitations of the research 
methods.  Clarifying my bias and ethical concerns was also fundamental to ensure the 
accuracy and reliability of findings.  The research was designed to promote Iraqi 
refugees’ participation in the production of knowledge and information which is 
necessary to plan and implement more effective refugee return and reintegration 
assistance programmes. The research endeavoured to treat contrasting information and 
diverse voices, especially those of silenced and marginalised Iraqi refugees, in an 
equitable manner and aimed at producing findings which have a positive impact on the 
lives and well-being of research participants. 
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Chapter Four: Displacement and return in Iraq since 1968 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter sets the historical context of the displacement and return of Iraqi refugees 
generated by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. A comprehensive historical review of 
displacement and return in Iraq would include the mass deportations under the 
Mesopotamian kings, the voluntary and involuntary migrations during the Arab Muslim 
Caliphates, the Mongol invasions, the shifting national borders of the Ottoman Empire, 
the population transfers of the British Mandatory rule, the Jewish Farhoud and the exile 
of political dissidents in the period of transition from the monarchy to the republic (Roux, 
1964; Tripp, 2007; Morad, 2008; Fattah, 2009; Etheredge, 2011). A common element that 
emerges from the study of these historical periods is the systematic use of population 
displacement as a nation-building and governance tool in Iraq. Understanding the causes 
and nature of refugee return in the post-2003 Iraqi context requires a detailed analysis of 
the multiple patterns of displacement of various Iraqi social groups over the past four 
decades of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime (1968-2003).  These more recent episodes 
are directly related to the post-2003 political and economic transformations in Iraq and 
have forged the life experiences and migratory patterns of the Iraqi participants in this 
study.  
  
This chapter is divided into eight sections. Section two looks at the exercise of mass 
population displacement and other repressive and totalitarian nation-building and 
governance practices employed by the Ba’ath regime in the past four decades. Section 
three explores the patterns of internal and external forced migration during the thirteen-
year long UN economic embargo against Iraq. Section four concentrates on the 2003 US- 
led invasion of Iraq and the return of the Iraqi opposition parties and militias from exile 
to manage the post-invasion reconstruction process. Section five examines the escalation 
of the anti-occupation insurgency and the ethno-sectarian conflict that caused the most 
recent refugee problem. Section six offers a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 
post-2003 population displacement and return in Iraq. Section seven explores the 
attitudes and policies of the new Iraqi regime towards the Iraqi refugees and their return 
home. Section eight draws together the main conceptual and empirical points developed 
in the chapter.   
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4.2 Saddam Hussein’s regime and its use of displacement as a 
governance tool 
The Baa’th party headed by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein came to power 
with a bloodless military coup on 17 July 1968 deposing President Abdul Rahman Arif, 
who faced increased opposition against his military regime unable to tackle the economic 
problems causing working-class and peasants arrest, the Kurdish nationalist rebellion and 
the growing social movement demanding democracy in Iraq (Tripp, 2007).  From the 
onset Saddam Hussein’s Ba'ath rule (1968-2003) did not bring democracy in Iraqi 
politics; rather it violently repressed any expression of dissent.  The Ba’athist tendency to 
centralise power and govern the population through the military and the intelligence 
apparatus created a vacuum between the state and the citizenry, who were left with little 
if any say on the domestic and foreign affairs of the country.  The Ba’ath regime used 
extreme levels of physical and structural violence supported by oil wealth to co-opt or 
eradicate any independent vestiges of civil society (Makiya, 1994). The autonomous 
social institutions that emerged and flourished under Brigadier Abd-Al-Karim Qasim’s 
rule (1958-1963) were removed and replaced by the ‘shadow state’,  an extensive 
network of patronage, fear and violence that reshaped Iraqi society according to the will 
of Saddam Hussein and his regime (Dodge, 2003) . In order to curb demands for 
democratic rights and broaden its popular support base, the regime directed a process of 
Ba’athisation of the state organs, the social institutions, the educational system and the 
cultural life of the whole nation. Any form of resistance to this process was criminalised 
and punished through imprisonment, torture, disappearance and death (Al-Jazairi, 1994). 
These governance strategies were accompanied by state- sanctioned and enforced mass 
deportation campaigns and population displacement against those who refused to align 
with the Ba’athist Pan-Arab Socialist ideology and the totalitarian practices of its ruling 
junta (Al-Jazairi, 1994). Since the beginning of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1968 the 
Kurdish people, the Shi’a Arabs and members of political opposition parties such as the 
Iraqi communists were targets of continued Ba’athist oppression.   
4.2.1 The Algiers Agreement and the Arabisation policies in Iraqi Kurdistan  
The Kurds representing about 15-20 percent of the Iraqi population (Anderson et al., 
2010) suffered, along with the Turkmen and the Christian Assyrian minorities, the tragic 
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consequences of the Arabisation policies enforced by the Ba’ath regime in the 1970s 
(Gunter, 1992). Among the oldest inhabitants of northern Iraq, the Kurds were not 
granted independence when the modern state of Iraq was created out of the three former 
Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra at the end of World War I. The result was 
intermittent Kurdish nationalist rebellions beginning under the British Mandate in 1919, 
1923 and 1931, by the Kurdish leader Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji and continuing by his 
successor, Mulla Mustafa Barzani the head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) until 
his death in 1979.  In 1975 the Algiers Agreement between the Iraqi and the Iranian 
governments ended Iranian support for the Kurdish rebellions and the KDP leadership 
fled to Iran followed by more than 100,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and their families 
(Stansfield, 2007). Immediately after, the Iraqi regime expelled around 50,000 Faili Shi’a 
Kurds living on the Iraqi side of the Zagros mountains, with the pretext that they had 
Persian origins and replaced them with Arab immigrants from central and southern Iraq 
(Gunter, 1992).  The regime forcibly removed thousands of Kurds from their villages in 
the north-eastern border regions, where the Kurdish insurgents received weapons from 
Iran, and relocated them in the plains of southern Kurdistan or to the south of Iraq. The 
aim of this policy, as stated by the Iraqi government, was to offer better living conditions 
to the Iraqi Kurds, who were relocated in new housing projects with access to water, 
electricity and schools (Franzén, 2011).  The implicit objective was to cut off Iraqi Kurds 
from their kinsmen and supporters in Syria, Turkey and Iran and protect Iraq from 
transnational organised attacks, and to secure the oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk out of 
Kurdish hands (Franzén, 2011).  Expulsions and involuntary population transfers were 
also ethno-sectarian engineering strategies to prevent Kurdish secessionist attempts, a 
dangerous example that, if followed by the large Shi’a Iraqi communities populating the 
southern regions, could have led to the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state (Gunter, 
1992). The Kurdish leaderships protested against the ethno-sectarian cleansing executed 
by the central government to destroy Kurdish national identity and disrupt the livelihood 
of a community whose traditions and culture depended on their historical relationship 
with the Zagros mountains (Sluglett, 1989). The deportations led to the resumption of 
Kurdish guerrilla warfare that intensified alongside dissident actions of the Shi’a militant 
groups in the 1980s.  
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4.2.2 The Islamic Revolution and the expulsion of Shi’a Iraqis  
Shi’a Arabs form the majority ethno-sectarian group in Iraq, reaching about 55-60 
percent of the total population (Anderson et al., 2010). The relationship between the Iraqi 
Shi’a Arabs and the central government in Baghdad was relatively peaceful until it was 
altered by the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran that brought the secular rule 
of the Shah to an end and replaced it with the Islamic state of Ayatollah Khomeini.  
Militant Iraqi Shi’a groups such as the Dawa (the Islamic Call), were inspired by events 
in Teheran and started working underground to bring about a similar transformation in 
Iraq (Tripp, 2007). Such dissident actions triggered a campaign of repression and arrests 
of Shi’a spiritual leaders such as Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir Al-Sadr who was arrested 
in June 1979. The Shi’a community reacted with huge public protests against the regime 
in Najaf, Kerbala', Kufa and Madinat Al-Thawra, the Shi’a housing estate in Baghdad. 
Order was only restored after the arrest of around five thousand members of the Shi’a 
community, some of whom were executed, and some expelled from Iraq under charges of 
being ethnic Persians (Fattah, 2009). The Ba’ath policies of forced ethnic homogenisation 
affected the population of eastern and southern Iraq, traditional transit zones between the 
Arab and the Persian worlds which, before the rise of the Ba’ath regime, were populated 
by a significant number of ethnic Persians in the same way as large numbers of ethnic 
Arabs settled in Iran (Etheredge, 2011). Between 1969 and 1980, however, the regime 
deported many Shi’a Iraqis regarded as Persians or Persian sympathisers. The 
displacement of members of the Iraqi Shi’a population continued throughout the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980 - 1988) and after the invasion of Kuwait in 1991.  
4.2.3 The Iran-Iraq war and the exodus of the Kurds and the Shi’a Arabs  
The Iran-Iraq war from September 1980 to August 1988 was the longest conventional 
war of the 20th century. It began when Iraqi forces invaded Iran. At the heart of the 
conflict was an unresolved border dispute between the two neighbours and Iraqi fears of 
the increasing political activism and insurgent tendencies of the long-suppressed Iraqi 
Shi’a majority instigated by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Throughout the eight years 
the two rival armies engaged in a war of attrition, neither managing to achieve final 
victory. The war eventually ended with a UN brokered cease fire in the form of UNSCR 
598 which was accepted by both sides. The economic, material and human costs of the 
war for both countries were tremendous with over a million casualties and immense 
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environmental and infrastructural destruction (Takeyh, 2010). In the aftermath of the war 
Iraq was criticised by international investigators for using chemical weapons of mass 
destruction against the Iranian troops and civilians, including Iraqi Kurds, and Iran for 
deploying boy soldiers in its human-waves assaults on the southern front (McNaugher, 
1990).  
 
During the Iran-Iraq war the Peshmerga - the paramilitary groups controlled by the two 
dominant Kurdish nationalist parties the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Massoud 
Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani - fought alongside 
the Iranian troops, initially achieving a series of military successes and seizing a number 
of strategic villages and border zones with Turkey and Iran. In February 1986 the Iraqi 
troops and their anti-Iranian Kurdish allies were forced out of Suleimaniya and in 1988 
the KDP captured the northern border town of Deirlouk, demolishing an Iraqi intelligence 
centre, the local Ba'athist headquarters and the district's governor office (Gunter, 1992). 
When Kurdish hopes of victory started materialising the Iraqi government incremented its 
use of chemical weapons as a counteroffensive strategy.  Chemical warfare was adopted 
by the Iraqi army as early as 1983 but the scale of the operations was significantly 
smaller compared to the al-Anfal campaign in Halabja and surrounding villages. From 
April 1987, the Iraqi government bombarded Kurdish villages with mustard, nerve and 
cyanide gases every time the Iraqi army suffered a military defeat at the hands of the 
Peshmerga. Thousands of Kurdish villagers, mostly children, women and elderly people 
succumbed to lethal gases, with an estimated 5000 people who were killed only in 
Halabja in 1988 (Gunter, 1992).  Terrorised by this brutal actions at least 60,000 Kurdish 
refugees fled across the Turkish border in 1988 (Gunter, 1992). The Turkish authorities, 
despite their own internal problems with the Turkish Kurdish insurgency organised by the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), offered emergency assistance for the Iraqi Kurds in tent 
camps at the Turkey-Iraq border but refused to grant them refugee status and long-term 
resettlement rights. By the spring 1989 hundreds of Iraqi Kurds, particularly children, 
were dying due to the freezing cold and the lack of basic needs. The Turkish authorities 
blamed the West for not sharing the burden of the emergency situation (Gunter, 1992). In 
the summer of 1989, the KDP accused the Turkish government of secretly sending more 
than 20,000 Iraqi Kurds to Iran. Turkey denied having sent any Iraqi Kurds to Iran and 
claimed that those who had entered did so on an independent and voluntary basis. By 
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1991 around 30,000 Iraqi Kurds still remained in Turkey when the post-Gulf War failed 
uprising led to another, but this time much greater, wave of refugees from Iraq to seek 
protection again mainly in Turkey and Iran (Gunter, 1992).  
 
In southern Iraq, the mass deportations of Iraqi Shi’as continued throughout the Iran-Iraq 
war (1980 - 1988) and well after the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. After a year under 
house arrest, in 1980 Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and his sister bint al-Huda were summarily 
executed in Baghdad while the Ba’ath regime put Ayatollah al-Khoi, the highest ranking 
Mujtahed in Iraq at that time, under house arrest in Najaf. The aim of the regime was to 
force the otherwise too powerful Shi’a religious leadership into obedience (Alborzi, 
2006). These measures were accompanied by the expulsion and confiscation of private 
properties of around thirty to forty thousand Iraqi Shi’a of alleged Persian origins, or 
simply suspected of showing sympathy for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Ba’athist 
ethnic cleansing of Iraqi Shi’a was legalised by a Presidential Decree in 1981, which 
granted respectively 4,000 Iraqi dinars to military officers and 2,500 Iraqi dinars to 
civilian men who divorced their wives of Iranian origins and facilitated their deportation. 
This law obliged Iraqi men to repudiate their wives and children because of their 
“Iranian” blood and forced them to participate in the state-sanctioned mass deportation of 
about one million Iraqis accused of being ethnic Persians on the mere grounds of their 
Shi’a origins (Matar, 1997:21). During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and the 1990-1991 
Gulf war Iran received an influx of 1.2 million Iraqis (Rajaee, 2000).  
4.2.4 The Post-Gulf War uprisings and the flight of Kurdish and Shi’a Arab 
refugees  
In the immediate aftermath of the UN sanctioned liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi 
occupation in 1991, a chain of spontaneous uprisings swept the southern Shi’a regions 
and the Kurdish northern areas of Iraq. As Saddam Hussein's retreating army started 
repressing the rebellions with the support of heavy artillery and airplane bombardments, 
the Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani appealed to the Bush administration for help 
reminding the US president of his direct calls upon the Iraqi people to revolt against 
Saddam Hussein's dictatorship (Yousif, 1991). The United States, however, did not 
intervene in support of the Iraqi civilian rebellion maybe because the US lacked the legal 
mandate to continue to use force against the Iraqi army after the latter had withdrawn 
from Kuwait, but more plausibly because the Bush administration feared that the collapse 
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of the Ba'ath regime could have brought to power a Shi’a pro-Iranian government 
eventually leading to a Lebanisation of post-Saddam Iraq (Alborzi, 2006).  
 
The lack of external intervention gave time to Saddam’s military forces to reorganise and 
respond with a harsh clamp down on rebels in northern and southern Iraq. The failed 
rebellions rapidly turned into a human tragedy with hundreds of thousands of Iraqis from 
the Kurdish areas in the north and from the Shi’a cities in the south fleeing by any 
possible means to the Iranian and Turkish borders. In the south the army launched a 
violent counter-offensive in the predominantly Shi’a cities of Najaf, Emara, Nassirya, 
Karbala’ and Basra, leading to the flight of more than fifty thousand refugees who found 
shelter in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and in the southern Marshlands. After the government 
restored control over the Shi’a population, the regime resumed its persecution of Shi’a 
clerics and in 1999 Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr and both his sons suffered the fate of their 
predecessors (Tripp, 2007).  
 
In the same years around forty thousand Marsh Arabs (also called Ma’dan people) 
became the target of retaliation by the government in Baghdad for having participated in 
the 1991 uprising.  The central government displaced the Ma’dan people from the 
wetland region of the southern Marshes, their historical homeland and source of 
livelihood, to implement a massive hydro-engineering project that completely drained the 
marshes causing serious environmental and ecological damage (Al-Bayati, 1989; Davis, 
2005a). These events and the plight of the Iraqi refugees from the south received less 
attention from the international media, who concentrated instead on the flight of Iraqi 
Kurds into Turkey and Iran (Alborzi, 2006).  
 
The Iranian authorities reported that by early May the number of Iraqi refugees in Iran 
had surpassed 1.1 million while the governor of the southern region of Turkey reported 
that 468,000 Iraqi refugees were stranded at Turkey’s border region with Iraq and these 
new arrivals joined the 30,000 Iraqi Kurds who formed the previous refugee wave 
(Gunter, 1992) It was impossible for the host countries to manage the huge influx of 
refugees from Iraq without international support. The Turkish authorities considered 
Iraqis' return as the only possible solution and called upon the international community to 
put pressure on the Iraqi government for the safe return of the Iraqi refugees to their own 
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homes (Gunter, 1992).  
 
In 1988 western countries did not share the burden of the Iraqi Kurd refugee problem, for 
which they were not directly responsible. This time, however, the US the UK and their 
Arab and non-Arab allies who played a decisive role in the war and in fomenting the 
following uprisings and could not easily disclaim responsibility. The international 
community took action by passing UNSCR 688 which required the Iraqi regime to 
immediately end the repression of its own population (Tripp, 2007). Then the US, the UK 
and France established, without explicit UN mandate, safe-havens for the Kurds in the 
north and the Shi’a Arabs in the south through no-fly zones patrolled by the Allied air 
forces (Benard, 2004). The imposition of the no fly-zone created a precedent in the 
history of international relations when the international community collectively justified 
the violation of the territorial sovereignty of a UN member state to protect the human 
rights of its civilian population.   
 
The implementation of UN humanitarian operations in northern Iraq began in May 1991 
with the objective to support refugees’ return home. Once this was accomplished in June, 
the humanitarian operations were handed over to the UNHCR which mainly focused on 
the protection of returnees and the implementation of short-term sanitation and water 
projects in return areas. During the first half of 1992 the Iraqi Kurds took advantage of 
the new international order and their relatively safe position in Iraq and started creating a 
de facto autonomous regional government in Kurdistan. Thereafter the Kurds were 
largely independent until the establishment of a new Iraqi provisional government after 
the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
4.3 Forced migration in the years of the UN embargo against Iraq 
After the 1990-1991 Gulf War the dependence of the Iraqi people upon the state 
increased dramatically when the UN sanctioned an economic embargo against Iraq aimed 
at punishing Saddam Hussein for invading Kuwait and compelling his regime to comply 
with UNSC disarmament resolutions. Under UNSCR 986, the Oil for Food programme 
started and, under UN supervision, Iraq was allowed to export up to $2 billion in crude 
oil and petroleum products while the proceeds of oil exports were used to import and 
distribute food and humanitarian aid to the Iraqi population. Around sixty percent of the 
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population depended on these handouts for their survival (Arnove, 2000). The rationing 
system constituted a strategic governance tool through which the regime secured its 
control and power over the population (Dodge, 2003). Through the application process 
for obtaining the food parcels and a system of food ration cards the Iraqi regime gathered 
crucial information regarding each household receiving assistance. The food distribution 
system restricted Iraqi people’s freedom of movement; the ration card holders could only 
collect their food parcel within the same region each month (Dodge, 2003).  The more 
efficient food distribution mechanisms in the capital combined with greater employment 
opportunities, led many Iraqi families to leave their homes in rural areas, particularly the 
southern Shi’a war zones, and permanently resettle in Baghdad.  Governmental efforts to 
limit the inflow of immigrants from rural areas were unsuccessful and by the beginning 
of the 21st century Shi’a Arabs represented a majority in the capital. Many of these 
migrants found residence in the poor Shi’a Arab housing complex known as Saddam's 
City between 1982 and 2003 and afterwards renamed Al-Thawra (the revolution) quarter, 
which alone houses around 2 million people (Etheredge, 2011).  
 
Under thirteen years of UN economic sanctions the social and economic infrastructure of 
the state gradually collapsed and was replaced by the shadow state (Dodge, 2003). In 
those years state employees received salaries as low as $2 dollars per month and 
depended on bribes to sustain their families (Arnove, 2000). Access to employment 
opportunities, welfare and social protection schemes did not depend on individual needs, 
qualifications and skills but on the right connections (wasta) and affiliations with the 
Ba’ath party and its tribal allies.  The increasing economic hardships and the lack of 
prospects for a better future persuaded a significant number of Iraqis, particularly those 
who were wealthy and ready to risk becoming victims of the brutality of the regime, to 
either seek refuge in the northern Kurdistan region, where living conditions had improved 
significantly under international protection, or to leave Iraq altogether and seek asylum in 
neighbouring or western countries. In those years an estimated one to two million Iraqis, 
many of them unregistered refugees, escaped and found refuge in various countries 
including Iran, Syria and Jordan (Chatelard, 2010; Mason, 2011). The Iraqi government 
considered the Iraqis who left the country without authorisation as spies or traitors and 
refused to renew the passports of many Iraqi intellectuals (Makiya, 1994: 201).  Among 
the Iraqis who found refuge abroad there were political exiles whose ideological stances 
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were not tolerated by the regime, but there were also individuals who were harassed by 
the state because they had no political or ideological orientations and refused to be 
affiliated with Ba’athism (Al Rasheed, 1994). 
 
International and Arab support for the Iraqi regime during the Iran-Iraq war made the 
position of exiles in Iran, Syria and Turkey increasingly difficult at a time when 
persecution was reaching extremely high levels. Many members of the Iraqi opposition 
eventually sought refuge in Europe and in the US, with London emerging as a centre of 
activity for the Iraqi opposition parties, including the Iraqi Communist Party, the Arab 
Nationalist Party and the Islamic Movement (Francke, 1994; Al Rasheed, 1994) Ismael 
(2011:216) argues that western states nurtured sectarian power politics in Iraq long before 
the 2003 US-led invasion. He claims that in the 1980s the British fostered an alternative 
centre of Iraqi Shi'a authority, as the seminaries of Sayyidah Zainab in Damascus were 
removed of their leaders and teachers who were hosted in London. The British 
Intelligence prepared for the post-Saddam era by building a reservoir of 'Ulama 
favourable to British influence’ (Ismael, 2011:216). This practice – if correctly reported - 
mirrors policies that were used by the British Mandate in the 1920s and 1930s, when ex-
Ottoman officers and Sunni tribal leaders were co-opted into the power structures of the 
new Iraqi state (Dodge, 2003).  
 
From 1991 onwards Anglo-American policy-makers sought to exploit internal ethno-
sectarian tensions to remove the Ba’ath regime (Ismael, 2011).  In parallel to the UN 
sanctions regime and the intermittent bombardment of Iraqi territories under the 
enforcement of the no-fly zone, in 1998 the United States Congress passed the Iraq 
Liberation Act, which was subsequently signed into law by President Clinton, with the 
explicit objective to remove Saddam Hussein from power.  As part of this policy 
approach towards Iraq, the US administration authorised the allocation of funds for the 
Iraqi opposition in exile and the training of selected sectarian groups including the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the two main Kurdish 
factions the PUK and the KDP and the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, alongside 
secular groupings including Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (Francke, 1994; 
Graham-Brown, 1999). These groups together with the Dawa Party, the communists, and 
smaller formations of independent democrats and Arab nationalists were the principal 
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components of the Iraqi Opposition. All these groups sought to overthrow the Ba’ath 
regime, they all accepted the principle of democratic elections and constitutional 
government and the need for a special status for the Kurds based on a degree of self-
government within a federal Iraqi state (Zaher, 1989; Chalabi, 1994). After meeting at the 
Beirut conference in March 1991 and at the Vienna conference in June 1992, these 
political entities unified and formed the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which had 
headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan. In 1993, growing internal tensions led to the withdrawal 
of the Dawa party from the INC. Political rivals criticised the INC for having conceded 
too much to Kurdish demands for federalism and for having placed too much importance 
on Shi’a Islamist representation to the detriment of Iraqi nationalist orientations. 
Moreover, the proportional representation system used by the INC to select the members 
of its governing body was criticised for underplaying Iraqi political differentiation and 
consecrating the ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraqi society (Francke, 1994). The INC 
was also opposed by other Iraqi and Arab political formations for its heavy dependence 
on western support and for underestimating the influence of neighbouring countries in 
regional politics (Francke, 1994). The dissenting nationalist groups made several attempts 
in the following years to form a rival coalition including the establishment in Damascus 
in 1992 of a Committee for National Coordination, and in 1993 of a nationalist 
democratic front (Francke, 1994). These alliances however, remained operative mainly in 
Syria and did not manage to establish a comprehensive front that could incorporate or 
dissolve the INC. British and US intelligence succeeded in co-opting a class of local 
leaders to form the core of the future post-Saddam Iraqi state.  The Iraqi political 
opposition parties and the Shi’a 'Ulama and their militias, which prospered with British 
and US financial and military assistance in the 1980s and 1990s reappeared in Iraq after 
the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, and were key promoters of the sectarian 
policies designed by the occupation to govern post-Saddam Iraq (Dodge, 2003, Ismael, 
2011). However, Makiya (1994:187-188) explained that under the republic of fear, the 
Iraqis in exile were unable to maintain contacts with their families and communities who 
lived under the repressive Ba’ath rule and were totally cut off from the dramatically 
changed realities and conditions inside Iraq.  Divorced from these changed realities, the 
Iraqi exiles developed romanticised views and ideologies of their home country and this 
was evident in their public statements and actions concerning the country’s conditions 
and future.  
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4.4 The US occupation of Iraq and the return of pre-2003 refugees 
In March 2003, a coalition of countries headed by the US and the UK waged war against 
the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein with the stated aim to disarming Iraq of its 
alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD), fighting terrorism, and establishing a 
democratic society in Iraq. Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion was not 
authorised by the United Nations and its legitimacy and credibility has been widely 
discussed at international level (Bellamy 2004). When Baghdad fell and the Iraqi army 
started withdrawing from the north, the Kurdish Peshmerga attacked Kirkuk and other 
key cities in northern Iraq and launched brutal assaults against the Arab population 
implanted in these areas by the former regime.  
 
Following the end of combat operations in 2003, Iraq was internationally recognised 
under US military occupation and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was 
established to manage the post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction phase, including 
the displacement problem.  The ineffectiveness of the US-led post-invasion 
reconstruction mission in Iraq was denounced by Arab and international observers 
(Cockburn, 2006; Barakat, 2008; Dodge, 2009; Field and Zahedi 2010) affirming that the 
US policy makers failed in coping with the post-Saddam disorder because of their limited 
knowledge and understanding of the country, its people and their actual needs. The 
CPA’s interaction with the occupied Iraqi population was extremely limited and it 
suffered from a chronic shortage of Arabic-speaking regional experts on post-conflict 
rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts (Dobbins, 2009). American and British military 
and civilian officers had little accurate information about the country and relied, without 
verification, on Iraqis who proclaimed themselves as representatives of the needs of the 
wider Iraqi population. Driven by the strategic objective of impeding Iranian influence to 
gain ground in Iraq, the US sought the support of local Shi’a communities by bringing 
back from exile secular or moderate religious figures such as Sayyid Abdul Majid al-
Khoi and Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the exiled Iraqi National Congress, and installing 
them in positions of power. Yet ‘a survey disclosed that many of Iraq's Islamist parties 
either did not like Mr Chalabi or had never heard of him’ (Rai, 2003:155). As for Al-
Khoi, he was killed by an outraged and armed crowd in front of the Ali Mosque in Najaf, 
only one week after his return to Iraq from exile in London (BBC News, 10 April 2003).  
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Despite early signs of local resistance against political leaders brought from outside, the 
first Iraqi Governing Council, was constituted by Iraqi political exiles such as Ahmed 
Chalabi, Ayad Allawi and Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Kurdish leaders including Masoud 
Barzani and Jalal Talabani chosen by the CPA administrator, Paul Bremer III, with the 
help of UN, US and British regional experts. The Governing Council, with a rotating 
chairman, initially had an advisory role but its decision-making power subsequently 
increased and its members became key figures in future Iraqi governments. Having 
suffered torture and persecution from the previous regime the exponents of Iraqi exiled 
parties were prepared to collaborate with the Anglo-American occupying forces to 
eliminate the Ba’ath regime and its leader Saddam Hussein (Chalabi, 1994). The US 
occupying authorities regarded the Iraqi exiles as an effective socio-political tool to 
reshape Iraqi political power structures in ways favourable to American projects in Iraq 
(Ismael, 2011) but they had not envisaged the possible repercussions of divisions and 
competition between the returned exiles and those who remained in Iraq throughout 
Saddam Hussein's regime. The Iraqi émigrés’ intermediary role was less successful than 
the Coalition forces had expected. Despite the large sums of money spent to set up party 
offices around Baghdad and publishing propaganda and newspapers, the two exiled 
groups with more secular tendencies, the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National 
Accord, failed to garner popular support in post-Saddam Iraqi society (Hashim, 2006). 
Their indifference towards the conditions of ordinary Iraqis and their constant struggle 
and competition over power instead elicited anger and hostility on the part of many Iraqi 
citizens, who perceived them as profiteers brought back on US military tanks (Barakat, 
2008; 2010).  
 
Their unpopularity was exacerbated by their direct involvement in the design and 
implementation of a set of controversial policies including the De-Ba’athification order, 
the dissolution of the national army and the state security apparatus and the creation of a 
new national army whose officer corps were recruited on ethno-sectarian grounds 
reinforcing ethno-sectarian divisions and violence instead of promoting national unity 
and reconciliation (Al-‘Agili, 2008). The various elements of the new Iraqi army 
followed loyalties and orders from a particular ethno-sectarian or political group rather 
than from the central government (Al-‘Agili, 2008; Al-Hamdani, 2008).  
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The CPA orders to purge some 30,000 senior Ba’ath Party members from public 
employment and dismantle the Iraqi national army and other national institutions that the 
largely Sunni Arab leadership had built in the past eighty years was received as a direct 
assault on the Sunni Arab community, which felt marginalised and discriminated against 
in the future Iraq where the Kurds and the Shi’a were US favoured partners (Hashim, 
2006).  Shi’a and Kurdish resentments against the Sunni community are connected to the 
fact that the Sunni minority’s supremacy was initially illegitimately imposed by the 
British and then sustained by dictatorial regimes (Dodge, 2003). Kurdish and Shi’a Iraqis 
also accused the former ruling Sunni elite for the violations of minority rights and the 
extreme violence which they suffered during the previous decades. A less aggressive US 
post-Saddam policy of reconciliation could arguably have mitigated the antagonism 
against members of the Sunni community by facilitating their participation in a gradual 
transition to a new political order in Iraq (Hashim, 2006). Instead the hastily conceived 
and arbitrarily implemented policies caused a mounting Sunni insurgency against the US 
occupation  and fuelled violence between the various Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups that 
escalated to a full-blown civil war in 2006 and 2007 following the bombing of the Al-
Askari Mosque in Samarra’.   
4.5 The anti-occupation insurgency and the ethno-sectarian conflict  
In the aftermath of the ‘liberation’ war, the US military and civil authorities in Iraq 
disappointed the expectations of ordinary Iraqis by neglecting their right to human rather 
than military security (Barakat, 2008). The US army and its regional allies aimed at 
fighting terrorism and establishing regional security more than coordinating a peaceful 
reconstruction effort. Physical and personal insecurity in Iraq is caused by infrastructural 
underdevelopment; the lack of basic services, high levels of unemployment; and the 
absence of legitimate governance and rule of law causing  growing and unchecked 
corruption, criminality and violence (Ghanim, 2011). Access to basic needs such as food, 
health, education, and respect of religious and cultural values may constitute the major 
security concerns of individuals and social groups (Barakat, 2008; Barakat and Milton 
2010). The CPA failed to cope with the structural and social roots of the conflict. The 
country was ruled by incompetent policy-makers without a settled policy and an effective 
economic reconstruction plan (Cockburn, 2006). 
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Actions taken in the first years of the occupation such as the siege and destruction of 
Fallujah and Najaf, the Abu Graib scandal, the Blackwater killings and the US army 
indifference, and in some instances involvement, in the looting and destruction of Iraqi 
cultural heritage sites such as the rests of ancient Babylon and the National Museum, 
contributed to augmenting the level of collective humiliation and indignation among the 
Iraqi people and to the transformation of spontaneous anti-occupation resistance into 
organised insurgency (Fontan, 2006; Ismael, 2011). The Iraqi opposition to the US 
occupation was expressed, among others, by the Secretary General of the Association of 
Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Harith Al-Dari (2009), at the National Accord Conference held 
in Cairo on the 15th November 2005:  
 
 It is the endless acts of brutality that we have always warned against that is making the 
resistance take a wider scale. […] Today the Iraqis suffer from serious wounds in their 
dignity: the scandals of Abu Graib, the attacks to the Koran, the breakings into mosques, 
the massacres of Fallujah and Najaf among other Iraqi cities, the imprisonment of women 
and similar violent events led the Iraqis to consider the end of the occupation of their 
country as the only viable way out from this situation.  
 
After the state collapsed and law and order turned into chaos under the US occupation, 
panic spread among the Iraqi people who divided and sought protection from families, 
tribes, clans, religious authorities, civil groups, political parties and any other force or 
power that could shelter them. The feeling of national belonging was suspended and 
replaced by communal loyalties that started competing to achieve a place of authority in 
the new political power structure (Saleh, 2008). In a desperate search for security, the 
post-2003 Iraqi society has fallen into the trap of symbolic ethno-sectarian politics 
(Kaufman, 2006) constructed by foreign powers, local parties and religious leaders who 
manipulated historical ethnic and religious resentments and divisions to achieve political 
and material goals and to justify the adoption of extremist policies and practices 
purportedly aimed at defending their people’s security and interests. The political process 
has thereby become a dangerous sociological experiment resulting in the exaggeration of 
the sense of ethno-sectarian belonging and in the escalation of the internal Sunni-Shi’a 
violent conflict over access to resources and political power that affected all Iraqis 
regardless of their ethnic, religious and sectarian affiliation.   
 
Divisions between the three main communities, the Shi’a, the Kurds and the Sunni have 
deepened with the institutionalisation of ethno-sectarianism as the organising principle of 
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contemporary Iraqi politics (Hashim, 2006; Barakat and Milton, 2010). Iraq has been 
subject to a process of ethnically-based territorial polarisation enshrined by the new 
constitution and the establishment of a federal government after the elections of 
December and January 2005.  
 
In January 2005, there was a nationwide vote for a Transitional National Assembly 
(TNA) which would draft the constitution. The structure of these elections predetermined 
the Shi’a and Kurdish victory, as the electoral system was based on proportional 
representation, with Iraq considered as a single electoral constituency (ICG, 2005a; 
2005b). The members of the Sunni Arab community boycotted the elections partly 
because of fear of violence and partly because they perceived the process as an 
illegitimate foreign imposition. The Sunni Arab boycott led to serious electoral and 
political consequences: the Interim Government was controlled by a Shi’a–Kurdish 
coalition and the Sunni minority was under-represented in the parliament and in the 
negotiations concerning the constitution. A result of the Sunnis’ exclusion from official 
political negotiations was the mounting sectarian strife and insurgency against the US 
military forces. Eventually, the US civil administration realised that the constitution-
making process could not take place without involving the Sunni element of the Iraqi 
society. Thus, on the 5
th
 of July, fifteen unelected representatives of the Sunni Arab 
community were added to the 55-member Constitutional Committee with full voting 
power, accompanied by one representative of the Sabean community.   
 
Following these elections, it took three months for a stable government to be established 
and another month before the TNA appointed a committee to write the constitution. At 
the third election on the 15
th
 of December, the Iraqis were asked to vote for a permanent 
Iraqi parliament serving a four year term. This time the elections were performed 
according to a new district-based system of proportional representation within the 
eighteen Iraqi governorates (ICG, 2005a; 2005b). A number of seats were reserved for 
Sunni Arabs’ representation in the government regardless of their actual participation in 
the elections. This time the voter turnout was rather high at 79.6 percent and Sunni Arabs 
participated in the elections but the outcomes confirmed the ethnically-based and 
sectarian distribution of votes and the demographic predominance of the Shi’a-Kurdish 
majority over the Sunni minority (Ghanim, 2011). Although some Iraqis may have cast 
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cross-ethnic and cross-sectarian votes, the majority of the Iraqi people voted for parties 
which traded on their ethnic or confessional identities (ICG, 2005a; 2005b). Party leaders 
managed to gain votes and political power by adopting a chauvinistic rhetoric and 
manipulating intra-ethnic and confessional competition and hostilities. The consolidation 
of political power by evoking Iraqis’ collective memory of past traumas and fomenting 
irrational fear and hatred toward the ‘other’ has become an inescapable trap. Once intra-
ethnic and sectarian violence had been triggered, it rapidly escalated into civil conflict 
and to a new mass population displacement. 
4.6 The post-2003 population displacement and return in Iraq 
From the end of military operations in May 2003 to the destruction of Al-Askari Mosque 
in Samarra’ on 22 February 2006, population displacement was mainly provoked by the 
US-led military campaigns against the growing Iraqi insurgency including the flight of 
around 200,000 people during the US military siege of Fallujah in November 2004. In the 
same period intra-communal tensions started surfacing, aggravated by the return of an 
estimated 325,000 pre-2003 refugees principally Kurds and Shi’a, who spontaneously 
returned from Iran (Ferris, 2007) to end up in a state of secondary internal displacement 
due to the unpreparedness of the Iraqi Interim Government and the lack of housing, 
infrastructures and public services (Sassoon, 2009). 
 
Disputes over property and land were the main source of intra-communal tensions. Many 
Kurds returned to the northern areas of Kirkuk and Tameem where their lands and 
properties had been completely destroyed by the former regime and set up tents near their 
former homes. At the same time, thousands of Arabs living in formerly Kurdish homes 
were displaced by returning IDPs and were forced to return south (Ferris, 2007). An 
estimated 400,000 Iraqi Shi’as who found refuge in Iran from Saddam’s persecution also 
started to return (Van Engeland-Nourai, 2008). These were people who had either been 
deported by the Iraqi security apparatus or were forced to escape the regime’s political 
persecution and ethnic-homogenisation policies in the previous decades.  Although in 
2003, the south of Iraq was relatively safe for the Shi’a, growing sectarian violence, 
criminality, and military operations, created a climate of constant insecurity and fear 
which provoked further population displacement.  
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The climate of ethno-sectarian intolerance, mistrust and violence culminated in the 
bombing of Al-Askari Mosque in February 2006, triggering a new wave of acute 
displacement of  people who were forced from mixed areas to single-sect ones. 
Displacement became the strategic objective in the armed struggle between the Sunnis 
and Shi’as fighting to consolidate territorial and political control (Sassoon, 2009).  Ethno-
sectarian tensions turned into a full-blown civil conflict and the Iraqi displaced and 
dispossessed became the victims of indiscriminate political violence and ethnic cleansing. 
The IOM Mid-Year Review (2007:1) describes the displacement in Iraq as follows:  
 
Displacement due to sectarian violence generally saw Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) moving from religious and ethnically mixed communities to homogenous ones. 
Shias tended to move from the center to the south, while Sunnis tended to move from the 
south to the upper center, especially to Anbar. In large cities like Baghdad and Baquba, 
both Sunnis and Shias were displaced within the city to homogenous neighborhoods. 
Christians primarily fled to Ninewa and the northern three governorates, and Kurds were 
usually displaced within Diyala and Kirkuk and to the northern three governorates. 
 
The sectarian-induced displacement contributed to a territorial polarisation of Iraq. This 
new demographic segregation is likely to have a long-lasting political and economic 
impact on the country, and is likely to lead to a radical transformation of the future 
structure of the Iraqi society.  About 70% of the Iraqi IDPs come from Baghdad and so 
far have relied on family ties and social networks’ support to find safe havens in other 
urban areas (IOM, 2007). However, since 2007 many governorates have started facing 
resource and financial constraints and can no longer absorb growing numbers of people.  
The majority of Iraqi IDPs lived in degrading conditions and lacked food, drinkable 
water, basic sanitation, electricity, education, employment, and health care. The arrival of 
new displaced persons caused widespread resentment as prices increased and basic 
services were further strained. The southern governorates, which in 2006 welcomed 
IDPs, began imposing restrictions on entry due to these economic and security problems. 
The three northern governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah also restricted IDPs 
access to their territory unless they were sponsored by someone living within the 
governorate (Weiss Fagen, 2007). The lack of political and economic improvements and 
the persisting sectarian violence led a growing number of Iraqis to seek refuge across the 
country’s borders. 
 
According to UNHCR estimates, by April 2008 over 4 million Iraqis have been displaced 
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around the world, including some 2.2 million inside Iraq and over 2 million within 
neighbouring states. In particular, it is estimated that Syria hosted 1.5 million refugees 
and Jordan 500,000 people (UNHCR, 2009a). As noted before, however, there are 
concerns that the governments of Syria and Jordan, the main recipient countries of Iraqi 
refugees, inflated the refugee figures to justify increased funding appeals (Chatelard, 
2011; Dodd, 2011).  
  
 
 
     
 Figure 4.1 - Iraq displacement 2003-2008                          Source: UNHCR 2009 
 
The majority of the Iraqi refugees hosted by neighbouring countries represent the Iraqi 
middle-class; the professionals, the intellectuals and the members of the political class are 
deemed essential in order to rebuild their country and to reconstruct social and economic 
institutions (Weiss Fagen, 2007). However, this group of Iraqis also has financial and 
social capital that enables them and their families to remain outside Iraq until the 
situation stabilises. Refugees’ return and participation in the reconstruction and 
reconciliation process in their home areas greatly depends on the policies and practices 
adopted by the post-2003 Iraqi governments to facilitate their return and reintegration in 
the home communities. 
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4.7 The policies of the new Iraqi regime towards the refugees 
The response of the new Iraqi governments to the post-2003 Iraqi displacement problem 
has been slow and characterised by a combination of lack of capacity and ambivalent 
political perceptions towards different groups of displaced Iraqis. At the beginning of the 
refugee crisis, in early 2007, the Iraqi government was expected to allocate the surpluses 
of the national budget of fiscal year 2007 for the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
the Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries (Leenders, 2008).   
 
Despite mutual suspicion and disputes over the refugee figures, in 2008 the Iraqi 
government provided a financial grant of $25 million, $15 million to Syria and $10 to 
Jordan, for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi refugee populations in 
their territories (Leenders, 2008). After the 2007 US military 'surge' in troops, the security 
situation in Iraq improved and under the Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA) of 30 June 
2009, the Iraqi authorities formally took over responsibility for the security of the 
country. Concomitant with progress in the security situation and reconstruction efforts, 
Iraqis who were internally and externally displaced were increasingly expected to return 
home. The EU countries jointly started funding voluntary return and reintegration 
programmes, including the IOM's new Return & Rebuild programme co-funded by the 
UK government and the EU, which offered financial incentives to encourage the 
‘voluntary’ return of Iraqi rejected asylum seekers whose only legal alternative is ‘going 
back’. In the same year, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), UNHCR, IOM 
and the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration started providing cash grants of 
one million Iraqi Dinars (corresponding to US $800) to Iraqi IDP and refugee families 
who chose to return (UNHCR, 2008). In 2009 a group of Iraqi MPs proposed the 
allocation of 3 to 5 percent of the annual oil revenues for the implementation of refugee 
protection and assistance projects, but the proposal was rejected by the ruling majority 
(Leenders, 2008).  
 
In addition to cash grants and transportation incentives to promote the voluntary return of 
the Iraqi refugees, the Council of Ministers, passed Decree  No (441) of 2004 to promote 
and facilitate the return and reintegration of highly qualified Iraqis in their former work 
places.  The scope of the decree included holders of higher education degrees who were 
removed by the previous regime or fled Iraq before the 1 of January 2008, and resided 
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abroad for at least one year prior to their return. The Iraqi government also enforced 
decree No. 262 and orders 83 and 101/S, which respectively established administrative 
support mechanisms for displaced persons who want to return to Baghdad, and the 
procedures for the confiscation of occupied properties. Other national policies adopted by 
the Iraqi Government or the relevant ministries to tackle the population displacement or 
related problems included the National Policy on Displacement, the Iraq National 
Housing Policy and the Iraq National Development Plan for the years 2010–2014.   
 
These policy developments attracted strong criticism from various practitioners and 
academics (Ferris, 2009; Marfleet and Chatty, 2009; Dodd, 2011; Chatelard, 2011), who 
argued that the US and the European donor countries’ were inducing premature 
‘voluntary return’ through the provision of cash and in kind incentives for prospective 
returnees and through the relocation of humanitarian and development assistance funds 
from the host countries to Iraq. These policies mirrored western donors’ preference for 
‘regional solutions’ over Iraqi refugees’ resettlement to the West (Berman, 2010).  
Marfleet and Chatty (2009) warned that the statements of the American and the Iraqi 
administration regarding increased security in Iraq contrasted with the reality on the 
ground and that neither the US forces nor the Iraqi authorities were able to ensure the safe 
and dignified return of refugees. 
 
The Iraqi governments’ policies and practices towards the displacement and return of the 
Iraqi refugees mirrored ambivalent political stances towards the various forced migrants 
who escaped Iraq in the past four decades, especially towards the Iraqis displaced 
between 2003 and 2006, whose displacement is connected to the change of regime in Iraq 
and the return of the forced migrants displaced before 2003 (Romano, 2005).  Van der 
Auweraert (2011) describes how the mechanisms in place for property and land 
restitution in Iraq favour one group over another and are likely to have a negative impact 
in terms of national reconciliation and peace building. While victims of the former 
regime have access to mechanisms for land and property rights compensation such as the 
Property Claims Commission dealing with claims from persons displaced in the period 
from 1968 to March 2003,  Iraqi victims of land and property rights violations after 2003 
have no other option but to seek justice through the ordinary Iraqi court system. 
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Similar bureaucratic categories have been applied to identify the Iraqi migrants eligible 
for different forms of return and reintegration assistance depending on the time, causes 
and dynamics of their displacement. The guidelines of the MoDM (2010) establish that 
the Iraqi people who were removed or were forced to leave Iraq before the fall of the 
former regime are eligible for a plot of land of 200-250 square meters along other types 
of financial and material incentives. The Iraqis who were either internally displaced or 
fled to neighbouring countries between 1 January 2006 and 1 January 2008 and who 
resided in the host country for at least eight months prior to their  return, are instead 
eligible for a financial grant varying from 100,000 to 1 million Iraqi dinars (from $80 to 
$800) (MoDM, 2010). The allocation of assistance is based on the general assumption 
that the Iraqis displaced by the former regime are victims deserving compensation for the 
past injustices and losses, while the Iraqis displaced after 2003, especially those displaced 
between 2003 and 2006 are vulnerable persons in need of ordinary and short-term 
assistance. Such return and reintegration policies based on temporal criteria and political 
distinctions between forced migrants generated before and after the fall of the Iraqi 
Ba’ath regime risk glossing over the complex and overlapping implications of the 
multiple displacement phases experienced by the Iraqi people in the past decades and 
ultimately exclude needy Iraqis from institutional assistance channels (Van der 
Auweraert, 2011). Given the different waves of displacement and return that occurred at 
different times and with distinct political reasons and consequences, the current 
displacement problem in Iraq cannot be dealt with as a single displacement file, because 
there are overlapping problems and needs that must be addressed (Van der Auweraert, 
2011). 
 
The Iraqi government’s stance towards the post-2003 refugees has been interpreted as a 
strategy of the ruling parties’ to weaken potential political opposition and punish the 
members of the Arab Sunni and other minorities for having supported or enjoyed benefits 
from the former regime (Leenders, 2010; Van der Auweraert, 2011). The political 
ambivalence towards this specific group of refugees emerged in the words of the Iraqi 
Kurdish Consul Barivan during an interview with the researcher in Damascus in April 
2010:  
  
There is a group of Iraqis here in Syria who are against the current political process in 
Iraq. We don't know their number; we don't know who they are; and we don't know 
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whether they are in need of assistance or not. The Iraqi government does not take any 
responsibility for assisting them because these Iraqis are against the political process and 
they are harming the Iraqi people. […] 
 
The Iraqi government has made it clear: it will not harm anybody who hasn't harmed or 
killed the Iraqi people.  So even the members of the Ba'ath party who are not charged 
with crimes and who didn't kill people can go back to Iraq. There are former officers who 
are now working in the army; half of the employees of our ministry [the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs] were working for the former regime and nobody touched them. The high 
ranking party men and military personnel of the former regime; they won't be able to 
return to their jobs, as far as I know. Of course, there is a list of people wanted by the 
Iraqi government. Otherwise, there are no bans on any Iraqi; we are here in this embassy 
to give assistance and provide documents to any Iraqi, anybody who comes to us, even 
the children of those Ba’athists.  They come here and we are obliged to provide them 
with the documentation and assistance they seek. 
 
The return of members of the Ba’ath party and of the resistance movement against the US 
occupation in Iraq is a highly political issue and a source of controversy between the 
ruling parties engaged in the struggle over government seats, control over territory and 
resources in post-Saddam Iraq. The competing factions have used internally and 
externally displaced populations as political tools or weapons to achieve particular 
interests and goals (Romano, 2005).   
 
The return of Iraqi refugees is likely to heighten disputes over the demographic 
composition of certain areas and internal territorial boundaries between the Kurdistan 
Autonomous Region and the rest of Iraq. The administrative status of key regions and 
cities such as the oil-rich city of Kirkuk has caused Kurdish-Arab conflict and led to the 
cancellation of a long due population census in 2010 (BBC news, 6 December 2010). The 
struggle between the Kurdish Regional Government and the Iraqi Government's Ministry 
of Oil canters on the interpretation of the constitution's provisions for the management of 
Iraq's oil reserves and the clauses of the oil law that stipulate the right of Kurdish regional 
authorities to sign Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSAs) 
independently of the central government in Baghdad (Anderson, 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, the return of the Iraqi refugees is also a key aspect of the national political 
reconciliation process.  The Head of the Iraqiya parliamentary coalition, Dr Salman al-
Jumaili explained in an interview with the researcher in Amman in January 2011: 
 
Another important factor affecting the return of Iraqi refugees is the undertaking of a real 
national reconciliation process. Many Iraqis, especially those who live in Syria, are afraid 
to return because they fear legal repercussions, revenge, or reprisals against them as it 
happened with the aviation officers who went to war against Iran. The national 
102 
 
 
 
 
reconciliation process should comprise a series of laws and measures established by the 
state, including an amnesty for all those who committed violations and crimes before 
2003, unless those crimes were committed against other people.  
 
The Accountability and Justice Law was one of the main questions discussed by the 
various political parties in the context of the reconciliation initiative proposed by Masoud 
Barzani. We [the Iraqiya MPs] proposed the abrogation of the law but the other parties 
rejected our proposal. They were only ready to review and amend the restrictive measures 
applied to the Ba’athists and the officers of the former regime.  
 
The majority of the members of the Iraqiya List are from Sunni governorates, which are 
inhabited by a large proportion of Ba’athists and former officers. In the 2010 elections, a 
high percentage of the votes in Syria and Jordan went to the Iraqyia List due to the 
presence of the Ba’athists and the ex-officers. This is our electorate and if we want to 
keep these votes, we need to address the issue of national reconciliation. 
 
The 2010 parliamentary elections were postponed from January 16th to March 7th, due to 
the political stalemate over amendments to the 2005 electoral law and the consequent 
deteriorating security situation. The Arab-Kurdish struggle over the electorate of the oil-
rich city of Kirkuk was followed, in December 2009, by Sunni Vice-President Tariq Al-
Hashemi’s veto of the election law, which failed to allocate enough seats to exiled Iraqis, 
a significant number of whom are Sunni Arabs, ex-Baathists, members of ethno-religious 
minorities and political opposition groups (UNHCR, 2009). Eventually, the Iraqi 
parliament passed a new electoral law stipulating that external ballots would not compete 
for the eight compensatory seats in a nineteenth special district but would be counted as 
internal votes in refugees’ governorates of origin.  Only 272,016 of the estimated 
1,903,519 Iraqis across sixteen host countries participated in the OCV elections 
(UNHCR, 2010; IHEC, 2010). The voter turnout among the Iraqi forced migrant 
population was low due to refugees feeling increasingly detached from Iraq’s politics and 
abandoned by their government. Iraqis’ intention to cast their vote was also discouraged 
by the episodes of violence in Baghdad connected to the decision of Iraq's Accountability 
and Justice Commission (AJC) to cancel the certification of 9 political entities and ban 
over 500 candidates, allegedly linked to the outlawed Ba’ath party, from running for 
office.  The actions of the Al-Maliki government only one month before the elections 
contributed to Iraqi refugees’ cynicism regarding the transparency of the electoral process 
(Husseiny, 2010).  
 
While the inclusion of the refugee population in the electoral process is a positive 
development, the Iraqi state’s policies towards the Iraqi refugees seem to suggest an 
ambivalent stance towards their return and participation in the national reconstruction and 
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reconciliation process. Refugees' potential for political activism upon return is perceived 
as a threat to the established ruling system. In negotiating their return and reintegration in 
the country of origin, the Ba’athists and other groups of refugees are demanding radical 
political reforms and changes in the current governance structures (ICG, 2008). 
 
The Iraqi authorities are cautious about refugees’ return and direct participation in the 
national political dialogue and reconciliation process. More welcome instead is refugees’ 
financial and material capital from abroad, to facilitate the reconstruction of the country’s 
economy and infrastructure.  Faced with substantial migration out-flows, the post-2003 
Iraqi governments have undertaken a gradual reconfiguration of Iraqi customs and have 
undertaken legislative and institutional reform, with the adoption in 2006 of a new 
Nationality Law that unlike the prohibitive previous law No. 46 of 1963, allows the Iraqi 
citizens to hold dual nationality.  
 
The Iraqi government that passed this law is dominated by former exiles with foreign 
passports who returned to Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion.   Article IV of the 2006 
law requires that an Iraqi holder of a foreign nationality ‘shall not assume a top level 
sovereign or security position, unless he/ she has renounced that nationality’ (Iraqi 
Nationality Law, 2006). The enforcement of this law shows the Iraqi government’s 
awareness of the transnational nature of the Iraqi society, whose members, displaced by 
decades of conflict and economic sanctions, have now acquired residence and citizenship 
rights in other states and established complex and multi-directional transnational 
networks and practices connecting Iraqi migrants in various countries of the world. The 
2006 law could be interpreted as an attempt by the Iraqi government to preserve the 
individual freedoms of the Iraqis abroad by adopting a de-territorialised and transnational 
understanding of citizenship (Basch et al., 1994) and reincorporating into the Iraqi polity 
the citizens who migrated to other countries with their economic and socio-political 
assets. In the period of post-conflict transition, the Iraqi government may also regard the 
international mobility of its citizens as a necessary condition to the sustainable 
reconstruction process in Iraq. The large-scale and sudden return of refugees and IDPs is 
likely to strain the limited absorption capacity of the home country and reignite intra-
ethnic and sectarian tensions and conflict over access to scarce resources and services.  
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4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the history of population displacement and return in Iraq from 
the rise of Saddam Hussein’s regime to power in 1968 to the present days.  Population 
movement is a phenomenon that characterizes pre- and post- 2003 Iraqi history.  Situated 
at the cross road of three continents and in the passage way between Central Asia and the 
Mediterranean, the Iraqi nation-state was built out of mobile peoples who in different 
epochs reached into present-day Syria, Iran, Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula. 
Transnational boundaries have been a key factor in the development of Iraqi society, 
along with the dynamic socio-cultural and economic integration of its inhabitants as 
opposed to their political integration that was instead often imposed on rival sub-regional 
communities by centralised political dynasties, empires and regimes (Fattah, 2009).  
 
The transnational nature of Iraqi society is also the product of the systematic use of 
population displacement as a nation building and governance tool in Iraq. This is not to 
argue that Iraq is an exception in that it is the only artificially built nation-state in the 
Middle East, but rather to reinforce the claim that population displacement has been 
among the key instruments used in modern nation-state building in different contexts, 
including the West.  Iraqi society is constantly changing along with the groups that are 
included and excluded from the Iraqi polity in different historical periods. The legacy of 
numerous and overlapping episodes of population displacement and return to Iraq 
requires the present Iraqi governments to adopt an integrated approach to tackle the 
internal and external displacement problem as a case of multiple displacement.   
 
The Iraqi authorities have taken an ambivalent stance towards the large scale return of 
refugees. Repatriation rarely results in the achievement of full citizenship rights and 
Iraqis' potential and commitment to return and engage in developments at home is 
affected by the social, economic and political changes that have occurred in Iraq during 
their absence. The post-2003 Iraqi governments face great challenges and are unable, or 
unwilling, to grant returning refugees their fundamental rights and freedoms. The Iraqi 
post-war economy has limited absorptive capacity to integrate returnees and meet their 
demands for basic services, employment and development opportunities. The institutional 
neglect of the needs and aspirations of the Iraqi returnees is likely to increase their 
vulnerability and threaten the sustainability of their return inducing some to re-migrate.  
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As will be shown in the following chapters, Iraqis' flight, return and following re-
migrations are integral phases of the complex forced migration experience. The 
protracted wars in Iraq caused progressive fragmentation and global dispersion of Iraqi 
families, who established transnational linkages and practices connecting the home and 
host societies. In the absence of strong family ties in the home areas, some Iraqis have 
low motivations and support to re-establish permanent livelihoods in their home 
communities. Yet they may still seek the assistance of the home state to return or recoup 
their lost citizenship rights and properties in order to integrate them into their 
transnational livelihoods.  
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Chapter Five: Regimes and geopolitics shaping the Iraqi 
displacement to Syria and Jordan 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws upon the theoretical discussion of regime formation and 
transformation (Krasner, 1983; Young, 1980; 1989; 1991) in specific global and regional 
geopolitical contexts to explain the interaction between the international refugee regime 
and the Syrian and Jordanian national asylum and migration management systems.  
 
Understanding the interaction between national and international regimes demands a 
flexible and inclusive explanatory framework, which considers traditional power-politics 
and strategic interests (Loescher, 1986; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1994), but 
also the historical and geopolitical context of regime formation and implementation, and 
the identities, experiences and socio-cultural beliefs of the state and non-state actors 
engaging with a given regime (Keeley, 1990; Hurrell, 1995b; Jönsson, 1995). 
 
In the case of the Iraqi displacement in Syria and Jordan, Iraqis’ spontaneous return and 
transnational livelihoods between Iraq, Syria and Jordan result from the uneasy 
interaction between the international refugee regime and national normative systems, 
which have yet to reach an agreement on a common legal framework for durable 
solutions to the Iraqi displacement. Given their non-adherence to the international refugee 
regime, the Jordanian and the Syrian governments have regulated the presence of refugee 
populations in their territories through a migration management regime which developed 
out of past experiences with refugee flows in the region and their traditional interactions 
with neighbouring governments and international donors.  
 
The chapter is organised in seven sections. Section two offers a detailed description of the 
emergence of the international refugee regime as a de facto imposed order and then 
discusses the related problem of burden-sharing which led to the North-South impasse 
(Betts, 2008; 2009). Section three discusses the historical geopolitical dynamics that 
prompted the Syrian and Jordanian refusal to ratify the 1951 Geneva Convention Related 
to the Status of Refugees and the consequent non-conforming stance of these two states 
towards the international refugee regime. Sections four, five and six then analyse the 
107 
 
 
 
 
national temporary protection regimes governing the Iraqi displacement in Syria and 
Jordan and explore the international and regional geopolitical factors that influence host 
states’ management of the Iraqi refugees, particularly their political and economic 
relations with Iraqi regimes and the United States before and after 2003. The attitudes and 
policies of the home and host states and the international refugee regime towards Iraqis 
displaced by the 2003 conflict are driven by their relations with international and regional 
actors and their strategic interests in foreign and domestic policy areas such as national 
security, economic growth and development.  Section seven sums up the key arguments 
of the chapter and provides some concluding remarks.  
5.2 The international refugee regime and the North-South impasse 
The international refugee regime is the product of the European social and political 
culture that emerged during World War I and II, concomitant with the redrawing of 
territorial state borders in Europe and the global expansion of the Westphalian nation-
state system. Both provoked massive human displacement and required a collective 
response to provide protection and durable solutions to refugee predicaments. The regime 
was officially established at the end of World War II, pursuant to UN General Assembly 
resolution 429 (V) of 1950. The pillars of the regime are the 1951 Geneva Convention 
Related to the Status of Refugees and its implementing agency the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Convention establishes the definition of 
'refugee' and the rights and duties which all refugees are subject to. The definition of 
refugee originally provided international protection and durable solutions only to people 
who (UNHCR, 1951: Art A(2)):  
 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
 
The Convention was supplemented in 1967 with a Protocol that removed the spatial and 
time limitations of the definition of refugee and extended the scope of this human rights 
instrument to post-1951 refugee flows in other regions of the world. The Convention also 
entrusted the UNHCR as the body responsible for monitoring its implementation. The 
mandate of the UNHCR is to work with states to guarantee refugees' access to protection 
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and durable solutions. The UNHCR was initially created as a temporary organisation to 
provide assistance to European refugees generated during World War II. Its mandate was 
subsequently extended and nowadays this UN agency has more than 7,190 staff 
worldwide and an annual budget of around $2 billion funding, mainly donated by few key 
western donors with remarkable influence on the agency’s evolving mandate and 
operational approach (Betts et al., 2012). 
 
 In order to guarantee the international protection of refugees the refugee regime endorsed 
two core norms: asylum and burden-sharing. Asylum refers to the obligation of state 
parties to the Convention to provide protection to refugees on their territory. Burden-
sharing, by contrast, relates instead to the obligation of states to contribute to the 
protection of refugees who are in the territory of another state. In legal terms, the norm of 
asylum is well established and supported by a strong and legally binding framework, 
while the norm of burden-sharing is a soft law with  no legally binding effect upon the 
member states (Betts, 2009a; 2009b). The disjuncture between these two norms has 
serious consequences with respect to the provision of protection to the growing number 
of refugees who are generated and mostly remain confined in conflict-affected regions in 
the global South (Betts, 2009a; 2009b). In practice, it means that southern state parties to 
the Convention that neighbour refugee generating countries, are compelled to provide 
asylum and bear the costs of refugee protection while northern countries who are 
geographically distant from refugee generating countries will not be legally bound to 
provide asylum or contribute financially to the protection of refugees in the global South.  
 
Betts (2008; 2009a) has called this imbalance in the international refugee regime the 
‘North-South impasse’, in which northern states have had very little incentive to 
cooperate in burden-sharing and southern states have had limited ability to pressure 
northern states to share the costs and responsibilities of global refugee problems. This 
impasse has had negative consequences for refugees' access to protection and durable 
solutions. Taking a rational choice perspective, Betts (2011) uses the concept of 
substantive issue-linkage to argue that states' attitudes towards refugee problems and their 
motivations to share the burden of refugee protection are influenced by the relation 
between the refugee problem and other issues in related policy areas such as security and 
border management, trade and investment, immigration and development. This argument 
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builds upon Loescher’s claim (1986; 1990) that the driving factors in states' refugee 
policies are foreign and domestic political and economic affairs. Consequently, in order 
to understand states' attitudes and policies towards refugee problems and their 
commitment, or the lack thereof, to contribute to refugee protection it is necessary to 
explore the links between the refugee problem and states' wider foreign and domestic 
policy concerns in specific geopolitical contexts. States are more prone to contribute to 
refugee protection when doing so serves their interests and goals in other interconnected 
policy areas. States, commit to international cooperation when they perceive that sharing 
the burden of refugee protection in the territories of other states will accrue benefits to the 
international community as a whole but also and more importantly to themselves.  
 
It has been argued, that since its foundation, western donor states have instrumentalised 
the international refugee system to serve their geopolitical and economic interests rather 
than to protect fundamental human rights and find durable solutions for people displaced 
by conflicts (Harrell Bond, 1989; Chimni, 1999).  Similarly Hathaway (1990; 1997) has 
analysed the historical emergence of the international refugee system and found that its 
western founders did not design the international legal framework for refugee protection 
according to principles of comprehensive humanitarianism and universal human rights. 
Rather, this framework was informed by a Eurocentric and particularistic legal mandate 
that supported a selective and unfair definition of burden-sharing. In his words 
(Hathaway, 1990:156): 
 
The imposition of the date and a geographic limitation indicated a preference of western 
states for meeting the needs of non-European refugees by regional rather than 
international solutions. A common view was that the needs of European refugees were 
the proper object of a universal convention, while the needs of non-European refugees 
ought to be dealt with in adjacent states. While European refugees required guarantees of 
rights in states of asylum or resettlement, it was argued that non-European refugees did 
not need legal protection. Non-European refugees might legitimately seek material 
assistance from the international community via the work of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), but this direct and discretionary financial responsibility would 
constitute the full extent of the obligation of western states toward non-European 
refugees. Thus, a two-tiered protection scheme for refugees was established, premised on 
the perception that binding, legal protection in the context of residence abroad was an 
appropriate answer for Europeans only.  
 
States took direct control of the refugee status determination process establishing an 
international legal framework that allows the screening of applicants for refugee 
protection based on a series of eligibility criteria established by single western donor 
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states or states of resettlement according to their foreign and domestic strategic interests. 
The result has been the transfer to individual states of the authority to administer refugee 
law according to their own interests and the creation of a two-tiered protection framework 
that relieves western states from sharing the responsibility and the economic costs of the 
provision of protection to asylum seekers and refugees who never make it to their 
territories and remain in first countries of asylum in the global South. Hathaway (1997) 
argues that the current framework of refugee protection is largely inconsistent with the 
attainment of either humanitarian or universal human rights principles and should 
therefore be changed. Western states' reluctance to reciprocate efforts and resources and 
provide protection to non-European migrants in the form of asylum, and the discretionary 
nature of their financial contributions towards countries hosting high numbers of refugees 
explains why some governments of developing countries, including the two Arab states 
under scrutiny in this study, refused to become members of the international refugee 
regime.  
 
The international refugee regime emerged as a de facto imposed order (Young, 1980) 
established by western powers with neither the direct participation nor the explicit 
consent of subordinate actors in the international community (Hathaway, 1997). The 
legitimacy of the regime was undermined by the lack of inclusive negotiations and the 
absence of a unanimous formal consent from the actors in the international community. 
Syria, Jordan and other Arab states did not accept this imposed normative order because 
they were not persuaded by the western neo-liberal discourse that the international 
refugee regime was designed to equitably share the responsibility and costs of delivering 
collective security and goods in the form of protection and durable solutions to refugee 
problems worldwide (Bin Talal, 1993). They perceived the regime as a less benevolent 
and discriminatory system delivering refugee protection according to the principles and 
interests of the dominant actors in the international community rather than universal 
values of human rights and humanitarianism (Hathaway, 1997; 2003; Cox, 1983). The 
absence of a sense of community of values, moral concerns and shared identity and goals 
among different actors, undermines patterns of spontaneous and voluntary cooperation 
and leads to actors’ non-conforming behaviour towards established social orders and 
institutional arrangements (Jönsson, 1995; Hurrell, 1995b). 
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5.3 Geopolitics of Syrian and Jordanian non-adherence to the 
international refugee regime   
The intrinsically discriminating nature of the international refugee regime in terms of the 
distribution of the costs associated with the provision of protection through asylum and 
burden-sharing partly explains the refusal of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, and the Republic of Iraq among other Arab states, to ratify the 1951 
Geneva Convention and the 1967 protocol related to the status of refugees.  For most 
Arab states the refusal to become parties to the 1951 Convention also had geopolitical 
significance. 
 
For Syria and Jordan, the accession to the Refugee Convention would have meant 
becoming legally obliged to provide a durable solution in the form of local integration to 
the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who found refuge in their territories 
after being displaced by the Israeli-Arab conflicts of 1948 and 1967. Signing the 1951 
Convention and its 1967 protocol would have created an official alternative solution to 
the Palestinian statelessness because according to Art. 34 of the 1951 Convention on 
naturalisation ‘the Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation 
and naturalization of refugees […]’ in their territories. The implementation of this clause 
would have served Israeli plans for the permanent resettlement and absorption of the 
displaced Palestinian Arab refugee population in the remaining Arab states in the region 
and would have rendered automatically irrelevant the claims of millions of Palestinian 
refugees and their offspring to their rights of return to their homeland, to compensation 
and to national self-determination, formally acknowledged in 1948 with UN Resolution 
194.  Given Arab states’ inability to force Israel to accept Palestinians’ repatriation, the 
only way they have to support and encourage the Palestinian cause is by denying the 
refugees citizenship rights and permanent integration opportunities. In this way the Arab 
states adjust to de facto protracted exile of the refugees while insisting that return is the 
only acceptable permanent solution to the Palestinian refugees’ predicament.  It could be 
argued that Arab states’ non-adherence to the 1951 Convention is unjustifiable because 
article 1 of this international legal instrument excludes the Palestinian refugees from its 
scope. Nevertheless, the Arab host states defend their position expressing the fear of a 
possible expansion of the UNHCR mandate over the Palestinians if the United Nations 
Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) was dissolved (Olwan, 
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2009).  
 
Moreover, Syria’s and Jordan’s nationality laws respectively enforced since 1969 and 
1954 are based on the principle of ius sanguinis, that is nationality by paternal descent, 
which virtually prohibits the naturalisation of long term foreign residents of Arab and 
non-Arab origins. With some politically driven exceptions such as the nationalisation of 
1948 Palestinian refugees who resided in Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 
February 1954, this legal principle and governing strategy has been historically enacted 
by the two host governments in order to prevent demographic changes that could lead to 
shifts in balance-of-power between the various ethnic, confessional and social groupings 
in the two countries and consequently to claims from emerging minorities and interest 
groups for greater inclusion and representation in government, and for the restructuring of 
national political power sharing arrangements (Fargues, 1993; McColl, 1993; Tobin, 
2012; Khatib et al., 2012). 
 
Having mentioned the two principal reasons for Syria’s and Jordan’s refusal to become 
parties of the 1951 Geneva Convention, this chapter now explores the alternative legal 
and normative regimes that the two Arab states have developed to handle refugee 
problems in general and particularly the Iraqi displacement following the 2003 US 
occupation of Iraq. It does so on the basis of interviews with policy makers, 
representatives of home and host authorities and INGOs in the two countries, close 
reading and analysis of legal and policy documents, as well as prolonged observations of 
practice in the field and Iraqis reactions to such institutional interventions. 
5.4 The temporary protection regimes in Syria and Jordan 
The post-2003 Iraqi refugees’ displacement is managed within a legal and normative 
environment formed by the international refugee regime, which is based on the 1951 
Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees 
implemented and monitored by the UNHCR and the regional and national migration and 
asylum regimes in force in the host states. Thus although Syria and Jordan are not 
signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the related protocol and have therefore no 
legal obligations to observe the principles of international refugee law, they and the 
UNHCR have engaged in negotiations which led to the drafting of the Arab Agreement 
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on the Regulation of the Conditions of Refugees by the Arab League in 1993 (League of 
Arab States, 2008). This document draws heavily on the 1951 Convention and is an 
attempt to define the category of ‘refugee’ in the Arab world and to develop a regional 
legal and normative framework to manage refugee movements and find collective 
solutions to their predicaments.  Twenty years have passed since the drafting of the 
agreement and most Arab states, with the exception of Egypt, have not ratified it. Despite 
this, the UNHCR continued the negotiations with the Arab League which led to the 
signing of a agreement between the two parties in June 2000 (General Assembly, 21 
September 2000). The agreement formed of 8 clauses provides a basis for strengthening 
the cooperation and coordination between the two parties in the area of refugees and 
durable solutions to refugee problems. As discussed below, the Syrian Arab Republic and 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have as a result integrated international and regional 
refugee law into national asylum and migration legislation to varying degrees.   
5.5 Syrian management of the Iraqi forced migrant population 
The Syrian government has not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention or the 1968 protocol 
related to the Status of Refugees. Syria does not have a comprehensive asylum legislation 
to grant Iraqis the refugee status and guarantee the rights attached to it.  Nonetheless the 
UNHCR started operating in the country in 1991 and there has been an exchange of 
letters between the Syrian government and UNHCR, even if no Memorandum of 
Understanding has been signed to date.  With a number of reported exceptions (Hilal and 
Samy, 2008), the Syrian authorities have respected the principle of non-refoulement by 
not forcibly returning Iraqi nationals to their home country, where their lives and 
wellbeing may be in danger. Despite Syria's limited resources and institutional capacity, 
Iraqi migrants have also been given access to national public services such as primary 
education and healthcare along with humanitarian assistance provided by Syrian and 
international NGOs.  Working as an Intern in the Duma Registration and Food 
Distribution Centre and in the Damascus Office, I could directly observe the availability 
and quality of services provided by the Syrian and International organisations to the raqis, 
between January and May 2010
1
.  
                                                 
 
1 A number of Iraqi families complained about the quality of the food package they received from 
humanitarian assistance providers in Syria. According to the families, the food distributed in the 
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humanitarian parcels was of poor quality, sometimes expired or not appropriate to meet the alimentary 
habits and needs of the Iraqi people. Because of the perceived poor quality of the food assistance, some 
Iraqis reported selling their food rations in the local market for the amount of 800 Syrian Pounds (£10.00)  
 
Fig.  5.2 - UNHCR food rations sold in a local market in Damascus,  
March 2010 
Fig. 5.1 - Duma Food and Assistance Distribution Centre, February 2010 
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The UNHCR coordinates with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and local and international 
organisations to provide assistance in the areas of healthcare, education and vocational 
training, food, cash and in-kind assistance, community services, outreach and legal 
assistance for refugees who need support to renew their residence permits or face legal 
problems with the host authorities. The Syrian authorities have generally guaranteed UN 
case workers’ access to detained asylum seekers and refugees but the agency was unable 
to regularly monitor their condition or refugee movements at the borders (Hilal and 
Samy, 2008).  In the absence of a Syrian national office specialised in refugee issues the 
UNHCR offices and centres in Damascus and Duma conduct registrations and the 
refugee status determination.   In the absence of an official mechanism to extend legal 
status to UNHCR-recognised refugees, Iraqi forced migrants’ entrance and stay in the 
country is regulated in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 29 of 15 January 1970 on 
the Entry, Exit and Residence of Aliens in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syrian Arab 
Republic, 1970). This law is implemented through executive regulations and residency 
policies that continually change along with Syria’s economic and political concerns and 
its relations with Iraq and the international community.  
 
In 2003 the Syrian government adopted an open door policy towards Iraqi refugees 
escaping the US-led war against Saddam Hussein’s regime. The Syrian government 
authorised the implementation of a Temporary Protection Regime (TPR) that allowed the 
UNHCR to grant the prima facie refugee status to most Iraqi externally displaced 
registered with the UN agency (Berman, 2010).  Being registered as refugees with the 
UNHCR, however, did not automatically entitle the Iraqi migrants residency status in the 
country.  Their presence was regulated through special entry and residency rules and in 
October 2007, due to differences between the Syrian and the Iraqi government of Prime 
Minister Al-Maliki over sharing the financial responsibility for the Iraqi refugee 
population, Syria suspended the initial consent to the Temporary Protection Regime and 
imposed visa restrictions on the Iraqi nationals trying to access the country.   
 
At the time of the research in 2010, this visa regime was still in place and Iraqis had to 
116 
 
 
 
 
purchase entry visas either from the Syrian embassy in Baghdad for $50 or from 
specialised travel agencies that reportedly triple charged the Iraqis for a Syrian visa
2
. The 
Syrian immigration authorities were granting annual residence permits to highly skilled 
Iraqis employable in the local labour market, members of the Iraqi Ba’ath party, members 
of the Council of the Iraqi Tribes
3
, families with children enrolled in Syrian schools, 
Iraqis undertaking medical treatment in Syria, Iraqi owners of properties/businesses in 
Syria and Iraqi professionals registered with the Iraqi Chamber of Commerce or Artist 
Unions.  Those refugees who did not belong to these categories applied for a 
humanitarian permit of stay valid for three months and renewable for another three 
months at the Immigration and Passports Department
4
. Iraqis interviewed for this study 
reported that they had renewed their short-term permits of stay several times, at no cost. 
Iraqis in possession of valid residence permits could obtain an exit and re-entry 
authorisation from the Syrian Immigration Authorities, which allowed them to travel 
back and forth between Syria and Iraq without incurring new entry visa costs. The exit 
and re-entry authorisation expired three months after its date of issue.   
 
Syrian immigration and residency policies towards the Iraqi displaced appear to have 
been motivated by the regime’s strategic goals in other domestic and foreign policy areas, 
including political calculations against US and international pressures and sanctions, 
attachment to international financial assistance in a period of economic crisis and 
ambitions to deepen political influence and trade relations in post-Saddam Iraq.  The link 
between Syrian attitudes and policies towards the Iraqi displacement and its international 
and regional geopolitical strategic role is discussed in further details below. 
5.5.1 The geopolitics of Syria’s management of the Iraqi displacement  
Syria publicly denounced the illegality and illegitimacy of the US-led military operations 
                                                 
 
2 A number of Iraqi research participants reported being charged extra fees, commissions or having to pay 
bribes to Iraqi and Syrian agents, embassy personnel, border and immigration officers in order to obtain 
entry visas or to renew their residence permits in Syria.  
3 During fieldwork interviews were conducted with a number of Iraqis who obtained their annual residence 
permit through the subsidiary work of Iraqi institutions such as the Council of Iraqi Tribes, an association 
that plays a coordinating and mediating role between the Iraqi people and the Syrian authorities.  The Iraqis 
who applied for a Syrian residence permit through the Council obtain annual residence permits while Iraqis 
who did not go through these channels obtained temporary residence permits. 
4 Interview of the researcher with Senior UNHCR Syria Protection Officers and Legal Advisors in Kafer 
Sousah, Damascus, 30 March 2010  
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in Iraq since March 2003. Syrian analysts and commentators explained that none of Iraq's 
neighbours felt that Iraq was a threat, and that weapons of mass destruction were a mere 
pretext for a war motivated by the interests of Israel and US companies that sought to 
profit from post-war reconstruction contracts in Iraq (Hinnebusch, 2006). The Syrian 
regime’s self-proclaimed role as a promoter of Pan-Arab unity against the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine and US imperialist projects in the Middle East is confirmed by 
the presence in its territory of activists of the Palestinian militant group Hamas and more 
recently of the Iraqi resistance movement, including exponents of the outlawed Iraqi 
Ba’ath party and the Nationalist and Islamic Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Iraq, a 
platform of anti-occupation organisations formed by former military officers, politicians 
and intellectuals with Arab nationalist, socialist and communist orientations
5
.  
 
Damascus’ close ties with Iran and Hizbollah in Lebanon, combined with its hospitality 
towards Palestinian and Iraqi opposition groups has been a source of continued tensions 
in Syrian-Iraqi-US relations. Despite reciprocal commitments to cooperate in the area of 
border security since 2003 the Syrian authorities have been repeatedly accused by the 
Iraqi and US governments of protecting infiltrators responsible for terrorist attacks in Iraq 
(The Guardian, 9 December 2009). In 2009 Syria and Iraq recalled their ambassadors 
after Syria refused to extradite two high-ranking members of the Iraqi Ba’ath party 
accused by the Iraqi authorities of being involved in financing and coordinating the 
bombing of the Iraqi Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs in Baghdad in August 
2009 (Oudat, 2009).  
 
Syria’s controversial role opposing the US-backed new political order in Iraq, and 
supporting Hizbollah’s asymmetrical guerrilla warfare against Israel in southern 
Lebanon, has had serious economic repercussions for the country. During the 2003 
invasion of Iraq US forces bombed and closed the Kirkuk-Baniyas crude oil pipeline, 
which had been reopened in 2000 in breach of UN sanctions, allowing the Syrian 
government earn around $1 billion per year in oil revenues, a critical economic buffer 
                                                 
 
5  Both in Damascus and Amman, the researcher conducted a number of interviews with Iraqi exiled 
Ba’athists, high ranking officers of the former Iraqi military and police forces and intellectuals members of 
opposition parties to the post-2003 US-installed political order in Iraq. 
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that helped the al-Asad regime to reinforce its political support base to implement 
domestic reforms at his slow and deliberate pace (Sharp, 2012).   
 
Syria’s inclusion on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1979 had 
already deprived the country of essential US development aid: in 1981, the last US aid 
programs in water supply, irrigation, rural roads, electrification, health and agricultural 
research were closed. Since then Syria has received no financial aid from the United 
States (Hinnebusch, 2006).  Between 2003 and 2006 the US Congress passed legislation 
and President Bush signed new executive orders that sharpened US sanctions against 
Syria including: (1) sanctions related to the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that, inter alia, prohibit most US exports to Syria except food 
and medicine; (2) presidential sanctions that deny certain Syrian citizens and entities 
access to the US financial system due to their alleged participation in proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin 
Laden, or destabilising activities in Iraq and Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from 
the US Patriot Act levied specifically against the Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006. In 
May 2010 the Obama administration renewed these sets of sanctions against Syria (BBC 
News, 4 May 2010).  
 
European and Arab donors’ lack of political interest towards or trust in the Syrian 
government was evident in the limited amount of financial aid they offered to share the 
costs of the Iraqi refugee crisis borne by the Syrian government.  The financial support 
Syria received included $18 million granted by the EU directly to the Syrian state and 
another $10 million donated by the United Arab Emirates through the UNHCR, along 
with other small donations that were insignificant vis-à-vis the amount needed to support 
the Iraqi refugee population in Syria (Sasson, 2009).  As a general trend international aid 
materialised unevenly and largely reflected host countries’ diplomatic relations with the 
US and international donors rather than the size of the refugee population in each 
country: Jordan received nearly twice as much as Syria and 1.4 times as much as 
Lebanon
 
(AI, 2008; Seeley, 2010) 
 
Syria tried to improve its relations with Iraq and the US by boosting surveillance over its 
600-km-long eastern border with Iraq and more effectively controlling the movement of 
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people and goods entering Iraq from its border points with the aim of stopping the flow of 
militants (The Washington Times, 23 September 2004). The Syrian regime also refrained 
from opposing the so-called Roadmap to Middle East Peace, closed down the Damascus-
based press offices of the militant Palestinian factions, put Hizbollah under pressure to 
refrain from attacking Israel from southern Lebanon, and offered to resume peace 
negotiations with Israel (Hinnebusch, 2006). In this tense political climate the Syrian 
authorities also restricted Iraqi refugees' freedom of expression and assembly and 
restrained their engagement in transnational political activism. These measures bore 
positive fruit as by 2010-2011, relations between Damascus and Baghdad had 
dramatically improved (Al Jazeera, 10 October 2010). 
 
The ambivalence of Syrian relations with Iraq reflected the fact that Syria was caught 
between its desire to resist the reality of regime change and occupation on the one hand, 
and its need to ensure its own security and stability by remaining within UN legitimacy 
and by rehabilitating and expanding its economic and political agenda in Iraq (Zisser, 
2009). The Syrian government used the presence of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
refugees in Syria as a bargaining card to obtain international recognition and financial aid 
and to wring concessions on Syrian-US relations on issues such as unilateral sanctions, 
Syria's role in Lebanon, the peace negotiations with Israel and the recovery of the Golan 
Heights lost in the Six-Day War in June 1967 (Alborzi, 2006; ICG, 2008). The al-Asad’s 
regime had to establish friendly relations with the new Iraqi leadership mainly formed of 
Iraqi politicians installed into power by the US occupiers, while also pursuing its strategic 
objectives in building and reinforcing relations with some members of the Iraqi society 
and political groups, especially the Shi’as close to Iran, and the Ba'athists, with whom 
Syria had close relations since Saddam Hussein’s era (Leenders, 2009). For the Syrian 
Ba’ath strengthening ties with these actors is necessary to extend its influence into 
present and future Iraqi affairs and to counter the US hegemonic project in Iraq and in the 
Middle East (Hinnebusch and Quilliam, 2006). The Syrian flexible immigration and 
residency policies reflected the regime’s ultimate goal in promoting lasting friendly 
relations with Iraq by cultivating connections with representatives of most Iraqi forces 
involved in the economic and political reconstruction process. The Syrian attitude and 
regulations have facilitated Iraqis' circular movements, their transnational livelihoods, 
their social and business networks, and their decisions and preparation for return 
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(Berman, 2010). 
5.6 Jordanian management of the Iraqi forced migrant population 
Jordan signed the first formal cooperation agreement with the UNHCR in 1997, despite 
the agency having already opened an office in the Jordanian capital, Amman, in 1991 to 
provide assistance and facilitate the refugee status determination of Iraqi refugees fleeing 
the Gulf War (Alborzi, 2006). The agreement authorised the agency to operate in the 
kingdom to help refugees and other persons under its mandate, with the exception of the 
Palestinian refugees who are under the mandate of UNWRA. In 1998, the UNHCR and 
the State of Jordan signed a memorandum of understanding, an ad hoc agreement which 
between the two parties which accept to collaborate following some of the principles 
contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention, which Jordan has not ratified (Olwan, 2002).  
In the MoU Jordan endorsed the principle of non-refoulement, enshrined in article 33 of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention and included in Article 2 of the MoU. Some articles of the 
MoU, however, are written in an ambiguous language and are therefore open to 
interpretation and manipulation. For instance, Olwan claims that the text of Article 2 of 
the MoU endorsing the principle of non-refoulement is ambiguous as it refers ‘to any 
refugee who seeks asylum in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’, which leaves open the 
question of whether it only refers to persons who have been granted refugee status or it 
also includes asylum seekers whose status has yet to be determined (Olwan, 2002). The 
Memorandum is clear with respect to the persons whose asylum applications have been 
rejected by the UNHCR: these persons are not covered by the principle of non-
refoulement.  Article 5 is also a source of contention between the two parties; it states that 
the UNHCR shall endeavour to find durable solutions for the refugees, so that their 
temporary residence in Jordan does not exceed six months (Art. 5 and 10). The language 
used in the text however, does not bind the UNHCR to find a durable solution for the 
refugees, the UN agency is only bound to ‘endeavour’ to find durable solutions for the 
refugees (Olwan, 2002). The only two available durable solutions are voluntary return to 
the home country or resettlement to a third state since the MoU does not posit the 
permanent resettlement of the refugees in Jordan and it requires that refugees’ temporary 
residence in Jordan shall not exceed six months.  But in practice, the period of six months 
of residence is exceeded because the UNHCR does not have the capacity to process every 
asylum application and find durable solutions for the refugees within six months. 
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Moreover, the MoU is silent on the case where it is not possible for the UNHCR to find a 
third country for resettlement and the forced migrants are unwilling to return to their 
country of origin. Art. 10 of the MoU attempts to address the impracticability of the six 
months residence limit by granting to the recognised refugees an amnesty from overstay 
fines and the exit tax (Olwan, 2002).  In the absence of a national body responsible for 
the refugee status determination, the UNHCR office in Amman is in charge of screening 
asylum applications and conducting the refugee status determination (Olwan, 2009).   
 
There are other details of the agreement that could be further analysed but what is 
perhaps more important is that overall this legal document has formalised the shift in 
responsibility between the Jordanian government and the UNHCR, leading to the 
officialisation of the role of the UNHCR as a ‘surrogate state’ (Slaughter and Crisp, 
2009) that acts as a substitute for the host governments in the provision of refugee 
protection.  As Kagan explains (2011:11): 
 
A refugee arriving in a major Arab state will not be in a total vacuum. There are some 
systems in place to receive people fleeing persecution; some refugees are able to find 
shelter, though many people are likely to fall through the cracks and the amount of 
protection available is certainly quite limited. The systems that exist on the ground for 
refugees in the Middle East are essentially off the radar screen of conventional thinking 
in the field of international law because they rely on shifting responsibility from state to 
the UN. The difference in the Middle East is that there are two relevant UN refugee 
agencies, UNRWA for Palestinians and UNHCR for non-Palestinians, and urban settings 
have long been more prominent than rural encampments of refugees. 
 
  
Kagan (2011) disagrees with Zaiotti’s (2006) claim that most Middle Eastern countries 
lack a legal and normative regime to govern refugee populations. Indeed in his opinion in 
Middle Eastern countries there are formal mechanisms for refugee protection but these 
systems are ‘off conventional international law radars’ (Kagan 2011:11) because they 
entail a shift of responsibility from the state to the UN organisations. Kagan continues his 
argument by presenting the limits of the UN as a surrogate state explaining that the ability 
of UN agencies to provide assistance and durable solutions is affected by their limited 
influence on host governments, insufficient financial budget and constrained operational 
capacity. Hence, the UN agencies cannot fully replace the state in the provision of 
services and the needs of the beneficiaries remain unmet (Kagan, 2011). The argument 
about the unsustainability of the UN as a surrogate state is compelling.  However, Kagan 
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ignores two important facts. Firstly, his discussion disregards the agency of the refugees 
who are not passive recipients of assistance. He does not seem to recognise that where the 
state and the UN agencies fail to provide, the refugees devise alternative solutions to their 
problems resorting to the informal means at their disposal. Secondly, like most other 
scholars and practitioners, Kagan suggests that persuading neighbouring Middle Eastern 
countries to facilitate the permanent settlement and integration of refugees in their 
territories is the ideal solution to the Iraqi refugee problem (Jacobsen, 2001; Zaiotti, 
2006; Kagan, 2011). He underestimates the extent to which in the absence of a static or 
sedentary solution to the Iraqi protracted displacement, the two host states have 
incorporated ‘selective’ mobility in their strategic governance of the Iraqi refugee 
population (Chatelard, 2002; 2010; Mason, 2011). The host authorities do not treat the 
Iraqi people as ‘refugees’ [laji’in] in need of international protection and humanitarian 
assistance but as ‘migrants’ [muhajirin] or temporary ‘guests’ [dhuyuf] with special 
humanitarian needs (Olwan, 2009; Fawaz, 2009; Mason 2011).  
 
In comparison with the Syrian management of the Iraqi migrant population, the Jordanian 
authorities have adopted more selective rules which facilitate temporary visits to Iraq and 
circular movements only for holders of long-term resident permits. Since 2005, in order 
to obtain an annual residence permit, Iraqis have to meet strict requirements, such as 
possessing major in-country investments or depositing large sums of money in a local 
bank account (ICG, 2008). For the less affluent refugees the renewal of residence permits 
has become impossible. The Iraqis who could not afford the costs of the permit of stay 
have overstayed their visas and are now residing illegally in Jordan
6
. Normally, foreign 
citizens who overstay their visas and have to pay fines which amount to 1.5 Jordanian 
dinars (about US $2) per day and are banned from returning to Jordan. Since February 
2008, the Jordanian authorities have granted Iraqi residents living illegally in the country 
the chance to rectify their legal status by waiving visa fines and granting a re-entry 
authorisation for those who return to Iraq (IRIN, 2008). There is no official assessment of 
the effectiveness of these initiatives in augmenting the number of Iraqi returnees, but 
there is a widespread concern among the Iraqi forced migrants that once they leave the 
                                                 
 
6
 Interviews with Iraqi research participants in Amman who overstayed their temporary residence permits.  
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country it would be extremely difficult to re-enter Jordan again
7
. The royal pardon does 
not grant longer residence permits to the Iraqis who leave and re-enter Jordan; upon their 
return from Iraq they are only eligible for a three-month residence permit after which 
they again face illegality and monetary fines. Jordan's more selective regulations have 
induced less affluent Iraqi migrants into illegality and consequently prevented them from 
embarking on cross-border movements and activities (Mason, 2011). The Jordanian 
approach towards the Iraqi displaced population in its territory is connected to the 
Hashemite Kingdom’s wider international and regional geopolitical and economic 
objectives discussed in the following part of this chapter.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5.3 - Iraqis attending non-formal education classes organised by the Jesuit Refugee Service in Al-
Ashrafyia, Amman, Jordan, November 2010 
 
5.6.1 The geopolitics of Jordan’s management of the Iraqi displacement  
Compared to the Syrian government, the Jordanian regime was less resolute but still 
opposed the 2003 US-led occupation of Iraq. In the 1990s, the late King Hussein's 
decision to stand by Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War had serious repercussions such as 
                                                 
 
7
  Interview of the researcher with Jordanian Legal Aid firm staff  
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the discontinuation of US aid to Jordan and the forcible return of over 300,000 Jordanian 
migrant workers from Kuwait and the other oil-rich Gulf Countries (Van Hear, 1995).  
Remembering the costs of his father’s decisions, King Abdallah II adopted a different 
stance towards the 2003 US-led occupation of Iraq. He publicly opposed military 
aggression and tried to convince the Bush administration that a diplomatic solution to the 
Iraq crisis would prove more effective than another war, a mistake that could have caused 
serious repercussions in the whole region (BBC News, 29 July 2002).  The king distanced 
himself from the US neoconservative policy but also urged Saddam Hussein to comply 
with the UNSC disarmament resolutions to spare the Iraqi people the consequences that 
would result from non-compliance (Hinnebusch and Quilliam, 2006). Despite Jordan 
affirming that it would neither participate in a military offensive against Iraq nor allow its 
territory to be used as a base for launching foreign military operations inside Iraq, it was 
reported that US military troops stationed in Jordan were operative in Iraq (Quilliam, 
2006).  The Jordanian regime’s position towards the 2003 Iraq War was the product of a 
combination of present economic and political concerns and Jordanians’ past experience 
of war and refugee crises generated in Iraq in previous decades.  The Jordanian approach 
towards the 2003 Iraqi displacement evolved in response to a rapidly evolving regional 
context.    
 
The visa regime, for example, was introduced as a security measure after the November 
2005 bombing of three hotels in Amman, which caused massive destruction and killed 60 
people (Mattar, 14 February 2008). A terrorist cell of al-Qaeda in Iraq led by a Jordanian 
national, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the attacks which triggered 
fears of terrorist acts by Iraqis. Leenders (2010:1580) explains that the memories of 
violent confrontation between the Jordanian military and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) militants during the tragic events of ‘Black September’ in 1970, 
prompt Jordanian officials to draw parallels ‘when assessing the propensity for political 
violence among Iraqi refugees’.  Moreover, the Jordanian authorities and some members 
of the Transjordanian tribal groups perceive the massive influx of Iraqi forced migrants as 
further altering the already fragile political and demographic composition of the 
Jordanian society, two thirds of which are already citizens of Palestinian descent and 
Palestinian refugees (Leenders, 2010).  
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The Arab Sunni-dominated regime of Jordan, shares with the leaders of Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and Egypt, the fear that the establishment of a pro-Iranian Shi’a-dominated Iraqi 
government  could facilitate the rise of Iran as a regional nuclear and hegemonic power in 
the Middle East (Rahigh-Aghsan and Viggo- Jakobsen, 2010).  The change of regime in 
Iraq could also reinvigorate radical Islamist attempts to fill the vacuum left by the 
collapse of Pan-Arab nationalism with their own anti-Israeli and anti-US ideologies that 
have already attracted the sympathy of Muslims in the region, including the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria; the National Islamic Movement in Sudan; Hizbollah, 
Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in Palestine and Lebanon; the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Jordanian Islamic Action Front in Jordan; the al-Nahda Party in Tunisia, and the Jihad 
Group in Egypt (Talhami, 2009; Hazran, 2010). The outbreak of ethno-sectarian violence 
between members of Sunni and Shi’a groups in Iraq and Lebanon in 2006 and the Shi’a-
led protests in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain since 2011 are seen by the Arab Sunni leaders as 
indicators of the ongoing shift in ideological power balance and an alarming Shi’a rise in 
the region.  
 
In this context, the Jordanian authorities have raised concerns over Iran’s political 
manipulation of Iraqi Shi’a refugees seen as a means of diffusion of political Shi’ism into 
the host societies (Leenders, 2010). International Crisis Group reported that the Jordanian 
authorities have implemented a series of measures and tactics to limit public expressions 
of Iraqi Shi’a identity and activities in Jordan (2008:12):  
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests various forms of official and more informal harassment and 
discrimination: a prohibition on opening huseiniyat (Shiite houses of prayer); teachers 
telling Shiite children they are not true Muslims; preachers giving Friday sermons in 
support of jihadis in Iraq (at a time when these were explicitly targeting Shiites); popular 
use of the derogatory term rafidin (“rejectionists”) to describe Shiites; and border 
officials often asking entering Iraqis whether they are Sunni or Shiite. 
 
Officially the Ministries of Planning and Social Development are in charge of the  Iraqi 
refugee file in Jordan, but key decisions such as the granting of residency permits and the 
overseeing of assistance are taken by the Ministry of Interior and the secret services, 
which reportedly regularly summon Iraqis for questioning (ICG, 2008:12). There are 
reports that the Jordanian border authorities have checked the ethno-sectarian affiliation 
of Iraqis seeking entry to Jordan and denied access to young male Iraqis (UNHCR and 
Home Office, 22 June 2007). The Jordanian immigration authorities do not provide 
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information concerning the rejection of Iraqi applications for residency permits or 
renewals, leaving the applicants in a state of uncertainty
8
.  Moreover, Iraqis in Jordan 
report that they are not allowed to set up charitable organisations to assist needy fellow 
Iraqis or to engage in political activism.  
 
The restrictive entry and residency regulations have provoked protests among the Iraqis 
living in Jordan, particularly wealthy businessmen and investors who, because of 
difficulties in renewing the residency permits, threatened to transfer their financial assets 
and explore new investment opportunities in other countries in the region, particularly in 
Lebanon (Hazaimeh, 20 February 2009).  In 2009, following directives issued by King 
Abdullah II, the host authorities took steps to relax the rules which constituted a source of 
complaint (Hazaimeh, 20 February 2009).  The new instructions covered the status of 
Iraqi businessmen and investors, Iraqis residents in the Kingdom and those wishing to go 
to Jordan. Under the new regulations, a special office was opened at the Karamah border 
crossing with Iraq to facilitate the entry of Iraqi diplomats, official delegations and 
holders of an investor card issued by the Jordan Investment Board (JIB) (Hazaimeh, 20 
February 2009).  The relaxation of visa and residency procedures, however, was 
beneficial only to the affluent Iraqi people with significant transnational financial capital 
and business networks to invest in the Jordanian economy.  In 2010, the Iraqi ambassador 
to Jordan, Saad Hayyani noted that ‘the insistence of the Jordanian authorities upon using 
a private sector company to process visa applications for Iraqis makes it difficult for most 
Iraqis to obtain entry into Jordan, discouraging them from visiting for investment 
purposes or medical treatment, and inducing them to consider other destinations’ (Iraq 
business news, 9 August 2010).  
 
During the years of the UN-sanctioned economic embargo against Iraq until the 2003-US 
occupation, Jordan had been Iraq’s principal trading partner. Bilateral trade between the 
two countries represented 20 percent of Jordan's $6 billion income in external trade 
(Quilliam, 2006). Iraq had traditionally sold cheap crude oil to Jordan in exchange for 
access to transit/ smuggling routes and transportation services from and to the strategic 
                                                 
 
8 Interviews with Iraqi research participants in Jordan.  
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Aqaba Port. In 2001, Jordan gained from Iraq half of its crude oil free of charge and 
received a discount of 40 percent, that is above $20 discount, per barrel on the other half 
(Quilliam, 2006).  Due to the economic interdependence between Iraq and its neighbours, 
Jordan, Turkey and Syria strongly opposed US proposals to implement smart sanctions 
against Iraq, worrying about the damage their economies would suffer if Baghdad 
responded to a new resolution by suspending trade with them (AlKadiri, 2001). In the 
wake of the 2003 war Jordan needed guarantees from the United States that if Saddam 
Hussein's regime were deposed, Jordan would still remain the recipient of favourable 
trade with the new Iraqi government. The 2003 Iraq war has definitely disrupted Jordan’s 
close economic and political ties with Iraq.  
 
After the 2003 war, Turkey and Iran have replaced Jordan as Iraq’s principal trading 
partner: Iraq’s imports in 2009 from Iran and Turkey stood at $4 billion and $6 billion 
respectively against just $1 billion from Jordan (Iraq Business Council, 9 August 2010). 
The expected privileged trade relations between Jordan and the new Iraqi regime have not 
materialised apparently due to tensions over ethno-sectarian differences between the 
Sunni-dominated Jordanian regime and the new Iraqi government formed by an alliance 
of Kurds and Shi’a Arabs linked to Iran (Sharp, 2012).  The new Iraqi political leadership 
is also reluctant to do business with Jordan as they contend that Jordanian-Iraqi trade ties 
during Saddam Hussein’s era helped entrench the Ba'athist repressive rule in Iraq 
(Schenker, 2003; Lasensky, 2006).  
 
In this difficult period of political transition Jordan’s dependence on foreign aid has 
increased, especially after its economic partnership with Iraq was interrupted. The US 
and European donors appreciated the delicate geopolitical position of the country and 
rewarded Jordan’s diplomatic moderation with substantial economic aid before and after 
the 2003 war. The close ties with the United States materialised in a free trade accord and 
debt rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club creditors in 2002 (Quilliam, 2006). In 
2003, Jordan's strategic utility to the US was confirmed by the Bush administration with a 
payment of $700 million to mitigate the loss in tourism caused by the war in addition to 
the usual $450 million annual economic, military and food aid (Quilliam, 2006). In 
November 2003 the EU granted Jordan €35 million in emergency funds. In 2008 the US 
and Jordanian governments signed a five-year-aid agreement whereby the United States 
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will provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign assistance to Jordan over the period 
2010-2014 (Sharp, 2012).  
 
Part of the US economic and military aid is destined to the Jordanian intelligence 
apparatus that monitor the presence and activities in its territory of members of Saddam 
Hussein’s family such as his wife and daughter, Sajida Khairallah Talfah and Raghad 
Saddam Hussein, of former and neo-Ba’athists and of opponents to the US occupation 
such as Sheikh Hareth al-Dari, the head of the Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq, all 
accused by the Iraqi and US authorities of financing terrorist groups and the insurgency 
in Iraq (Sharp, 2012).  The presence of these high profile figures in Jordan has 
highlighted the mediating role played by the Jordanian government in the post-conflict 
reconciliation phase; key negotiations between the US occupying authorities and 
members of the Iraqi opposition have taken place in Amman.  The renewed US financial 
support to Jordan at a time when most the US foreign aid budget is spent to cover US 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, highlights the strategic importance of the Hashemite 
Kingdom in US policy in the Middle East (Sharp, 2012). 
 
Moreover, since the beginning of 2010 Iraqi-Jordanian relations have improved and the 
neighbouring governments have engaged in a series of negotiations leading to the signing 
of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that has enhanced cooperation in trade and 
investments within the framework of Jordan’s Qualifying Industrial Zones and of the 
Jordanian Investment Promotion Laws of 1995 (Iraq business news, 9 August 2010).  
Iraqi-Jordanian trade has seen a rapid increase from JD387m ($543.8m) in 2007 to 
JD842m ($1.2bn) in 2011 (Oxford Business News, 2012). For the Jordanian authorities 
the presence of Iraqi politicians, businessmen and investors directing from Amman cross-
border business and contracts performed in Iraq is fundamental to maximising profitable 
relations. Prompted by national security and economic calculations, the Jordanian 
government has therefore relaxed immigration and residency restrictions only in favour 
of the more affluent Iraqis, while keeping restrictions for the Iraqis with less financial 
assets. Lacking the material funds, the latter are unable to engage in cross-border 
movements to personally assess the situation at home, take decisions about return, 
mobilise resources and actively participate in economic and socio-political developments 
linking the home and host countries. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
It is interesting to notice the tension between international and domestic normative 
approaches to solutions to the Iraqi protracted displacement. Iraqi refugees’ returns and 
circular migration strategies are not the product of international multi-lateral agreements 
or of regional refugee protection frameworks. They are governed within host 
governments’ national migration management regimes. The migration policy approaches 
of the host governments with respect to Iraqis’ return and regional mobility do not 
conform to the political agenda of the international refugee regime. The international 
community recognises the Iraqi forced migrants as refugees but it is slow to share the 
responsibility of refugee protection through the allocation of resettlement places, and 
only contributes limited financial assistance to share the costs of refugee protection so 
long as the displacement problem remains regionally contained.  
 
On the other hand, the Jordanian and Syrian governments are not signatories of the 
Geneva Convention and of regional legal and normative instruments on refugee issues. 
Having limited resources to provide protection and assistance to high numbers of forced 
migrants, the host authorities have incorporated ‘selective’ mobility in their strategic 
management of the Iraqi protracted displacement, treating the Iraqis not as ‘refugees’ but 
as ‘guests’ or ‘migrants’ with temporary humanitarian needs.   
 
The diverging political and economic interests and stances of international donor and host 
states are reflected in the UNHCR’s cautious position with respect to return as a durable 
solution to the Iraqi displacement. The Refugee agency does not promote ‘voluntary’ 
return and maintains that due to persisting insecurity concerns and to the scarce progress 
in reconstruction efforts, conditions in Iraq are still not conducive to large-scale returns. 
However, faced with increasing spontaneous return movements from neighbouring 
countries of asylum, in 2008 the UN agency has started a Voluntary Repatriation 
Programme based on an individual case management system, which facilitates the return 
of Iraqis who, despite the insecurity and political instability, wish to return to their 
country.   
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The analysis of the uneasy interaction between the international and national migration 
and asylum regimes in this case study stresses the importance of the historical and 
geopolitical context on the emergence and implementation of specific international 
regimes, and on the causes of actors’ non-cooperation within certain international 
institutional arrangements. Actors’ more or less cooperative interaction with the 
principles, norms and operational procedures of international regimes is partly the 
product of the distribution of power in the international state-system or in terms of 
absolute and relative gains but also of their different moral and political stance on 
specific international and regional geopolitical issues and disputes.  
 
In the case of the Iraqi displacement, the two host states’ refusal to conform to the norms 
and procedures of the international refugee regime is partly explained by their rejection of 
a de facto imposed hegemonic order established by western powers to shift the political 
and economic burden of providing protection and durable solutions to global refugee 
problems. The geopolitical context and historical events in the Middle East, particularly 
the 1948 Israeli-Arab conflict and the notorious question of Palestinian refugees’ right to 
return, have also affected the formation of the international refugee regime and its 
interaction with the Syrian and Jordanian national normative systems for the past six 
decades. 
 
The two host countries follow international refugee principles and norms only to the 
extent that enables them to shift the economic costs and political responsibility for the 
provision of protection and assistance for the Iraqi displaced to the UNHCR and other 
interested international organisations. This does not prevent Syria and Jordan from 
managing the Iraqi displacement problem building upon the accumulated knowledge and 
experience of managing population displacement in the region and on their traditional 
socio-political and economic interactions with neighbouring nation states and 
international key players. Such experiential knowledge includes host countries’ security 
concerns and calculations of the long-term impact of involuntary migrants’ presence and 
cross-border activities on host countries’ socio-economic development. The relationship 
of interdependence between the three neighbouring countries is confirmed by historical 
bilateral trade and investment agreements in the energy, transit routes and transportation 
sectors (Brand, 1994).  For Syria and Jordan, hosting Iraqi transnational migrants, 
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especially wealthy and powerful Iraqi politicians, businessmen and merchant families, 
who have controlled Iraq’s agricultural and industrial sectors for the past century, 
guarantees continued profitable transactions with Iraq in the post-war reconstruction 
phase. Van Hear (1995) has emphasised that involuntary population influxes can bring 
great benefits to receiving societies in terms of acquisition of human, social and 
economic capital needed for local development.  
 
The analysis of regional geopolitics and regimes is useful to explain the policies and 
practices adopted by international refugee agencies, home and host states to govern 
refugee populations in the Middle East. Yet this type of investigation is less helpful to 
examine the interaction of states and other institutional actors with the migrant 
populations. Institutional attitudes and practices towards the refugees, can be better 
investigated adopting the concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1991) that has been 
applied in recent years to highlight the mentalities of states and other institutional and 
non-institutional actors, who exercise forms of power other than physical coercion and 
laws to govern migrant populations.  The governmental rationalities behind migration and 
asylum governance in the Iraqi case study and Iraqi people’s reactions to such 
institutional rationales and interventions will be further discussed in the chapters on the 
role of information in the context of Iraqi refugees’ return from Syria and Jordan and 
Iraqi refugees’ return and transnational livelihoods.  
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Chapter Six: Return and Transnational Livelihoods 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relationship between refugee return and transnationalism, in the 
context of the Iraqi refugees’ displacement in Syria and Jordan.  It is theoretically 
informed by transnational migration approaches that challenge a sedentary and permanent 
conception of return and conceive it as a complex process that unfolds over a long period 
of time and entails various degrees and modalities of transnational mobility (Carling, 
2009) identities (Kivisto, 2001; Vertovec, 2001), social networks (Koser, 1997; Faist, 
2000) and livelihoods (Sørensen and Olwig, 2002; Stepputat, 2004; 2006) influencing the 
socio-economic development of the ‘transmigrants’ (Glick Shiller et al., 1999) and of 
their host and home societies (Black and Gent, 2006b).  
 
The empirical findings
9
 are presented in four sections. The first section explores Iraqis’ 
willingness to return and argues that their decision to go back is less driven by 
improvements in the home country than by their desire to rebuild their lives back home 
and to overcome the difficult legal and socio-economic conditions in neighbouring 
countries. The second section explores Iraqi returnees’ experiences based on accounts of 
their return and subsequent re-migration to Syria and Jordan.  Iraqi returnees’ personal 
characteristics, the pre- and post-flight circumstances affect their ability to mobilise 
resources and prepare for return. The micro- and macro- transformations occurring in 
post-Saddam Iraq also have a strong bearing on refugees' return and reintegration in their 
home communities.  The third section investigates the relationship between transnational 
mobility and return and finds that for most Iraqis in Syria and Jordan, access to legal 
transnational mobility opportunities is a precondition for their sustainable return to home 
areas undergoing post-conflict political transition and socio-economic transformations. 
The final section illustrates the variety of post-return transnational livelihood strategies 
pursued by Iraqi returnee families in the absence of immediate permanent settlement and 
                                                 
 
9
 The findings presented in this chapter are in the process of being published in the form of journal articles. 
The article ‘Attempting return: Iraqis’ re-migration from Iraq was published in 2012 in the special issue of 
Refuge on Iraqi refugees, volume 18 (1). The second article ‘Post-return transnationalism and the Iraqi 
displacement in Syria and Jordan’ has been accepted by the editors of a special issue on return and 
transnationalism to be submitted for publication in International Migration.  
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integration opportunities in the home and host societies.  
6.2 The desire to return and the lack of alternatives  
The decision to go back to areas affected by lack of security, basic infrastructure and 
public services is extremely difficult. Within the limits of available information, 
uncertainty, legal and socio-economic constraints in host and home countries, Iraqi 
refugees evaluate their human conditions and life circumstances and attempt to devise 
solutions to their problems, taking critical decisions about their future. The participants in 
this study demonstrated different degrees of willingness to return.  Some of the Iraqis 
interviewed in Syria and Jordan left Iraq after being targets of direct persecution, 
violence, and/or witnesses of killings, kidnappings and forced removal of family 
members. They attributed the crimes and gross human rights violations which they had 
suffered to the military operations launched by the US-led forces and the subsequent 
escalation of politically incited ethno-sectarian conflict. The physical abuses some 
participants endured left them with irreversible damage to their body organs, severe 
burns, disfigurement, scarring and broken bones.  Their physical disability was 
aggravated by traumas derived from the loss of family members and loved ones, their 
houses, land, properties and jobs. The decision to return was taken by these respondents 
with apprehension about being exposed to renewed abuse and violence given the absence 
of security and rule of law in their country.  The new Iraqi government and its security 
apparatus were depicted as "weak", "powerless", "corrupted" and "sectarian" institutions, 
which, instead of unifying forces to protect their people’s security and interests, were 
entangled in divisive ethno-sectarian politics that culminated in internal armed strife over 
power and resources.   
 
Other participants were not direct targets of violence, but fled, alone or with their 
families, in order to avoid becoming victims of the armed conflict and economic 
depression associated with it. For these research participants return was not a matter of 
"free choice" but more a reaction to the lack of alternatives. As in other displacement 
crises, the precarious legal status and the lack of means of subsistence and future 
prospects in the neighbouring countries of asylum, combined with the scarcity of 
assistance and opportunities for resettlement in the West led a number of respondents to 
consider return as the only available option (Kibreab, 2003).  Abu Mustafa, a 59 year old 
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carpenter, stated that if he had enough resources to live in Syria he wouldn't have gone 
back to Iraq:  
 
I went back for economic reasons. I can’t afford living here anymore. I have a sick wife 
and a disabled child. I thought that the UN would have provided us with support, but the 
UN is not helping us financially because I'm not over 60. If I received cash assistance 
from the UN and I could work in Syria, I could afford living here.  
 
Many families left Iraq in haste and with little funds to invest in their socio-economic 
integration in the neighbouring societies. Living in a situation of protracted displacement, 
they exhausted their savings and faced economic downward assimilation, competing with 
the less advantaged members of the host communities over access to affordable housing, 
informal employment and scarce education opportunities for their children, who in some 
cases drop out of school to work and support their families. Karima, a 64 year-old 
housewife and mother of five described the economic and social integration problems her 
family faced in Syria: 
 
None of my family members has a job here. When we arrived, we didn't have much 
money with us and we couldn't work. We had some gold; we sold it and survived on the 
money we made. When we finished the gold we sought support from our relatives who 
sent us money.  
 
                       
Karima's family relied on unsustainable forms of subsistence such as limited savings and 
borrowings from families and friends in Iraq and other countries, access to public 
services subsidised by the host government, casual jobs and limited assistance from 
international humanitarian agencies. The high dependency of the Iraqi family on transfers 
and savings rendered their socio-economic condition very vulnerable, and their social 
integration potential in the host society was severely constrained by the economic 
hardships they experienced. For Karima, return was the way to escape the distress and 
anxieties associated with providing her family with decent accommodation and essential 
needs in the host country.  
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    Fig. 6.1 - Syrian visa stamp: "NOT ALLOWED WORK" on Iraqi passport 
 
The participants who registered with the UNHCR and sought resettlement to a third 
country mentioned the lack of progress in their asylum applications as another important 
reason for their decision to return. The reluctance of third-party governments to accept 
high numbers of refugees combined with the UNHCR's limited resources and operational 
capacity to deal with a substantial amount of asylum applications caused backlogs in the 
allocation of resettlement places (Bowser, 2008). A number of participants met in Syria, 
expressed disappointment and frustration at the UNHCR's delay in examining their 
refugee files, which were pending for over three years. The long hours spent outside 
UNHCR offices, queuing to listen to a stressed and overworked UN employee saying 
"come back in six months, your case is still under scrutiny" crushed their hopes and left 
the migrants in a wearing state of uncertainty about the future. The sense of 
temporariness and liminality in the host countries was evident in the participants' choice 
to spend their limited funds fulfilling their immediate needs rather than investing in 
longer-term integration projects. Overwhelmed by the psychologically and physically 
challenging living conditions in exile, some took the quick decision to go back without 
carefully planning their return. 
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    Fig. 6.2 - Land Rover laden with Iraqi belongings departing from Damascus to Baghdad 
 
 
Other participants, most of whom were interviewed in Jordan, were economically more 
advantaged: their well-being depended on state salaries, pensions and the income 
generated through rents and sales of lands and properties in Iraq. They left Iraq with the 
initial intention of finding temporary shelter, assistance and socio-economic opportunities 
in neighbouring countries until the situation at home had improved and they were able to 
return and resume their 'normal' life. Their lack of interest in permanent resettlement 
abroad and their greater willingness to return were also driven by their weak family ties 
and informal support networks outside of Iraq.  In the words of Nour, a 42 year old civil 
society activist who moved to Amman with his wife and two children:  
 
When I first came to Jordan I wasn't thinking to leave the Middle East and I was planning 
to return to Iraq as soon as the situation improved. Iraqis from Sunni and tribal areas, 
especially from […], don't think of travelling abroad because migrating entails a series of 
compromises and losses. The Iraqis who go to the USA complain and suffer because they 
find it hard to bring their children up in a society very distant from our cultural values and 
traditions. Migrating has a price. If you travel to the USA through the UN you'll receive 
support for the first eight months. Then you'll have to take up jobs which are unsuitable 
to your qualifications, your skills and your dignity, like washing dishes in restaurants.   
 
For Nour the migration experience entailed more compromises and losses than 
advantages: he was not ready to travel far from his homeland and re-build his life from 
scratch in a different socio-cultural environment, where he and his family would have had 
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no support networks and therefore were likely to face communication barriers, economic 
hardships and social integration problems. He counterweighted the high costs and 
challenges of living in a foreign society with his strong desire to reunite with his families 
and friends whom he had left behind, recoup his lost rights and properties and resume his 
pre-war activities in his home community.  
 
In the absence of income-generating opportunities in the host countries some participants 
decided to take the risk and return to Iraq, where they expected to find or resume their old 
professions and earn wages substantially higher than in neighbouring Syria and Jordan. 
Ali a 25 year-old IT professional, took up precarious and under-paid jobs in the Jordanian 
informal labour market until he decided to return to pursue better opportunities in his 
country:  
 
At the beginning I wasn't doing anything. Then I found a job as an IT technician in a 
publishing house here in Amman. I worked there for six months but then I got an offer in 
Baghdad and the wage there was four or five times higher than my wage in Jordan. It was 
worth going even if it was dangerous.  
 
Post-Saddam Iraq is in a period of political uncertainty and slow economic growth. In 
2008, the Iraqi government granted a large wage increase in the public sector to 
compensate for the erosion of real wages that had occurred during previous years. Since 
mid-2009, oil export earnings have returned to pre-2003 levels and government revenues 
have recovered and are expected to increase, along with global oil prices (IMF, 2010). 
Some participants were attracted by the news of economic progress and decided to return 
despite the difficult security and political circumstances to earn high incomes to support 
their families. As will be discussed in the next section, Iraqi participants’ personal 
characteristics, their pre-and post-flight circumstances and the micro- and macro- 
transformations occurring in post-Saddam Iraq affected their return and reintegration 
experiences. Adapting to the changing circumstances at home sometimes entailed tough 
compromises, even forsaking the skills, values and identities acquired abroad.  Those 
who could not achieve a satisfactory adjustment with the changing conditions at home 
faced integration challenges and problems and eventually opted for re-migration. 
6.3 Attempting return and re-migration from Iraq 
After living in the safety of neighbouring Syria and Jordan for a prolonged period of 
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time, some participants had difficulties in adapting to the unsafe and poor living 
conditions in war-torn home areas. Upon return, their nostalgic memories of Iraq's 
beautiful cities and natural landscapes have been replaced by images of destruction and 
dilapidation of historic streets, buildings, and national heritage sites with few visible 
signs of reconstruction. Some participants described areas of return as "enormous piles of 
dust and dirt", where high concrete walls and numerous checkpoints hamper people's 
freedom of movement, divide cities into homogeneous ethno-sectarian areas and create 
an atmosphere of fear and suspicion among former neighbours. For some participants 
physical reintegration was an exhausting and frustrating process given the unreliable 
provision of electricity, health care facilities and other essential public services. They 
could not endure the general lack of security and the harsh climate and living conditions 
in their home country. Rami, a 68 year-old retired School Coordinator re-migrated with 
his younger son to Syria because he could not bear the general lack of security and public 
services in Iraq. He expressed frustration at the Iraqi authorities’ failure to use public 
money to improve the living conditions of the Iraqi people:  
  
Our rulers haven't managed to do the simplest thing, repairing the electricity system. Iraq 
is a rich country; our national budget amounts to billions of dollars each year, why can't 
they repair the national infrastructure with all that money? Why don't they fix the 
electricity in Iraq? Why? […]  
 
The explosions, the killings and terror in the country, the lack of electricity and 
infrastructure are all meant to distract the Iraqi people from high-level politics. We spend 
most of our time worrying about our security and how to survive in those miserable 
conditions. We don't have the time and the energy to worry about anything else. We don't 
think about politics, we don't think of personal development opportunities, we spend the 
entire day thinking: is the electricity back or not?  
 
After the end of the war, the CPA and the subsequent Iraqi governments failed to live up 
to the expectations of Iraqi citizens by neglecting their need to human rather than military 
security (Bilgin, 2004; Barakat, 2005). Iraq's transitional period has been characterised by 
uneven distribution of national resources, socio-economic inequalities, high levels of 
unemployment and destitution and a lack of legal protection. These factors caused 
widespread popular discontent and a growing involvement of Iraqis in conservative 
religious groups and insurgent movements, which took up the role of alternative 
guarantors of physical and human security (MacQueen and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Pirnie et 
al., 2008).  
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Some participants went back to their areas of residence before flight where they owned a 
house, which was not damaged, expropriated or occupied by others. Abu Mustafa and his 
family returned to their house in a neighbourhood of Baghdad.  He clarified that he was 
not afraid of his neighbours; he feared the violence resulting from the power struggle 
between political parties and their respective militia groups:  
 
I went back to the place where I have lived for the past twenty years. We have a house 
there and we are in good relations with everyone in the neighborhood. The people who 
don't work for the government or for the security apparatus are less likely to be target of 
attacks. But the security was generally unstable: there were sudden explosions of car 
bombs in the streets and the armed groups linked to the government forcibly removed and 
arrested people from their houses. The political parties created unrest and instilled fear 
among the people.  
 
Others were not able to return to their home areas because their properties were destroyed 
or occupied in the course of the episodes of ethno-sectarian cleansing that occurred 
during the recent conflict. The Iraqi mosaic of ethno-religious groups have co-existed in 
relative peace for centuries and Iraqi families and tribal confederations are the product of 
inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian marriages (Matar, 1997; Batatu, 2004). The pre-1963 Iraqi 
nationalist movements were cross-ethnic in nature and prioritised domestic development 
over membership in a supra-national Pan-Arab entity. Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim 
(1958-1963) was the main promoter of a form of inclusive and pluralist Iraqi nationalism. 
The succeeding Ba'ath regimes endorsed instead a Pan-Arab unity discourse emphasising 
a xenophobic and chauvinist interpretation of Arabism that promoted Sunni Arab 
domination of Iraqi politics and society, repressing Kurdish and Shi’a claims to ethno-
sectarian self-determination (Davis, 2005; Bunton, 2008). Under Saddam Hussein (1968-
2003) the Ba’ath regime indoctrinated the people to believe that the Iraqi nation was 
equivalent to the president or that being loyal to Iraq meant being loyal to Saddam (Saleh, 
2008).  For over three decades the Iraqi people were exposed to this equation through the 
state-controlled media outlets, its educational institutions and its party cadres. When in 
2003 the dictator fell and hid in a hole under the ground, Iraqis’ feelings of loyalty 
disappeared with him. According to Saleh, after the ‘big tent’ of the state collapsed and 
law and order turned into chaos, panic spread among the people who divided and sought 
protection from families, tribes, clans, religious authorities, civil groups, political parties 
and any other force that could shelter them. The feeling of belonging to the Iraqi nation 
was suspended and replaced by innumerable loyalties that started competing to achieve a 
place of authority in the new political power structure. The CPA and the subsequent Iraqi 
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governments enforced constitutional laws and policies such as the 2005 electoral  law, the 
De-Ba’athification order and the dissolution of the Iraqi national army that reinforced 
ethno-sectarian divisions and led to the territorial polarisation of previously religious and 
ethnically mixed areas and communities (Bellamy, 2004; Caspersen, 2004; International 
Crisis Group, 2005a; 2005b; 2006).  
 
For some respondents the relationships with family members and friends who stayed 
behind has changed along with the surrounding environment. The time spent sheltering in 
the  host countries has offered the forced migrants room to recover from the traumas of 
the conflict, regain health, learn new things and look forward to a more hopeful and 
peaceful future. In contrast, they have depicted their relatives and friends who remained 
in Iraq during and after the war as "fearful", "worried" and "stressed"; and prone to 
suspicious and aggressive behaviour as a response to the multitude of dangers and the 
depriving living conditions. Iman, a 43 year-old single woman returned to Basra to live in 
her brother's household and faced difficulties interacting with other members of her home 
community, which, during her absence, had become increasingly religious and 
conservative: 
 
People have changed. The circumstances in our country changed their minds and their 
personalities. I don't know, people have become very religious and conservative. If before 
we were afraid of elements of a single party, the Ba'ath, now we are afraid and distrustful 
of everyone because there are so many political groups ready to use force to obtain 
control and power. Now when you are in front of someone, you don't know which side he 
belongs to. 
 
During the Ba'ath era, there was a single centre of power and social control and Iraqis 
could recognise and thereby avoid the sources of threats. In contrast, after the fall of the 
regime, they feel they can no longer guarantee their safety, since they are exposed to 
unknown perils from several sides. The US military troops, foreign terrorists and the 
various political and religious parties ruling the country are ready to use arbitrary force to 
impose their power and control over national resources.   
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Fig. 6.4 - Commemoration of the 1991 US bombing of the Al-Amiriyah shelter in Baghdad, painting 
by Iraqi artist Fuad Hamdi, Iraqi Cultural Forum, Damascus, 13 February 2010 
 
One of the alleged goals of the US-led invasion was to bring democracy and freedom of 
expression to the Iraqi people. Ten years since the end of military operations in Iraq, 
these objectives have evidently not been achieved. The US disengagement strategy has 
progressively left the country in the hands of conservative religious authorities and 
political parties, which repress citizens' freedom of expression and have committed gross 
human rights violations, including the arrest and detention of thousands of civilians 
without charge and fair trials (Amnesty International, 2011). After more than four 
decades of largely secular Ba’athist rule, radical factions in Iraq's Sunni and Shi’a 
communities have asserted political control over society, leading to the prevalence of 
conservative religious values and habits such as pressures on women, including 
Christians, to wear the veil.  Rand, a 30 year-old female interviewee was forced out of 
Iraq in 2009 for the second time after she was target of renewed death threats by a group 
of unknown armed men, who, the previous year, attacked her because she ran a “Haram” 
(forbidden) beauty salon. The assaulters brutally beat her and threw sulphuric acid at her 
face, causing her disfigurement and the loss of one eye. The perpetrators of this horrible 
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act remain at large; the Iraqi police never opened an investigation into this violent crime.  
 
Some participants in this study have re-migrated after being subjected to abuses of power 
committed by the very authorities that were supposed to protect them. Ala’, a 39 year-old 
man returned with his family from Jordan to Iraq in 2006. He re-opened his supermarket 
in Baghdad but he reported that the local police harassed him and the other shop owners 
in the area and extorted bribes in exchange for protection. He took the brave decision to 
report the injustices he was enduring to the governorate authorities. As a result, he said 
his shop was destroyed, he was physically assaulted by security officers and had to 
escape again from Iraq to protect his family.   
 
Other returnees felt neglected by the new Iraqi government, which adopted a series of 
policies and measures that promoted social inequalities and discrimination rather than 
national reconciliation and rehabilitation. Yousef returned with his family to Baghdad to 
reclaim his house, which had been expropriated by members of the new Iraqi National 
Guard. He said he was forced to go back to Syria after his failed attempt to seek justice 
and the restitution of his property. While victims of the former regime have access to 
appositely established mechanisms for land and property rights compensation, Iraqi 
victims of land and property rights violations after 2003 have no other option but to seek 
justice through the ordinary Iraqi court system (Romano, 2005; Van der Auweraert,
 
 
2009). They have to go back and file a reclaim with no guarantee of being compensated 
for the harms suffered.  Despite the great need for protection and compensation for their 
losses, the lack of confidence and mistrust towards public authorities prevents returnee 
families from registering with the Ministry of Migration and Displacement for 
reintegration assistance. Afraid of being identified and located by potentially dangerous 
agents, many returnees avoid state authorities altogether. This type of return and 
reintegration assistance favours one group over another and is likely to have a negative 
impact in terms of national reconciliation and peace building since it may sow the seeds 
for future strife.  
 
The situation of one of this study’s participants, Dr Samir, a 59 year old former civil 
servant who was subject to the Accountability and Justice Law was even more sensitive. 
He felt he was victim of a grave injustice; the de-Ba'athification regulations were applied 
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to his case not based on evidence of his individual responsibility but rather on the 
assumption that being a Ba’ath party member he shared the responsibility for the crimes 
of the previous regime. As a result, his properties were confiscated, he was forced out of 
employment, lost his pension rights and, upon return, he was again exposed to threats and 
retribution from elements of the Bader Organisation linked to the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI). The government has used the Accountability and Justice Law as a 
weapon of collective punishment and a means of eliminating potential agents of dissent 
or opposition to the newly established political order in Iraq (Sissons, 2008).   
 
Some returnees gave up their rights to social welfare and services from state institutions 
in order to preserve their dignity and avoid the frustration of dealing with the 
disorganised and corrupt Iraqi bureaucratic system. In order to obtain support from local 
authorities some respondents had to pay bribes or use their "wastas" (personal 
recommendations and connections) with the sectarian political groups, which controlled 
the various ministries and public offices. The system of patronage and widespread 
corruption has developed and rapidly proliferated since the 1990s, in reaction to the 
protracted wars and the devastating effects of the thirteen years of UN economic 
sanctions against Iraq, when state employees received salaries as low as $2 dollars per 
month and depended on bribes to sustain their families (Arnove, 2000). Obtaining job 
opportunities and access to welfare and social protection schemes did not depend on 
individual needs, qualifications and skills but on the right connections and affiliations 
(Arnove, 2000). Indeed, the change of regime has not brought improvements in this 
sense. Before, Iraqi people had to be members of one single institution, the Ba’ath party, 
in order to ensure employment and socio-economic mobility. Now the new ethno-
sectarian political order has reshaped the system of patronage into multiple channels of 
political loyalism that hamper people's rights to equal opportunities. This situation has led 
one of the interviewees to claim: "Today, corruption is the only institution that can be 
called national in Iraq; it involves Iraqis from all ethno-sectarian backgrounds and there is 
coordination between them". 
 
These institutionalised practices prevent the socio-economic reintegration of those who 
are qualified for certain positions but do not wish to be associated with any religious or 
political group and refuse to be part of this system of ethno-sectarian discrimination.  The 
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participants who returned with the intention of actively contributing their knowledge and 
skills to the national political reconciliation and reconstruction process have been 
prevented from doing so by the prevailing system and by new threats of persecution and 
violence.  Bader holds a PhD in Political Science and returned to work in an Iraqi 
university. During a conference on the role of religious parties in national politics he 
made a contribution for which he was assaulted by the outraged audience: 
 
I decided to leave again Iraq because I couldn't find the right work environment. There 
isn't academic freedom in Iraq. […] I used to speak about democracy, the religious parties 
and the administrative corruption in Iraq. I presented my arguments to an Iraqi 
conservative audience and many people were offended by my words and tried to attack 
me. This episode made me flee again.  If I wanted to keep working in my country I would 
have to be quiet and keep a low profile. This is not my nature and I told them as well: we 
are not in the republic of bananas where you can cut our tongues to shut us up. In Iraq we 
have religious authorities very similar to the Inquisition in medieval Europe.  
 
After this episode, he had to leave the country and his job again and re-settled with his 
family in Jordan. This experience convinced him that the Iraqi society is not yet ready to 
offer him an open and democratic work environment, where he can freely express his 
opinion without fear of subsequent retaliation.  
 
Under the above mentioned circumstances, these Iraqi migrants' attempts to return were 
unsurprisingly unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the failed return experiences produced diverse 
reactions among the research participants. The abortive returns made some lose hope of 
ever re-establishing their lives back home and have spurred them to seek onward 
migration opportunities and an alternative "home" in a western country, where they hope 
to achieve personal security, stability and a better future. On the other hand, the 
challenging post-return experiences in the home areas have not dissuaded some other 
participants from returning to Iraq.  A growing body of theoretical and empirical research 
demonstrates that refugee return may be neither permanent nor sedentary (Bakewell 
2002; Stefansson, 2004; Black and Gent, 2006a; Eastmond, 2006; Stepputat, 2004; 2006; 
Huttenen, 2010) and that  refugee secondary, circular movements and transnational 
mobility and livelihoods amongst refugees can be an indicator of progressive 
normalisation of living conditions in war-affected societies, where seasonal and 
international migration was a livelihood even before the conflict generated mass exodus 
(Bakewell, 2000; 2002; Juergensen, 2002; Stigter, 2006; Monsutti, 2008). The next 
section will explore the links between return and transnational mobility in the Iraqi 
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displacement context and show how a significant number of Iraqi respondents considered 
access to legal cross-border mobility opportunities as a precondition for their sustainable 
return.  
6.4 Sustainable return through transnational mobility  
The voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons is interpreted as 
evidence of restored security and political stability, improved civil-state relations and 
public confidence in reconstruction efforts in war-torn countries (Petrin, 2002; Ferris, 
2009). In legal terms, return is seen as the natural solution to refugee problems because it 
entails the physical return to the homeland and the re-establishment of the interrupted 
relation between the state and the refugee, who, going back, is entitled to seek the 
restoration of his lost citizenship rights (Goodwin-Gill, 1989; Hathaway, 2005). 
According to this reasoning, the success of return has been measured in terms of the 
number of refugees who return rather than the sustainability of their reintegration in the 
home country. Understandings of refugee return as going back to the status quo ante 
demote the relevance of institutional monitoring and evaluation of refugees’ experiences 
and needs after repatriation (Harvey, 1990) and justify the lack of investigation of what 
actually means to return home for the refugees (Bakewell, 2000). This conception of 
permanent and sedentary return informs states’ and international agencies’ evaluation of 
returnees’ secondary movements as evidence of the unsustainability of the return 
experience (Black et al., 2004).  
 
Black and King (2004), challenge sedentary understandings of return by conceptualising 
transnational migration as a form of return, a process that takes place over a prolonged 
period of time and involves stages of preparation and various degrees and modalities of 
transnational mobility and livelihoods, which may be fundamental to ensure forced 
migrants’ safe and sustainable return and integration in home societies undergoing post-
conflict political and socio-economic transformations (Black and King, 2004; Black and 
Gent, 2006b).  
 
Indeed, transnational mobility plays a crucial role in the strategic decisions and practices 
of return of most Iraqi interviewees in Syria and Jordan.  Yahya, a 49 year old PhD in 
Arabic literature does not seek transnational mobility opportunities with the intention to 
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emigrate and resettle permanently in another country. For him access to transnational 
mobility is vital because he can go back to his home area under circumstances of low-
intensity conflict without losing the possibility of re-migrating if he needs to:  
 
The decision to return is a difficult one. If I go back permanently, I will lose my residence 
permit in Jordan and if I want to come here again I will have to re-apply for the visa and 
for a residence permit.  You see, I think that those who apply for refugee status and want 
to be resettled abroad, do it mainly to obtain a foreign passport that enables them to travel 
to a safe place whenever they wish. In 2008, my family was in Algeria and I was in 
Baghdad. Syria and Jordan had closed their borders and imposed strict visa regulations on 
Iraqis' movement. For the first time in my life I felt like a prisoner, I realised that I was 
very vulnerable. If someone wanted to hurt me or arrest me I couldn’t protect myself or 
escape, I was stuck in Iraq. My wife couldn't come to Iraq with my child because of the 
security situation, I couldn't go to Algeria because I didn’t have the visa; we could have 
remained apart for years. So when I think of returning to Iraq, I worry about being always 
able to leave the country in case I need to.  
 
The permanent and sedentary approach to refugee return links access to rights and 
resources to settlement in a physical place. Such a perspective, however, is paradoxical 
given that refugees often return to home countries affected by conflict and ruled by 
fragile governments that are unable to provide stability, security and fundamental civil 
rights and needs, the lack of which induce them to become refugees in the first place 
(Kibreab, 2003; Ferris, 2009). 
 
This perspective also overlooks opportunity structures engendered by transnational 
mobility and their impact on migrants’ decision-making processes and practices of return. 
Some returnees may seek to secure their freedom of movement across international 
borders as a precautionary measure and in search for alternative opportunities and 
resources unachievable back home.  The awareness of the precarious conditions in home 
areas prompts refugees and migrants to secure their freedom of movement through the 
attainment of permanent residence or citizenship status in a country whose citizens are 
not subject to restrictive international migration regimes.  Thus access to residence and 
citizenship rights in a third country, either through asylum or regular migration 
opportunities, becomes instrumental in exercising the right to freedom of movement 
across international borders without discrimination. It may sound counterintuitive, but for 
the Iraqi interviewees in Syria and Jordan access to legal transnational mobility 
opportunities is a precondition for embarking on the return process.  Faris, a 45-year old 
computer engineer renewed his temporary residence permit in Syria two days before 
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returning to Baghdad: 
 
V: You are going back to Iraq in few days but you also renewed your residence permit in 
Syria, can you explain me why?   
 
F: I take precautions; I may stay in Iraq for a couple of months and then return to Syria in 
Summer. I have this paper; it's worth keeping it valid, right? So I can come back 
whenever I wish.  
 
Most participants keep renewing their Jordanian and Syrian residence permits several 
months, and even years, after their return to Iraq. The residence status grants the Iraqi 
people freedom of movement across borders without facing immigration restrictions and 
without being charged expensive entry-visa fees. Transnational mobility is practiced to 
increase returnees’ physical security in the face of unstable and wearing living conditions 
in the home areas and to keep options of material and immaterial resource mobilisation as 
open and as diversified as possible (Stepputat, 2004; 2006). Hala, a 49 year-old returnee 
from Jordan and director of the Iraqi Health Organisation in Baghdad explained:  
 
I come to Jordan very frequently, I can’t stay in Baghdad more than six weeks; after a 
while I need to breathe. It's too tense over there. If I knew for one second that I couldn’t 
come out to a safe haven then I wouldn’t go to Baghdad. If I didn't have the annual 
residence permit I would never go back. But because I know that I can come here 
[Amman] whenever I want, then I go back.  
 
 
Returns are taking place in regions still affected by low-intensity violence and in areas 
marked by food and water insecurity, lack of affordable housing, inadequate 
infrastructures and services, and a system of factional patronage and corruption 
controlling access to employment opportunities (Home Office, 2011). In these 
circumstances living conditions in the home areas are difficult and the Iraqis who have 
re-established livelihoods in Iraq, take advantage of their resident status in Syria and 
Jordan to pay temporary visits, rest and recover from the stressful lifestyle back home. 
Return to Iraq is largely dependent on returnees’ ability to engage in circular migration 
and ensure their periodic access to a more relaxed and comfortable environment that 
enhances their physical and mental wellbeing. Most returnees exclude the possibility of 
going to Iraq without securing beforehand legal residence status in the host countries and 
without obtaining the re-entry authorisation from the host authorities. Zainab, a 43 year-
old woman whose brothers are resident in Amman since the 1990s claimed: 
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V: Would you return to Iraq without renewing your residence permit in Jordan? 
  
N: No, I wouldn't because I come often to Jordan to visit my family. There is a possibility 
that I get tired in Iraq and I decide to move back to Jordan and settle here again. We 
never know what is going to happen in Iraq, the situation is still unstable. 
 
 
Iraqi people’s search for regional and international mobility is also spurred by the need to 
remain in close contact with extended families spread in various countries in the Middle 
East and further afield. Migrants' notion of 'home' may be extremely complex: it may 
signify a social more than as a physical space that extends beyond one physical location 
and local referent to include several sites of socio-cultural relations and meanings 
(Eastmond, 2006) and the original home may become a myth, a place of nostalgia 
compared to other more practical homes (Al Rasheed, 1994; Zetter, 1999).  The long-
term integration of migrant and refugee communities in the host societies has led to the 
establishment of multi-directional transnational networks of relationships, regular and 
sustained social contacts linking Iraqi returnees to members of their national community 
in the wider diaspora (Koser, 2002; Vertovec, 2008). The sustainability of return may 
depend on returnees’ access to the social and business networks that they have 
established abroad and that constitute a source of continued material and moral wellbeing 
after return to their home societies.  The geographical proximity between Iraq and 
neighbouring Syria and Jordan as well as improved technology and low cost 
communication and transportation increase the intensity and scope of circular flows of 
persons, money, goods, information and ideas in the region.  Some respondents have 
already visited their areas of origin several times for periods that ranged between one 
week and one year. These spontaneous return movements have been acknowledged by 
the UNHCR (2009): 'Recent increases in no-show rates for food and cash assistance may 
be an indicator that significant numbers of Iraqis are travelling to Iraq without 
deregistering from UNHCR'.  
 
The UNHCR has acknowledged the importance of transnational mobility and livelihoods 
as a means of increasing the protection space for Iraqi refugees in the Middle East (Crisp 
et al., 2009) but the agency has yet to review its operational approaches to voluntary 
refugee return accordingly.  In policy and practice the three durable solutions of 
“resettlement to a third country,” “local integration in the first country of asylum”, and 
“voluntary repatriation” are still regarded as discrete options or stages in a refugee 
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“cycle.” (Van Hear, 2006). The governments of western countries of resettlement 
consider the Iraqi asylum seekers who have adopted cross-border livelihood strategies 
less eligible for refugee status. Forced migrants’ circular movements reduce their chances 
to be granted resettlement. The asylum claims of Iraqi circular migrants are dismissed as 
lacking credibility because it is assumed that the real “refugee” is unable to return to Iraq. 
Iraqis’ return movements are interpreted as an indicator that the circumstances that 
caused their displacement no longer exist and therefore asylum applicants who engage in 
transnational mobility should not be treated as refugees but as normal migrants. In 
interviews with UNHCR resettlement officers, Iraqi asylum seekers are advised not to 
pay frequent and lengthy visits to Iraq in order to be eligible for resettlement
10
. 
 
In order to be eligible for resettlement opportunities and other forms of assistance many 
Iraqis have followed the instructions and requirements of assistance providers and 
renounced the possibility of engaging in cross-border mobility and livelihood strategies, 
often at very high material and emotional costs.  Alia, a 47 year old woman explained 
how the living conditions of her family in the host country deteriorated after her husband 
was advised by the UNHCR Syria to stop going back and forth between Syria and Irbil to 
work as an agricultural engineer in a Kurdish poultry factory:  
 
Here he can't work. If he doesn't return to Erbil and works how are we going to survive? 
We are five people in this family. The UNHCR treats us as refugees, we can't go back 
because we are persecuted. But how does the organisation expect us to survive without 
any assistance and without being allowed to work in the host country? Why don't they 
think that going back to Iraq is our only option to make a living?  
                                                                                        
The UNHCR exercises enormous influence on the decision-making processes and 
migratory behaviour of refugees and asylum seekers by constructing and enforcing 
particular bureaucratic knowledges and categories of ‘refugeehood’, which inform the 
agency’s protection and assistance practices. In his work on governmentality Foucault 
(1991:4) identified the ‘conduct of conduct’, which is the power of constructing and 
guiding the conduct of individuals and populations, without their full awareness and 
consent, through the use of subtle and non-coercive methods and technologies that 
constitute incredibly powerful instruments and techniques of governance shaping and 
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 Interview of the author with UNHCR Syria Protection Officers 
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limiting the lives and freedoms of populations and individuals. 
 
The UNHCR and some third-party governments discourage Iraqi asylum seekers’ circular 
migration between Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, since this practice hampers national 
governments’ and international organisations’ ability to manage highly mobile displaced 
communities. A growing number of Iraqi forced migrants nevertheless disregard the 
institutional requirements and adopt transnational livelihoods as a risk diversification 
strategy and a way to explore opportunities for the future.  Ahmed sought UNHCR 
assistance to return to Iraq, but he decided not to benefit from the Vol. Rep. package 
because he was not ready to renounce to the annual residence permit that he had just 
renewed, in order to obtain the negligible sum of $350 to cover the costs of transportation 
to go back to Iraq from Syria: 
 
V: Did you receive assistance to return to Iraq? 
 
A: We didn't receive any assistance, I went to the UN to seek assistance and the officer 
told me that they would give $350 to my family to return, $100 per adult and $50 per 
child.  I thanked the UN officer for the help. But then he told me that if we accepted the 
UN assistance they would have cancelled our residence permits. We didn't obtain the 
residence permit from the UN, why should they cancel it? I didn't accept the assistance 
because I don't want to lose my residence status. Now, we can come and visit my parents 
whenever we wish. Without residence permit we will have to apply for a new entry-visa 
every time we want to visit them.  
 
 
The individual case management set up by the UNHCR in October 2008 to facilitate the 
voluntary return of Iraqi refugees from neighbouring countries of asylum provides limited 
material assistance and imposes on potential applicants 1) the cancellation of their 
refugee status and the consequent loss of access to the associated international protection 
and material assistance 2) and the cancellation of their residency permit in the host 
country. These conditions are based on the supposition that returnees ‘voluntarily’ re-
establish permanent livelihoods in their country of origin’11. The assumptions and 
eligibility criteria attached to the UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation assistance are 
unrealistic and counterproductive; instead of supporting refugees’ safe and dignified 
return by protecting their right to free movement and their legal status in the host 
                                                 
 
11 Interview of the author with UNHCR Syria Senior Protection Officer 
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countries, such policies increase migrants’ legal vulnerability and restrict their ability to 
move across borders and make informed choice about return. Eastmond (2006:144) 
correctly stresses that interventions based on the presumption that return is ‘going back to 
pre-war homes to remain there, ‘fail to take account of other patterns of return and home-
making that may be more sustainable for the individual’.  Not surprisingly, between 2007 
and 2011 only 4,479 Iraqi refugees returned facilitated by the UNHCR while the 
estimated number of unassisted returns in the same period reached 201,307 individuals.49 
This raises critical questions about dominant understandings and operational approaches 
to refugee return and transnational mobility (UNHCR Iraq, 2012). Most Iraqis who 
adopted temporary return and transnational livelihood strategies do not seek the Vol. Rep. 
assistance because they do not want to lose their residence rights in the host countries. 
Moreover, leaving the UNHCR file open, allows them to come back from Iraq every two 
months or so to collect the cash, food and in-kind assistance provided by the UNHCR and 
other agencies.  
 
Refugees’ refusal to identify with and behave in conformity with the institutional 
bureaucratic categories constructed for them or to live in designated refugee camps, or 
their engagement in temporary return and transnational livelihood strategies (Grabska, 
2005; Iaria, 2012) should not be considered as evidence of the lack of credibility of their 
‘refugeehood’ and be used to restrict their access to legal rights and financial assistance. 
Rather refugees' expressions of agency, independent livelihood strategies and solutions 
should inform more effective national and international policies and practices aimed at 
promoting the safe and sustainable return of forced migrants to their home countries 
under circumstances of conflict or post-conflict reconstruction. The next section offers a 
conceptual definition of post-return transnationalism and illustrates the variety of 
independent transnational livelihood strategies pursued by Iraqi returnee families in the 
absence of immediate settlement and integration opportunities in the home and host 
societies.  
6.5 The ‘post-return’ transnational livelihoods of Iraqi returnees 
Is it appropriate to talk about ‘post-return’ transnationalism’ if return is not the end of the 
refugee cycle, but a dynamic part of the ongoing migration experience?  (Black and 
Koser, 1999) For the sake of conceptual and empirical clarity, this research uses a 
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subjective definition of ‘post-return transnationalism’ to explore the lived experiences of 
Iraqis who self-proclaimed themselves as having returned and re-established their 
principal residence in the home country despite their livelihoods rest on their 
transnational mobility, social networks and activities linking Iraq to neighbouring Syria 
and Jordan. De Bree (2010) emphases that due to a certain receiving country bias in the 
transnational migration research agenda, the pre-return transnational orientations and 
practices of migrants have received much greater attention than their post-return 
reintegration experiences and transnational livelihoods. This section addresses this 
concern by looking at the post-return transnational mobility and livelihoods of Iraqi 
returning refugees from Syria and Jordan.  It finds that a number of Iraqi interviewees 
engage in transnational mobility after return and for them the transnational social and 
professional networks that they have established in Syria and Jordan during displacement 
constitute a critical source of continued material wellbeing and moral resilience.  When 
asked about her transnational life Hala commented:  
             
Well, I'm in Jordan and in Baghdad, I think I'm more in Baghdad than in Jordan. In 
Baghdad there's my work, I kind of went back to my life in Baghdad with my husband 
but my children are staying here [Amman]. This is how I manage to work in Baghdad, if I 
know that they are safe here then I can work, and if I work with my husband there 
[Baghdad] I can support them to live peacefully here [Amman].  
 
[…] we are in transit; we are sometimes here sometimes there. If the situation in Iraq is 
bad, we come here for a week or so, until things there get better. If there's a religious 
ceremony and we can't work there, we come here and spend some time with our children.   
 
[…] I stay for few days, see my children, see what is needed here, cover the bills and I 
rush back to Iraq. This is how it is. It's interesting because it's not only me. I come on the 
flights and I see all sorts of politicians, business people, humanitarian people, I think we 
all live the same life, very funny, people in transit. Most of them have houses here in 
Jordan and work in Iraq.  
 
 
Conceptualising Iraqis' livelihoods as taking place within transnational social fields 
(Levitt, 2004) allows the analysis to expand beyond those who returned to those who 
remained in the countries of refuge but are connected to returnees through the networks 
of social relations they established and sustain across borders. Transnational and 
diasporic connections between returnees and the members of their families and social 
networks constitute crucial support mechanisms for entire families and migrant 
communities. Sørensen and Olwig (2002) identified a typology of mobile livelihoods, 
'staggered repatriation' that includes fragmented families, with one or two members, 
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usually male, returning to the home country in search for socio-economic opportunities, 
while women and school-age children remain in the country of asylum. Such livelihood 
strategy is perceived by the migrants as a safety net, since it allows them to reduce the 
economic and security risks of return. Dr Samir, the former civil servant who was 
subjected to the Accountability and Justice Law, left Iraq to Syria with his family in late 
2006. Due to the absence of regular income-generating opportunities in the host country, 
in 2010 he decided to take the risk and return to Iraq to find a new job.  He did not return 
to Baghdad, his area of residence before flight, he found employment in Erbil, in the 
Kurdistan region, where he took up a teaching position in a private university. He has 
embarked on the return experience alone, while his wife and two children remained in 
Damascus. When asked whether he was going to be fine away from his family, he 
replied:  
 
We'll be apart only for a short period of time, until the children complete their school here 
[Damascus].  If I have three or four days off work I can come and see them. Now that I 
have a residence permit for one year I'm entitled to a multi-entry visa with which I can go 
out and come back as I wish. But this situation is temporary. If the conditions in Iraq 
change after the elections, if there are improvements in the security situation, […] I’ll 
take my family back with me. 
 
 
The wellbeing of members of a household may be predicated on the return or indeed the 
onward migration of other family members (Monsutti, 2006; 2008; Van Hear, 2006).  In 
line with earlier studies, Iraqis’ strong desire and aspirations for ‘permanent return’ 
contrast with the temporary and transnational return strategies that they have developed 
in order to fulfil their immediate and longer-term needs unachievable through immediate 
permanent resettlement in their home societies (Eastmond, 2006; Sinatti, 2011).   
 
Under favourable conditions, refugees and returnees can improve their lives and 
contribute to the reconstruction of economic infrastructures and the socio-political fabric 
of their home country through transnational activities and networks, by exposing the 
areas of origin to a constant flow of material and social remittances (Levitt, 2004).  Nour, 
the 42 year old civil society activist mentioned earlier, returned to Iraq with his family in 
2008. A few months after his return to Iraq, he moved back to Amman, where he had 
been offered a PhD place in a Jordanian private university. His wife and children have 
permanently resettled in Iraq, where they enjoy the protection and support of their 
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extended families and tribe. Every three months he visits them in Iraq and upon the 
completion of his doctoral studies he plans to join his family and find work in an Iraqi 
university. His aspiration is to use the postgraduate qualification and skills he is acquiring 
in Jordan to contribute to the nation-building process in his country:  
 
I’ll complete my PhD in International and Islamic Law and I hope I will be able to make 
a contribution in my field of expertise. […]  
 
I am convinced that in Iraq we need a strong Sunni political entity able to restrain the 
Shi’as and the Kurds and restore the necessary power balance. I would like to participate 
in person in the empowerment of the Iraqi Sunni community.   
 
Those migrants with enough financial and material resources, try to optimise life in exile 
and turn it into an opportunity to acquire skills and experience that they can employ to 
facilitate their post-return reintegration and their participation in Iraq’s reconstruction. 
Whether transnational livelihoods after return will benefit the Iraqi returnees and promote 
reconstruction and reconciliation in the areas of return depends on returnees’ material and 
social assets, skills and attitudes, and whether the home government will adopt flexible 
and encouraging policies, will offer socio-economic integration opportunities and will 
create a stable and propitious political environment (Ghosh, 2000).  
  
Refugees’ post-return transnationalism is conditioned by structural inequalities such as 
refugees’ position within past and present political power structures, their socio-economic 
status, age, ethnicity and religion, pre and post-flight circumstances that affect their 
access and mobilisation of resources before and after return (Cassarino, 2004; Horst, 
2006).  The Iraqi participants interviewed in Syria and Jordan are a group of returnees 
who could mobilise the necessary resources, connections and support mechanisms to 
pursue mobile and transnational lifestyles after return. Future studies will need to expand 
the investigation to returnee areas in central and southern Iraq and explore the 
experiences of Iraqi returnees who may be less, if at all, transnationally active.   
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the nature and dynamics of return in the context of the Iraqi 
refugees displaced to Syria and Jordan after 2003. It offers interesting answers to 
theoretical and empirical questions concerning the relationship between refugees’ return 
and transnational migration. The empirical findings presented in this chapter demonstrate 
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that return is a complex psychological, social and physical process that occurs over a long 
period of time and entails various degrees and modalities of cross-border mobility, 
transnational livelihoods and networks connecting the refugees to host and home 
societies. 
 
The lack of resettlement opportunities and difficult living conditions in neighbouring 
countries influence refugees’ decision-making processes and migratory plans. Iraqi 
refugees' return depends on their varying degrees of willingness and readiness to interact 
with the socio-political and economic transformations occurring in areas of return. The 
legal and socio-economic obstacles faced in Syria and Jordan limit their ability to 
mobilise resources before return. Consequently many refugees have to rely on pre-
existing resources in order to return and reintegrate in their home areas. Those with 
enough financial and material resources, optimise life in exile and turn it into an 
opportunity to acquire skills and experience that could facilitate their post-return 
reintegration and their participation in Iraq’s reconstruction.  
 
Iraqis' potential and commitment to return and engage in developments at home is 
affected by the social, economic and political changes that have occurred in Iraq during 
their absence. Repatriation rarely results in the achievement of full citizenship rights. The 
transitional governments in Iraq have faced great challenges and have been seldom able, 
or willing, to grant returning refugees their fundamental rights and freedoms. In post-war 
Iraq, neither the economy nor receiving communities have had sufficient absorptive 
capacity to integrate returnees and meet their demands for basic services, employment 
and development opportunities. The institutional neglect of the needs and aspirations of 
the Iraqi returnees has increased their vulnerability and threatens the sustainability of 
their return inducing some to re-migrate.  
 
In the absence of permanent integration opportunities in the home areas, a growing 
number of Iraqis pursue various types and modalities of transnational mobility and 
livelihoods after their return. A precautionary measure adopted by most unassisted 
returnees is renewing their residence permit before their departure to Iraq. Holding a 
valid residence permit allows them to re-enter Syria and Jordan at any time, without 
facing immigration restrictions and without being charged expensive entry-visa fees.  
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Some Iraqi families reside in Syria and Jordan while members of the family, generally 
males, go to Iraq to work and send/bring money back.  Some other families have 
permanently resettled in Iraq and regularly visit Syria and Jordan to undertake medical 
treatment, run businesses and rest from the hard living and work conditions in Iraq. Some 
refugees visit Iraq to collect pensions, rents and check on their properties and businesses. 
The evidence about refugees’ transnational mobility and livelihoods before and after 
return suggests that access to transnational mobility opportunities is a precondition for 
embarking on a sustainable return process. 
 
The international refugee regime has acknowledged the importance of Iraqis’ 
transnational mobility and livelihoods between Iraq and neighbouring countries of 
asylum. Yet the policies of UNHCR and western donors are still informed by a 
permanent and sedentary conception of return as a durable solution that impedes the 
provision of adequate protection and assistance to Iraqi returnees. Prospective returnees 
react to irresponsive and counterproductive return policies and interventions by 
embarking on the return process unassisted and juggling with official immigration and 
asylum statuses in order to enhance their freedom to engage in transnational mobility and 
livelihoods as alternative solutions to their protracted displacement. Between 2003 and 
2011, the number of Iraqi beneficiaries of the UNHCR Voluntary Return Programme has 
been very low compared to the estimated number of Iraqis who returned unassisted.  
 
The recurrent discrepancy between the number of assisted and spontaneous returns in 
various displacement contexts prompts critical questions about dominant understandings 
and operational approaches to refugee return and transnational mobility. Should refugees 
accommodate to the bureaucratic requirements of the international refugee regime and 
governments or should institutional approaches be revised to be more responsive to the 
lived experiences and needs of forced migrant populations? Is return a sedentary and 
permanent act or a dynamic and gradual process? Is it possible to establish a clear-cut 
distinction between voluntary and forced migration experiences? Due to political 
disinterest these questions are often underestimated, leading to inadequate knowledge and 
understanding of spontaneous refugee return movements, their nature and dynamics, and 
their impact on the reconciliation and reconstruction of war-affected societies. Further 
research on returning refugees’ transnational mobility and livelihoods would be valuable 
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to increase knowledge and understanding of the complex individual and societal 
processes of return migration to conflict or post-conflict societies and to inform more 
effective policies and interventions aimed at increasing protection and assistance for 
refugees in situations of protracted displacement. 
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Chapter Seven: The role of communication and information in 
Iraqi refugees' displacement and return 
7.1 Introduction 
The chapter investigates the role of information and communication in the context of 
Iraqi refugees’ return from Syria and Jordan.  Iraqi refugees’ desire to return and their 
commitment to re-building their own lives in the country of origin depend on their 
perceptions and expectations of ‘home’, which can differ from those of other 
stakeholders. The decision to return entails refugees’ subjective comparison of the degree 
of economic and socio-cultural integration achieved in exile vis-à-vis information 
concerning conditions in return areas. Clearly, refugees can directly assess their living 
conditions in the countries of asylum. In contrast, accurate and reliable information on the 
security situation in Iraq, and challenges and opportunities for return are not always 
readily available. The Iraqi authorities and the international humanitarian actors have not 
provided Iraqi refugees with updated information on conditions in return areas and advice 
on the available reintegration assistance.  
 
The chapter argues that the lack of information provided by institutions is partly due to 
their limited institutional presence and operational capacity in Iraq as well as to problems 
of cross-institutional information-sharing and cooperation (Constant et al., 1994; Tsai, 
2002; Kim and Lee, 2006; Tung-Mou and Maxwell, 2011). However, the provision of 
institutional information, or the lack thereof, can also be seen as a governance tool 
adopted by state and non-state actors to control and manage the Iraqi displaced and 
indirectly steer their unassisted return and cross-border mobility in the region.  The 
theoretical and empirical discussion of the role of information and communication draws 
upon the Foucauldian notion of governmentality (Foucault, 1980; 1991) and its re-
elaboration and application in migration and refugee studies (Epstein et al., 1999; 
Hyndman, 2000; Hyndman and Mountz, 2007; Epstein, 2007; Pécoud, 2010).   
  
Iraqis in Syria and Jordan have responded to the absence of reliable and updated 
institutional information and advice by developing their own informal information and 
communication systems that enable them to collect and disseminate personalised 
information on challenges and opportunities for return. Their communication and 
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information systems are based on the use of modern information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) and on their transnational mobility and social networks. Institutional 
actors could improve their performance by making their policies and practices more 
transparent and accountable to their beneficiaries and by incorporating refugees’ informal 
communication and information systems into official return assistance programmes, 
which maximise the participation of returnees and members of receiving communities as 
key information agents.   
 
The findings
12
 are presented in five sections. Section two investigates problems of cross-
institutional information-sharing and cooperation in the context of the Iraqi displacement 
in Syria and Jordan. Section three applies the concept of governmentality to show how 
information and communication systems are instrumentalised by state and non-state 
actors as migration governance tools to manage the Iraqi displaced and steer their 
decisions and practices of return. Section four highlights Iraqis’ agency and the 
independent communication and information systems that they have developed in the 
absence of accurate and reliable institutional information and advice. Section five draws 
some conclusions and recommendations for the establishment of integrated refugee 
information systems. 
7.2 Cross-institutional information-sharing and cooperation in the 
Iraqi displacement context  
In October 2010 the UNHCR published the results of a survey of Iraqi refugees' post-
return experience. According to the poll carried out by the refugee agency: “A majority of 
Iraqi refugees who have returned to Baghdad from neighbouring countries have regretted 
their decision, citing insecurity, economic hardship and a lack of basic public services” 
(UNHCR, 19 October 2010).  The UNHCR reported that many of the returnees stated 
                                                 
 
12
  The findings presented in this chapter have been disseminated in a preliminary research report on‘Iraqi 
refugees' repatriation from Syria and Jordan: facilitating well-informed decisions', published in 2010 in the 
Bulletin of the Council for British Research in the Levant, Vol. 5; and in a feature article on ‘Iraqi refugees’ 
informal information systems in Syria and Jordan’, published in the Bulletin of the Council for British 
Research in the Levant, Vol. 6. 
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that they were obliged to return to Iraq due to the economic hardships they faced in 
asylum states, and that more than one third said that they may re-migrate to nearby 
countries again if conditions in Iraq do not improve (UNHCR, 19 October 2010). These 
findings make one wonder whether the Iraqi returnees took well-informed decisions 
about return. Were the refugees aware of the evidently unsatisfactory conditions in their 
home country when they decided to go back? How did they obtain information about the 
security situation in Iraq? It is not clear whether the UNHCR Return Monitoring Team 
investigated the sources, nature and impact of the available information on Iraqi 
returnees' decision-making processes. It is certain, however, that since the end of the US-
led invasion of Iraq until March 2011, the time of completion of the fieldwork for this 
research project, the international humanitarian agencies and the Iraqi authorities charged 
with protecting and assisting the refugees had yet to establish effective information and 
communication systems to facilitate prospective returnees' well-informed and voluntary 
decisions about return.  The lack of information campaigns to raise Iraqi refugees’ 
awareness of prevailing conditions in home areas is connected to the fact that the 
UNHCR is not promoting large-scale repatriation to Iraq.  The UNHCR Handbook on 
Voluntary Repatriation/International Protection states (1996:32):  
 
Where UNHCR is only facilitating (spontaneous) repatriation, information campaigns 
with a view to promoting voluntary repatriation are not normally appropriate. However, 
the provision of accurate and objective information on the situation in the country of 
origin by UNHCR will be an important activity. When providing information in the 
absence of an intent to promote repatriation, some of the following methods of 
information-sharing may still be useful. 
 
The methods of small-scale information-sharing endorsed in the handbook include: 
posters and leaflets, verbal presentations at public or community meetings, broadcasts on 
public address systems, audio tapes, videos or films, establishment of refugee information 
committees, house-to-house visits by UNHCR staff and information committee members,  
individual counselling, approaching refugees through NGO networks, churches and other 
groups, visits by authorities of the home country to the refugees, provided that the 
refugees have been consulted and have no objections or reservations (UNHCR, 1996). 
 
During the period of field research in Syria and Jordan the home government, the 
UNHCR and other international humanitarian agencies employed these methods 
occasionally to inform the refugees about return and reintegration assistance. Yet, the 
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available information focused on the assistance available to refugees who wished to go 
back; there was virtually no institutional information about conditions in return areas and 
assistance available in Iraq.  What are the reasons of the lack of institutional information 
in the Iraqi displacement context? The findings presented below indicate that the lack of 
updated information and advice to potential returnees has been partly caused by the 
unstable security situation and the limited institutional presence and operational capacity 
in Iraq.  Problems with inter-agency and inter-ministerial information-sharing, 
coordination and collaboration have also complicated the provision of reliable 
information to refugees.  
 
International organisations’ monitoring and operations in return areas dramatically 
decreased with the enforcement of the UN restrictions on the deployment and movement 
of international staff following the bomb attack against the United Nations Headquarters 
in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on the 19
th
 of August 2003 that provoked the death of the 
Secretary General’s Special Representative, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, along with other 
twenty UN staff. The UN-funded return and reintegration programmes inside Iraq have 
therefore been implemented by Iraqi staff and local NGOs. For its operations in Iraq, the 
UNHCR has developed Project Tracking and IDP databases that purportedly allow it to 
implement projects at a lower risk to all stakeholders and to improve financial 
accountability, oversight and transparency (Harper, 2011). Interviews and informal 
conversations with personnel of the UNHCR, IOM and other INGOs working with the 
Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan and Iraq, however, have revealed that these agencies have 
limited information about the reality on the ground in Iraq and about the assistance 
offered by Iraqi and international agencies in return areas. According to an IOM Iraq 
Displacement Monitoring Officer based in Amman, the lack of security has hindered the 
establishment of effective information-sharing and coordination mechanisms between 
different humanitarian assistance providers on the ground and the responsible Iraqi 
authorities:   
There are outreach teams working for various organisations and there's not yet 
coordination or enough coordination at the field level.  For example, there's an outreach 
team and they know something that our outreach team doesn't know. Right now, the way 
this work is that the information that they collect in the field goes to their Baghdad 
offices and our information goes to our Baghdad office and then, maybe the two agencies 
talk. Unfortunately that developed because of security concerns. For a long time and in 
some cases until now our staff keep their identities and their employers secret because it's 
dangerous to work for international organisations. Certainly you don't want it to get to be 
known that there's a whole bunch of UN representatives that are having a meeting, you 
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know, on such and such a day in such governorate. It's just not safe. Because of that the 
coordination still continues to happen at a very centralised level. I don't know what the 
solution is except for trying to work very carefully, I certainly think that it is positive 
when you can have more direct coordination at the field because things happen more 
quickly; those who work in the field are more knowledgeable about what’s going on than 
the people in the head office in Baghdad.  
 
The INGO officers interviewed for this study showed understanding of the importance of 
cross-institutional information sharing but because of the centralised nature of authority 
and control, bureaucratic organisational boundaries, internal operative guidelines and 
procedures, and information clearance mechanisms (Constant et al., 1994; Tsai, 2002; 
Kim and Lee, 2006; Tung-Mou and Maxwell, 2011) they seemed less aware of what 
information could be shared with and retrieved from other institutional and non-
institutional partners, including the Iraqi authorities. Lack of time and human resources 
also complicated inter-agency communication and information sharing. Pressures due to 
time and staff shortages led the various international humanitarian agencies in Syria and 
Jordan to prioritise projects and issues under their direct responsibility over cross-
organisational information sharing initiatives. Moreover, despite the adoption of the 
Cluster Approach to strengthen the coordinated response of the international 
humanitarian regime in emergency situations, the UN agencies working with the Iraqi 
refugees appeared reluctant to share with potential competitors information and 
knowledge, which they produced investing their budget, staff, networks, and time and 
which is the basis of future funding proposals for their programmes (Willem and Buelens, 
2007; Pardo et al., 2006, Pardo et al., 2007). The limited information-sharing and 
cooperation between the UNHCR and IOM, for example, could plausibly be seen as a 
strategy for securing a relevant role as leading service provider in the increasingly 
competitive international migration and refugee regime complex (Betts, 2009; 2010).  
When asked how IOM produces and disseminates information about the available return 
and reintegration assistance to potential beneficiaries and other stakeholders, the IOM 
Capacity building officer answered:  
 
To be honest, I don’t have a clear picture about the assistance provided to the returnees 
and it is something I want to learn more about.  We have approached some donors about 
the implementation of a referral system at the border crossings but it hasn't led to funding 
for a project yet. We do understand that this [the lack of information] is a gap and we are 
keeping it in mind. I would have assumed that even if the UNHCR Iraq does not provide 
any information about the government to the returnees, they should have an overview, if 
they don't I wouldn't know…I assume that the UNHCR Iraq would know about the 
assistance provided by the Iraqi authorities […] When I go to Baghdad next week, I want 
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to have a chat with UNHCR colleagues, just for my personal information.  
 
Above and beyond problems of inter-agency communication and information sharing, the 
representatives of IOM and UNHCR interviewed for this study reported facing 
difficulties in obtaining information from the Iraqi authorities. The Iraqi embassies in 
Syria and Jordan have scarce resources and depend on the information and directives 
arriving from Baghdad. Problems of communication and information sharing between the 
various Iraqi ministries and other executive authorities lead to embassies facing delays 
and obstacles in inter-institutional collaboration. During an off-the-record and unrecorded 
interview with the researcher, a high-profile member of staff of the Iraqi embassy in 
Amman was unprepared to answer most questions concerning the return and reintegration 
assistance provided to Iraqi returnee families by the Iraqi government. He justified his 
lack of knowledge by asserting that the various ministries do not share information with 
the embassies and, if they share information, they do it with delays and other problems. 
He claimed that the lack of communication and information sharing between the various 
Iraqi ministries exposed the staff of the Iraqi embassy to the complaints of the Iraqi 
visitors and the negative judgment of foreign observers. He added that the absence of 
directives from Iraq sometimes resulted in bureaucratic backlogs and mistakes. 
 
 
Fig. 7.1 - Public announcements of return and reintegration opportunities for Iraqi health 
professionals and military officers who served during the former regime 
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According to the IOM officer implementing the capacity building projects for the MoDM 
staff in Baghdad, the ministry did not implement a public information campaign about the 
return and reintegration assistance provided by the Iraqi authorities due to the seven-
months long political stalemate after the 2010 general elections and to the failure of the 
winning political coalitions to reach a power-sharing agreement and form a new 
government: 
 
What people can see is a minister but he no longer has the authority. He's only a figure, 
he takes simple decisions but he cannot take decisions about the budget of the ministry, 
for example. Launching a large-scale public campaign requires a lot of money but the 
allocation of the budget for the MoDM and for all the other ministries is on hold. In 
stable countries there is a strategic plan that is approved and doesn't change even when a 
new government is elected. But this government and this ministry don't have a strategic 
plan; so basically they cannot approve any budget of any ministry until a new 
government is formed. This is why they didn't do any public campaign to promote return. 
 
Internal political instability and competition between the ruling ethno-sectarian parties 
has complicated communication, information sharing and coordination between the 
various Iraqi ministries, which are divided and controlled according to the post-2003 
muhasasa system, that is the division of the state ministries among the ethno-sectarian 
factions that won the 2010 elections and have negotiated the uneasy power-sharing deal 
in Iraq.  The IOM Capacity Building Officer described the challenges faced by the 
organisation to facilitate an inter-ministerial task-force between the various ministries 
involved in border management:  
 
The MoDM is relatively small compared to the MoI [Ministry of Interior] which is huge. 
The bigger and older the ministry is, the more difficult to change its internal structures 
and habits and make it exchange information, not only within departments but also with 
other ministries. This is why we had this inter-ministerial task force that really is just 
meetings but this is how we make people from different ministries meet and share 
information and ideas. We do recognize, even after all these years, that this is one of the 
key problems they [the Iraqi authorities] have. It becomes even more acute at the border. 
In many countries around the world, you have one border agency, for example in Canada 
or in the US, one agency takes care of the borders, but in Iraq you have many ministries 
involved in the management of border crossings. Imagine, you have a very little border 
crossing and the various ministries have offices literally next to each other but if you ask 
them: do you guys meet? Do you guys talk to each other? Do you share information? 
They are there right next to each other, they see each other on a daily basis but they don't 
talk, they don't. This is one of the smallest border-crossings, they are all in the same 
building. So you can imagine in Baghdad, where they are all in different buildings in 
different areas, with all the problems and issues that they face. They don't understand the 
advantage of sharing information. Information is something that they secure carefully.   
 
Government offices may resist sharing information because it is a source and an 
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instrument of power and control over resources. Moreover, Iraqi ministries may resist 
cross-institutional information sharing as it may increase their visibility and the exposure 
of their performance to public scrutiny and evaluation (Pardo et al., 2007). Despite the 
lack of security and the limited technical and operational capacity and despite the inter-
agency and inter-ministerial distrust and competitive relationships, the Iraqi authorities, 
the UNHCR and IOM have jointly produced some information on the displacement 
situation in Iraq. As the following part of this chapter shows, however, there is a 
mismatch between the information produced and disseminated by institutional actors and 
the information sought and consumed by the Iraqi displaced.  
 
The Foucauldian concept of governmentality introduced in chapter two is used in the 
following section to analyse how, in this refugee context, the provision of information, or 
the lack thereof, has been an instrument of migration control, or better a strategy of 
remote control adopted by state and non-state actors in order to influence and guide the 
decisions and the migratory behaviours of the Iraqi displaced.  The following analysis of 
the information generated and disseminated by state authorities and international 
organisations through official means including reports, posters and leaflets about 
voluntary return assistance and counselling sessions with UN protection officers, reveals 
the techniques of self-discipline or self-government devised by these powerful 
institutional actors to manage the Iraqi forced migrants.  
7.3 Information and communication systems as migration governance 
tools  
Similarly to other refugee situations, the home and host governments and international 
organisations generate information about the Iraqi displacement and return through the 
categorisation, counting, and coding of refugees (Hyndman, 2000; 2007). The 
information produced through these exercises is disseminated in the form of statistical 
reports, return updates, fact sheets, charts, maps, monitoring and need assessments and 
other standardised informative materials accessible on online databases such as the 
UNHCR Project Tracking and IDP databases, ReliefWeb, IRIN and IAU for an audience 
of international donors, governments, humanitarian practitioners and academics but 
seldom accessed and used by the forced migrants.   
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This type of information is useful for institutional planning but refugees do not use it 
because it is either not easily accessible, being mostly disseminated on English language 
online databases, or when accessible, is not tailored to meet their concerns and needs 
(Walsh et al., 1999). Institutional information on conditions in home areas is often too 
general and does not target specific places in home areas or particular individuals or 
groups in the home and host countries (Koser, 1997). It does not focus on refugees’ 
personal characteristics such as gender, age, health conditions, nature of settlement and 
length of time in displacement and different economic and socio-cultural priorities and 
projects between first generation migrants and later generations born in exile.  
 
Moreover, it has been argued that such forms of standardised knowledge and information 
constitute a governance tool that constructs refugees as deviant numerical objects that 
need to be ordered and managed (Hyndman, 2000). Humanitarian discourses and 
practices tend to deprive refugees of their historically and culturally diverse identities and 
present them as undifferentiated masses of agency-less and speechless humanity whose 
personal interests and needs no longer drive their actions (Malkki 1995; 1996). The 
'victimisation' of refugees legitimises the design and implementation of policies and 
practices that relegate refugees to passive recipients of humanitarian and development 
interventions planned and implemented in absentia by ‘expert’ foreign interveners 
(Barakat, 2008). The translation of refugees’ lived experiences into standardised 
cartographic, statistical and textual data constitute acts of management and social 
surveillance and enact unequal and asymmetric power relations between the refugees and 
institutional actors who use these techniques of power to govern displaced populations 
often resenting and resisting these practices as culturally inappropriate (Hyndman, 2000).  
Government agencies generally inform repatriation policies and plan development 
interventions only by consulting institutional actors such as UN agencies, think-tanks, 
military sources, and embassy personnel. Returnees and members of receiving 
communities are hardly regarded as precious sources and mediators of information who 
can contribute with their knowledge to policy-making, project planning and resource 
mobilisation (Ghosh, 2000; Dumper, 2006).  Information and communication systems 
have been used as a governance tool in a number of ways in the Iraqi refugee context 
where the asymmetric interaction between the refugees and the UN case workers often 
translated into encounters aimed at extracting personal information from the migrants in 
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order to assess the credibility of their claims rather than providing them with useful 
information and advice about return and reintegration assistance.  
 
A number of Iraqi interviewees have expressed frustration at the UNHCR and IOM’s 
delay in examining their asylum applications, some of which have been pending for over 
three years. In a number of cases, refugees have protested about the tendency of UNHCR 
and IOM to withhold the notification of refusal of their resettlement applications until it 
was too late for the migrants to present an appeal against the decision. Oday, a 40-year-
old engineer, complained about the lack of clarity and transparency in INGOs dealings 
with the Iraqi asylum seekers: 
 
The UN is supposed to inform the Iraqis either of the approval or the rejection of their 
applications, so that we know and can seek other ways and look after our future. I am 
hanging on to my last shred of hope. They have to deal with us in a clear way. We know 
that they try to help us, and we know that the issue is not solely in their hands and that 
they respond to external requirements, but there must be clarity from their part. People 
want to know their destiny. 
 
In informal conversations, humanitarian actors justified their lack of clarity as a necessary 
measure to ensure field staff security and to enhance their management of a large and 
highly mobile refugee population often holding unrealistic expectations about the 
availability, scope and nature of institutional assistance (Iaria, 2011; Saltsman, 2012). 
According to the humanitarian reasoning, refugees’ increased awareness of eligibility 
criteria and other internal guidelines would prompt them to manipulate humanitarian aid 
policies or make false statements in order to obtain resettlement or more financial and 
material assistance. The lack of institutional transparency and clarity was therefore a 
strategic management choice that limited the refugees’ control over their personal 
circumstances and their ability to independently devise alternative solutions to their 
problems. These ambiguous governmental practices added to the stress of refugees who 
had often already suffered traumas and human rights violations. 
 
A number of voluntary repatriation counselling sessions at the UNHCR Registration and 
Food Distribution Centre in Duma, Syria, were observed as part of this research.  During 
the VRP counselling, the protection clerks solicited personal information from the 
refugees in order to assess their willingness and readiness to return to Iraq without 
clarifying the need for such information. In return the refugees received scant information 
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and advice about the security and socio-economic conditions in Iraq and assistance 
available upon return.  
 
When interviewed, a senior UNHCR Syria Registration Officer in charge of the VRP 
counselling claimed to be unfamiliar with the type of return and reintegration assistance 
provided by the UNHCR Iraq and the Iraqi authorities. He had not been briefed by his 
supervisors on such information. He could provide prospective returnees with mobile 
numbers and email contacts of the Return, Integration and Community Centres (RICCs), 
the Return Assistance Centres (RACs) and Protection and Assistance Centres (PACs) in 
the various Iraqi governorates, but there was no clear information regarding the type of 
assistance provided by these centres. He claimed that his role as a VRP counsellor was 
exclusively to inform the refugees of UNHCR Syria return assistance. Providing 
information concerning other UNHCR regional offices was not his responsibility.  He 
suggested that the refugees could obtain further information by directly contacting the 
UNHCR Iraq offices and the Iraqi embassy in Syria. As part of the VRP counselling, 
refugees were originally offered the opportunity to meet Iraqi MoDM officials to acquire 
information on security and socio-economic conditions in Iraq and the availability of 
reintegration assistance. In the UNHCR Registration centre in Duma, the MoDM officials 
were not present to meet potential returnees.   
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Fig. 7.2- Informative poster in Arabic about the UNHCR Vol. Rep. Program 
affixed on the wall of a community centre in Zarqa, Jordan, February 2011 
 
The absent or limited interaction of the Iraqi authorities with the Iraqi nationals in the 
host countries was a recurrent theme in the interviews with Iraqi refugees in Syria and 
Jordan, who expressed a sense of abandonment, lack of confidence and disappointment 
with the performance of the new Iraqi government. The doubts and distrust of the Iraqi 
refugees were alimented either by their disappointing personal experiences and 
interactions with Iraqi authorities or by other people's accounts of institutional inability, 
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and sometimes unwillingness, to provide information and assistance to refugees and 
returnees. The lack of confidence towards the Iraqi authorities was voiced by Abu 
Zainab, the president of an Iraqi association assisting Iraqi refugees in Syria: 
 
When a senior figure in the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced the 
intention to repatriate all Iraqis in exile, I told him: - if the ministry is not able to return 
Iraqis from one area to another within Iraq, how could it possibly repatriate Iraqis from 
abroad?! - Many Iraqis before leaving Iraq were living in rented houses; now if they go 
back they will need affordable accommodation and a job.  
 
Guided by scepticism and doubts about the willingness and ability of the Iraqi authorities 
to provide any assistance, a significant number of Iraqi participants have returned to Iraq 
by relying on their informal support networks. Raed, a 68-year-old professor of physics, 
returned to Iraq unassisted after he learnt that the Iraqi authorities did not honour 
promises of assistance:  
 
The Iraqi government claims to assist Iraqi returnees but they just make propaganda. I 
heard on the news that they merely provided two buses for the people who registered to 
return with their assistance. Some Iraqis arrived at the borders and were left there for 
three days waiting for transports to arrive from Baghdad to take them home. 
 
Previous research has highlighted how state and non-state actors can construct and 
disseminate specific forms of knowledge and information to influence migrants’ 
perceptions, decisions and migratory projects (Walsh et al., 1999, Pécoud, 2010). 
Hyndman and Mountz (2007) have interpreted the strategic 'absence' of the state as a 
technique of refugee control and exclusion through the systematic positioning of the 
migrants outside official assistance channels, where moral and legal protection 
mechanisms are ambiguous or suspended. The strategic non-presence of state authorities 
enables governments to simultaneously maintain the façade of responsibility and 
commitment to a range of international agreements concerning the rights of migrants and 
refugees, while at the same time avoiding the accountability inherent in these agreements 
through the maintenance of zones of legal ambiguity and uncertainty.   
 
 The absence of state guarantees for returnees’ safety and the lack of information about 
institutional return and reintegration assistance has had a negative influence on Iraqis’ 
decisions and actions with respect to return. The lack of institutional information, 
protection and assistance created apprehension among Iraqi interviewees, whose fear of 
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return was grounded on the perceived risk of being exposed to renewed abuses and 
violence given the absence of security and law enforcement in their country. The fear of 
being identified by potentially dangerous agents led some Iraqi families not to report their 
return to the state authorities and not to seek reintegration services.  Abu Ahmad, a 40-
year old plumber accepted the UNHCR Vol. Rep. cash grant to cover the travel expenses 
for his family to go back to Iraq but upon his return to Baghdad he did not seek return and 
reintegration assistance from the local authorities and UN offices for fear of being 
questioned and becoming a target of institutionalised social control and violence:   
 
[…]  I won't go to the UN office in Baghdad, I won't go to avoid problems, I don't want  
to present myself and tell them that I was a refugee in Syria.  
 
V: Why don't you want to go? Don't you need assistance? They may be able to  
help you. 
 
AA:  I told you, if I return to Baghdad I won't go, but if I return to Sulaimaniya I will go 
and seek assistance. In Baghdad, the security situation is not good, they will ask me many 
questions and I don't want them to know.  
 
Despite the great need for protection and compensation for their losses, the lack of 
confidence and mistrust towards public authorities prevents returnee families from 
registering with the Ministry of Migration and Displacement for reintegration assistance. 
In order to obtain information and support from local authorities some respondents had to 
pay bribes or use their personal recommendations and connections with the sectarian 
political groups, which controlled the various ministries and public offices. Some 
returnees gave up their rights to social welfare and services from state institutions in 
order to preserve their dignity and avoid the frustration of dealing with the disorganised 
and corrupted Iraqi bureaucratic system.  
 
For the above mentioned reasons, the Iraqis participants in this study questioned the 
motivations of the Iraqi authorities and international humanitarian assistance providers 
and received institutional messages with scepticism and distrust. In the absence of 
reliable, updated and relevant institutional information, the Iraqi refugees have developed 
their own communication and information systems by collecting and disseminating 
personalised information on challenges and opportunities for repatriation, instead of 
passively receiving it from institutional sources.  As will be discussed in further detail 
below, Iraqi refugees’ informal information and support mechanisms are based on the use 
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of modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their own 
transnational mobility and social networks.  
7.4 Iraqi refugees’ informal communication and information systems  
This qualitative study conducted with a total of 70 Iraqi participants, 35 in Syria and 35 in 
Jordan, found that in the absence of the provision of accurate and relevant institutional 
information, many Iraqi refugees have developed informal information production and 
sharing systems based on the use of modern information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) and their transnational mobility and social networks. Research participants 
reported that they obtained information through phone calls to family and friends in Iraq, 
the news on satellite TV channels, visits to and from home areas and word of mouth 
communications with other Iraqis living or transiting in the host countries.  The following 
chart illustrates the frequency with which the research participants in Syria and Jordan 
used the different means of information. The chart shows responses to the open question: 
“how do you obtain information about your country of origin?” The cases in the Y axes 
correspond to the number of participants who reported using the information means listed 
in the X axes. The chart illustrates that both in Syria and Jordan all the participants 
reported using more than one means of information.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig.  7.2 - Iraqis' means of information in Syria and Jordan 
 
  
Each means is discussed separately below, with the exception of Iraqi hard-copy 
newspapers and the radio that are the least used media in the neighbouring countries of 
asylum as they are not easily accessible. The patterns of usage of such media are 
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influenced by the ICT infrastructure and services available in the home and host 
countries, but also by the legal status and socio-economic characteristics of the Iraqi 
migrants. 
7.4.1 Mobile phones 
A number of studies have highlighted the increasing reliance of migrant and refugee 
communities on mobile phones in order to bypass physical distance and time constraints 
in communication (Horst, 2006; Wall, 2011; Danielson, 2012). Mobile phone calls are 
also the principal channels of communication of Iraqis in Syria and Jordan. In both home 
and host countries, mobile technology penetration is higher than internet penetration and 
mobile phone technology is accessible at affordable prices. In Iraq, land-line services are 
almost non-existent outside of Baghdad. Consequently, since their launch in 2004, mobile 
phone services have boomed to reach penetration rates as high as 75.4%. Mobile-cellular 
penetration rates in Syria are low compared to the rest of the region at 54.8%. In contrast, 
the Jordanian mobile market is among the most liberalised in the region with several 
operators competing for customers, resulting in reduced mobile phone roaming charges. 
The affordable prices have led to very high active subscriber numbers with 116% of the 
total population (ITU, 2012).   
 
There are no official statistics about the level of usage of mobile phones among Iraqis in 
Syria and Jordan. However, all the Iraqi respondents in this study were in possession of 
and used a personal mobile phone to exchange national and international phone calls, 
including calls to and from Iraq. The widespread usage of this innovative communication 
technology allowed UNHCR field offices in Damascus and Amman to contact the 
registered asylum seekers by calling them or sending them SMS messages to inform them 
of available assistance. In 2008, the UNHCR Return Monitoring Team conducted follow-
up interviews by phone to check the conditions of returning refugees
13
.  
 
 All interviewees reported using the vocal and SMS functions to communicate with 
family and friends in Iraq and check on their safety and wellbeing on a daily or weekly 
basis. Phone calls play a crucial role in the establishment, maintenance and 
                                                 
 
13  Interview with a UNHCR Return Monitoring Officer, Damascus, Kafer Sousah , 20 April 2009. 
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transformation of migrant transnational social relations (Vertovec, 2004). Sharing audio, 
text and visual messages allowed most participants to maintain their virtual presence and 
ties with meaningful others boosting their emotional resilience in a situation of physical 
long-distance separation.  
 
 
          Fig. 7.4 - Iraqi young woman sends SMS from her mobile phone, Amman, Jordan, 
 March 2011 
 
For detailed information about the security situation and return and reintegration 
opportunities in their home areas, most Iraqis rely on daily or weekly phone calls to 
relatives and friends.  Maha, a 34-year-old refugee with a degree in English literature, 
called her friends to seek information about postgraduate education opportunities in Iraq: 
 
There is a doctor who was teaching in a university here in Amman. She went back to Iraq 
and she told me to call her if I need any information. So I call her from time to time to 
know how she is and to seek information about PhD opportunities in Iraq.  
 
In the absence of reliable institutional information, the Iraqis trusted information 
generated by themselves or by trustworthy informal sources and agents, who produced 
news oriented towards their own personal concerns (Walsh et al., 1999).  Phone 
communications with family members, friends and other trustworthy people were 
considered the principal means of information but some Iraqi interviewees showed 
awareness that personal information agents may more or less consciously alter qualitative 
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features such as the nature, scope, accuracy and directedness (Koser, 1993) of the 
information they convey.  When asked about his sources of information concerning the 
security situation in his home area, Abu Jaber, a 39 year old man replied:  
 
I cancelled my trips to Iraq several times. In 2007, one year after my arrival in Jordan, I 
thought of going back permanently. I called my relatives… my family are my source of 
reliable information. They told me that the situation was improving in the Salwa areas 
where people started fighting terrorists back and collaborate with the Americans to find 
criminals and send them to justice. The person who told me this may be honest but his 
information was limited to the area where he lives. He didn't know whether the way from 
Baghdad to Amman was safe for instance. I called a driver who goes back and forth 
between Amman and Baghdad and I asked him information about the situation at home. I 
called many people and they told me that the situation was bad and they discouraged me 
from going back to Iraq.  
 
Refugees' decision-making processes are strongly influenced by the available information 
about conditions in home areas, how it is circulated amongst them, and how they 
subjectively evaluate and react to it (Koser, 1997). The information acquired through 
informal social networks contributes to raising refugees’ expectations about their post-
return experience (Turton et al., 2002). In some cases, Iraqi refugees have realised only 
upon their return that the information obtained by informal sources was less accurate or 
objective than they expected.  
7.4.2 Satellite TV channels 
During Saddam Hussein’s regime, TV broadcasting was under strict state control and 
censorship; watching satellite TV channels was banned and was punished by 
imprisonment and fines (UNDP and GoI, 2008). Tareq, a 53 year old mechanical 
engineer shared memories of the isolation of the Iraqi society before and during the years 
of the economic embargo:  
 
You see, the Iraqi people have been closed in their own world for a long time. Even 
before the embargo, in Iraq there was no satellite TV, no internet, no mobile phones, it 
was also very hard to obtain permission from the regime to travel abroad. […] For many 
years the country was deprived of any technological development. For security reasons 
Saddam forbade the use of mobile phones. He forbade satellite TV systems to prevent the 
Iraqis from entering in contact with the western culture and way of life.  
 
The collapse of the Iraqi Ba'athist rule in 2003 opened the doors for ICT imports and 
heralded greater freedom of expression, independent media and political pluralism in 
Iraq. Shortly following the end of the Coalition military operations, hundreds of local and 
foreign private TV and radio stations were established in addition to the national public 
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broadcaster, Al-Iraqiya. A growing number of Iraqi homes were equipped with relatively 
inexpensive satellite TV hardware and software, enabling the Iraqis to watch and engage 
with free national and international TV channels. According to the Irex Audience 
Measurement Survey, the television is the first source of information inside Iraq with a 
daily average of 16 million Iraqis watching the news on the TV (Irex, 2010). The 
increasing availability in Iraq of new communication and information technologies has 
enabled the migrants to reach beyond their physical location and become members of 
transnational communication networks linking home and host societies and to participate 
from a distance in Iraqi socio-cultural life and politics (Chatelard, 2009).  
 
Most research participants in Syria and Jordan have access to satellite TV systems either 
at home or in public places such as cafés, restaurants, shops, and offices of private 
businesses. They reported watching the news about Iraq on a number of national and 
foreign satellite TV channels available without restrictions. Iraqi interviewees in Syria 
and Jordan confirmed that the TV is a fundamental means of information, yet they had 
trust issues with Iraqi TV channels sometimes seen as inaccurate information agents. 
Mustafa, a 45 year old Iraqi owner of an import export company based in Amman 
explained: 
  
Sometimes I watch the news on the TV and the internet but it's basic information about 
official events. The media don't disseminate information accurate 100%. For example in 
the news they say that there was an explosion that caused one victim and 10 injured. You 
have a friend who lives near the place of the explosion and he says that the explosion 
caused 10 victims and 50 injured. On TV sometimes they alter reality by disseminating 
inaccurate information. I obtain more accurate and detailed information from the people 
who are there [in Iraq].  
 
Freedom of expression is a novelty in Iraq and the country is in the process of developing 
a comprehensive regulatory framework for the work of the media in the peace-building 
and reconstruction process. The Communications and Media Commission of Iraq (CMC) 
was established in 2004 with the aim of setting the legal framework and the editorial 
guidelines for the content of TV and radio programs. The CMC has faced the challenge 
of creating a code of practice that balances the principle of 'freedom of speech' with 
preventing the use of the media to incite ethno-sectarian divisions and violence in the 
Iraqi society (Salloum, 21 December 2009). Some participants showed a high degree of 
awareness and criticism of the performance of Iraqi and international media outlets and 
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the information they disseminate. In the words of Ahmed, a 32-year old TV director of an 
Iraqi satellite channel:  
 
The plurality of the media in Iraq is supposed to enhance freedom of information. But 
political parties manipulate the media to spread news that only reflects their views and 
interests. […] There are media linked to religious groups, some linked to political parties, 
others to the Ba’ath; you can understand their affiliation and orientation by reading their 
news headings. Al-Sharqiya is the first TV channel in Iraq and it's independent, Al-
Baghdadia and Al-Summaria are also independent channels.   
 
The sectarian and political ownership of the media entails that the information that each 
channel disseminates reflects the ideas and interests of its sponsors and therefore lacks 
objectivity and impartiality (Al-Marashi, 2007). In his study of media consumption 
among members of Arab migrant groups in Berlin, Rinnawi (2012:1451) argues that Arab 
satellite media reinforce migrants' transnational political and religious engagement by 
promoting a form of 'instant Arab nationalism' while the media become a 'cyber mufti'. 
Aware of the politicisation of information, most Iraqi participants filtered and cross-
checked the messages they received from media outlets with information produced 
through more independent systems, such as personal visits or email and phone 
communications with family and friends in Iraq. 
7.4.3 Internet 
Most studies on refugees' usage of web-based technologies have been conducted in 
resettlement countries in the global north (Kabbar and Crump, 2006; Leung 2010, 2011; 
Flemming, 2011; Oiarzabal and Reips 2012) mainly due to more developed infrastructure 
and facilities. Despite the limited regional access to affordable and efficient internet 
services, the internet plays an increasingly crucial role as a communication and 
information means among the Iraqi displaced in Syria and Jordan.  At present, internet 
infrastructure and facilities in Jordan are better developed and more affordable than in 
Syria and in Iraq. Internet penetration rates in Iraq are among the lowest in the region, 
due to the lack of high-speed internet backbone infrastructure and delays in the 
establishment of a national telecommunications regulatory framework. Internet usage 
among the Iraqi people in Iraq, Syria and Jordan also varies depending on individuals’ 
age, socio-economic characteristics and computer skills.  
 
In Iraq a number of capacity building projects have been implemented to improve the 
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state of ICT facilities in the public and private sector, to increase computer awareness and 
provide training courses for beginners in educational institutions (UNDP and GoI, 2008). 
Private internet services, restricted during the Ba’ath regime, have begun proliferating 
thanks to the availability of personal computers in the retail market and satellite 
broadband systems. However, due to underdeveloped infrastructure and the high prices 
set by network providers only 2.5% percent of the Iraqi population uses the internet (ITU, 
2012). Most users inside Iraq access computer and internet services in public places such 
as internet cafés but the unstable security conditions may prevent Iraqi people’s 
movement and the ability to use public internet facilities. The Irex study indicates that 
with improvements in the security situation and in the reconstruction of the country, the 
internet market will rapidly grow and will challenge other information means like the 
radio and newspapers (Irex, 2010).   
 
In Jordan internet penetration rate is at around 38% but the government has worked to 
extend it to 50% by the end of 2015 through the provision of a fibre optics broadband 
network (ITU, 2012). Internet penetration is lower in rural than in urban areas where 
there is a dense usage of home wired and wireless connections. In the major urban and 
tourism centres like Amman, Irbid and Aqaba, internet services are also available for free 
in hotels, cafés and restaurants. In recent years, the installation of broadband networks to 
connect public education institutions to the internet has led to the rapid expansion of ICT 
usage among young people in universities, schools, and community colleges. The 
Jordanian authorities do not impose strict censorship on online social networking 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Similarly to other cases of migrant 
transnational political mobilisation and activism in the cyberspace (Graham and 
Khosravi, 2002; Bernal, 2006; Rinnawi, 2012) online social media have attracted a 
growing number of young Arab people and were employed in both Iraq's and Jordan's 
2010 parliamentary elections as powerful communication and political propaganda tools 
in alternative to more traditional familial and tribal communication and support systems.   
 
Internet penetration rate in Syria is lower than in Jordan at 20.7% due to delays in 
developing the state-controlled infrastructure (ITU, 2012). The high prices and low-
performance of broadband services has discouraged home internet subscriptions while 
internet usage in public facilities has increased, particularly among young people in urban 
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centres. The Iraqis interviewed in Syria mainly accessed computer and internet services 
in high-traffic public spaces such as restaurants and Internet cafes. The high demand for 
Internet access in areas with a high concentration of Iraqis, particularly young 
unemployed Iraqi men, drove the expansion of internet facilities for commercial use, 
often owned by Iraqis in partnership with Syrian nationals. The mobile phone and 
internet markets are heavily controlled and regulated by the Syrian government. At the 
time of the fieldwork for this study the Syrian authorities blocked personal blogs along 
with other popular social networking web sites like Facebook and YouTube and imposed 
strict internet censorship to prevent political opposition groups and human rights activists 
from mobilising and coordinating protests. Moreover, internet cafes in Damascus were 
monitored by surveillance cameras and the owners of the commercial activities had to 
keep a record of names of customers. However, experienced internet users in Syria 
circumvent state censorship and access forbidden web sites by using international 
proxies. 
 
The access to and usage of internet among Iraqi participants interviewed in Syria and 
Jordan varied depending on their age, socio-economic characteristics and computer skills 
and the characteristics of the people they communicated with through the internet. The 
lack of large-scale survey data make empirical generalisations difficult; yet, during 
fieldwork it was evident that many of the Iraqi refugees living in Syria come from a 
poorer socio-economic background compared to the Iraqis who found refuge in Jordan. 
The lower-socio-economic profile of the Iraqis in Syria is confirmed by the fact that the 
Iraqis resident in Jordan had the financial resources to meet stringent residence 
requirements including the deposit of large sums of money in local bank accounts while 
the Iraqis in Syria obtained residence rights without meeting similar financial conditions. 
Most research participants in Jordan could afford a personal computer and some of them 
had wired or wireless internet connections at home or in their offices. Most Iraqi 
participants in Jordan hold higher education degrees and know how to use the computer 
and the internet to exchange emails, participate in chat rooms, make video calls and work. 
Rand, a 35 year old Iraqi woman with a Diploma in Pedagogy preferred seeking 
information by making phone calls than surfing the internet:  
 
Sometimes I check my emails but I don't search the internet for information. I can obtain 
audio-visual information from the TV more easily than from the internet. The telephone 
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is also faster to get information. Searching for information about Iraq on the internet takes 
a long time…I have to sit in front of the computer for hours. Sometimes the internet is 
not a reliable means of information as well, isn't it?  
 
Interestingly, among the participants who mentioned the internet as a means of 
information, only the most educated reported to read online documents and newspapers, 
mainly in Arabic and sometimes in other languages. In the interviews the quality of the 
web content did not emerge as a major theme of discussion because the information 
acquired through the internet, was mainly of a personal nature and generated from email 
exchanges and chats with families and friends and not from official websites.  
 
 
Fig.  7.3 - Iraqi students work with a laptop computer in the court yard 
of a church, Amman, Jordan, May 2011 
 
 
In Syria, wealthy and literate research participants also knew how to use the computer 
and the internet to exchange emails, participate in chat rooms, make calls and work. 
Samir, a 59 year old male with a PhD in International Law, found a remedy to the lack of 
job opportunities in Syria by working online from home.  He translated research papers 
and academic articles from English and French into Arabic for websites based in Jordan 
and the Gulf Countries:    
 
Here [in Syria] there are very few job opportunities; I am doing some translation from 
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English and French into Arabic. I translate pieces of research and articles for some web 
sites; I earn between $500 and $600 per month and I work from home like Europeans do. 
But this money is not enough to cover all my family's living expenses here in Syria.  
 
 
For the most educated and skilled Iraqis the internet was not only a critical means of 
obtaining information about the home country but also a source of livelihood and an 
instrument to play an active social role both in the host and home society. Danielson 
(2012) investigated refugee communication and information systems in the urban setting 
of Cairo. She observed that in Cairo a number of refugee-led attempts to set up web-
based informative initiatives for refugees failed due to lack of funding and the departure 
of the initiators of the projects. Similar projects were undertaken more or less 
successfully by some Iraqis both in Amman and Damascus. For instance, Oday, a 40 year 
old computer engineer and the president of the Iraqi Youth Assembly, a semi-licensed 
Iraqi civil society organisation based in Damascus, created an Arabic-language website
14
 
containing text and audio-visual information on the socio-cultural activities and 
vocational training courses run by the organisation for the Iraqi youth in Syria.  Firas, a 
35 year-old male photographer who has now been resettled to New York, created his own 
blog in English, 'Native without a Nation'
15
 and launched an online fund-raising 
campaign for Iraqi refugee children in Syria. At the time of the field research Odays' 
website was accessible to internet users in Syria, while Firas’ blog was blocked by the 
Syrian authorities for unclear reasons.  
 
Other Iraqis interviewed in Syria were less affluent, educated and computer literate. The 
lack of computer skills accompanied by insufficient dedicated web content in Arabic 
restricted these participants’ ability to access information through the internet. Wael, for 
example is a 40 year old male driver who could not complete his primary school studies 
in Iraq because he had to work to help his family. His living conditions in Syria were 
harsh: he lived with his wife and two children in a small, unhealthy and empty room in 
Saida Zainab in the rural outskirts of Damascus and their wellbeing depended on 
                                                 
 
14 The web site of the Iraqi Youth Assembly was accessible online at  
< http://www.iraqiy.com/index.php/2010-07-11-21-10-38/3-newsflash/41-newsflash-5.html> 
15 The web site of Native Without a Nation is accessible online at  
< http://nativewithoutanation.blogspot.com/> 
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inadequate humanitarian assistance, charity, and occasional low-paid jobs. Wael’s family 
could not afford a television at home or a computer. His writing and reading skills in 
Arabic, his mother tongue, were limited. His illiteracy and lack of computer skills 
restricted his ability to access information from other sources. Wael is one of the many 
Iraqi heads of household who, in their struggle to survive in Syria with their families,  
had no time to attend free English language and computer training courses offered by 
humanitarian assistance providers. They mainly relied on phone calls and personal visits 
to and from Iraq to acquire information about the security situation and return and 
reintegration opportunities.  
7.4.4 Cross-border mobility, visits and word of mouth communication 
For the Iraqis cross-border mobility and visits between Iraq, Syria, Jordan and countries 
further afield is another critical livelihood strategy and an effective way of acquiring 
personalised information. Over three decades of war and economic sanctions in Iraq have 
caused the progressive fragmentation and global dispersion of Iraqi families, and the 
establishment of transnational networks and practices connecting Iraqi migrants in 
various countries of the world. Damascus and Amman, the neighbouring capitals and 
main recipient cities of Iraqi refugees, have become critical hubs of information. They are 
places of transit, encounter and interaction for members of different Iraqi migrant groups 
travelling to and from Iraq (Chatelard, 2002; 2010). Yousef, a 49-year-old with a PhD in 
Arabic literature, stressed that Iraqi political networks extend into Jordan, where it is 
possible to obtain both public and non-public information:  
 
Amman is a fundamental place of transit for the Iraqis. Every week here in Amman I 
meet at least five or six Iraqis who are members of the parliament or senior officers in the 
state apparatus. Here we have the opportunity to obtain public information and also news 
which are not publicly accessible. 
 
During their temporary visits to the home areas the Iraqis can directly assess the security 
situation and explore challenges and opportunities for return and reintegration in their 
home areas.  Ammar, a 62 year old retired engineer who worked for the state-controlled 
oil company in Basra, decided to remain in Amman after his visit back home:   
 
V: What was your impression of your home area when you went back? 
 
A: Static, there’s been no progress… no infrastructure, no services, no improvements in 
terms of electricity, health and education. As far as I could see, in Basra city centre very 
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little has been done to improve people's living conditions. Sometimes you can see in the 
streets that there are some reconstruction works of pavements, they have planted some 
trees but they died soon because of the lack of water. Things are being done without 
plans, over a short-time frame, so nothing lasts. Effectively, I didn't sense any 
improvement since the time I left.  
 
V: Are you planning to return? 
 
A: Not now because nothing has improved since the time I left. For me personally if I 
want to go back, I need to settle in a safe place where I can do some work, I have 
freedom of movement, where there are services and some of the common entertainments 
that no longer exist in Iraq. Yesterday I saw one of the lousy things that happened in 
Basra. A circus came down to Basra from Erbil, just a normal circus that was going to be 
in Basra for thirty days to offer some entertainment for the people. Yesterday the 
religious authorities closed the circus down because they claimed that some girls were 
going around almost naked. How can things get better in Basra with this kind of closure, 
this way of thinking? They don't want a circus in town, I'm not talking about ordinary 
people; I'm talking about the local authorities, the influential people who are linked to 
political parties and religious groups. [… people are angry because they miss some form 
of entertainment …of course there are no cinemas, there are no clubs, needless to say that 
bars and restaurants that serve alcohol don't exist anymore because they are forbidden 
[…]. There isn't a real attraction to live in Basra nowadays.  But I have family and friends 
there, if things change, yes, I would love to go back. I lived in Basra in times when it was 
a beautiful city, twenty years ago Basra was a beautiful city, it was an open port and there 
were many entertainments and nice places to visit but all this is now gone down the 
drains because of the politics since 1980s.  
 
Ammar and other Iraqi research participants personally witnessed the lack of 
improvements in their home areas and had low expectations concerning their return 
experience. Some respondents who have not visited Iraq before their return claimed that 
it was impossible to gather sufficient and accurate information about transformations that 
have occurred at home during their absence. They felt ill-prepared to plan their return 
without personally assessing the situation at home. Those who have engaged in cross-
border mobility and adopted transnational livelihood strategies, were instead better 
equipped to take informed decisions about return because they had the opportunity to 
assess the local realities at home, weigh the costs and benefits of return and prepare their 
sustainable reintegration.  
 
The Iraqis who were less mobile and paid less frequent visits to Iraq obtained information 
about conditions in home areas through word of mouth communication with family 
members, friends and other co-nationals who visited them in Syria and Jordan. When 
asked how she obtained information about her house in her home area Nadia, a thirty 
year-old woman replied: 
 
Before the elections, a group of young men from our home area came to Syria. AD [her 
husband] met them and they told him that the situation in our area was bad; the National 
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Guard was arresting people in our neighbourhood. These young men came to Syria 
during the elections for fear of being arrested, after the elections they went back. We get 
information about our home area from the people who come from Baghdad.  
 
The information refugees acquire during visits to Iraq and their positive or negative return 
experiences have a strong impact, not only on their own decision to return permanently, 
but also on the perceptions and expectations of other refugees who hear their accounts. 
The findings of this study confirm previous research stressing that the evaluation of 
information is essentially a behavioural process and is therefore highly subjective (Koser, 
1997). Personal characteristics such as age, gender, socio-economic background, political 
orientations and individual aspirations and projects can greatly influence the manner in 
which information is received and evaluated by different migrants. Iraqi participants’ 
evaluation of information and their decision-making processes about return were often 
collective exercises and depended on the religion, socio-cultural values and gendered 
power relations in the Iraqi households and communities. 
 
Individual motivations and characteristics may arguably render the information provided 
by the Iraqis less reliable, since they may be unable to provide an objective assessment of 
the traumatic events which they experience or they may lie to achieve personal goals. 
Despite significant obstacles and within the legal and socio-economic uncertainty and 
constraints experienced in host and home countries, the Iraqis interviewed had 
nevertheless actively engaged in processes of generation and dissemination of knowledge 
and information on challenges and opportunities for return, instead of passively and 
uncritically receiving it from institutional sources.  In doing so, they have reclaimed their 
right of shared ownership and participation in the production of knowledge and 
information and in decision-making processes that affect their lives.  They have resisted 
and attempted to transform repressive institutional structures that relegate forced migrants 
to the role of passive and dependent receivers of external “expert” information and 
assistance. The global spread of user-friendly and affordable information and 
communication technologies has led to the growing ‘crowdsourcing’ of ideas and 
services to groups or communities of ordinary people rather than to traditional service 
providers (Wall, 2011; Price and Richardson, 2011; Wilding, 2012; Danielson 2012). 
These changing patterns of ICTs usage are challenging existing power relations and 
operational approaches in the humanitarian and development world, where “expert 
knowledge” is no longer the remit of a small group of technocrats and practitioners, but it 
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is increasingly with the general public and the beneficiaries of humanitarian and 
development programmes (Currion, 2011; Iaria, 2011).   
7.5 Conclusions: towards integrated refugee information systems 
At the time of the fieldwork for this study hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had already 
returned to Iraq unassisted from Syria and Jordan and many others adopted cross-border 
livelihood strategies as a solution to their condition of protracted displacement.  Such 
returns have taken place despite both the Iraqi government and international organisations 
failing to earn the trust of the migrants and provide them with accurate information and 
assistance. Due to time and resources limitations and difficulties in cross-institutional 
collaboration and information-sharing, institutional actors face challenges in monitoring 
refugees’ returns and evaluating the outcomes of return and assistance projects in the 
home areas.  
 
The production of objectified and standardised forms of knowledge and the provision, or 
the lack thereof, of institutional information is also a migration governance strategy 
adopted by state authorities and international organisations to enhance their management 
of a highly mobile refugee population. The lack of institutional transparency and clarity 
was a deliberate governmental practice that limited refugees’ control over their personal 
circumstances, and their ability to make informed decisions and devise alternative 
solutions to their predicaments. This practice contributed to increasing the vulnerability 
of the Iraqi displaced and threatened the sustainability of their return.   
 
Institutional actors could improve their performance by adopting more transparent 
approaches in their dealings with the refugees and by promoting the participation of 
potential returnees and members of the receiving communities in the development of 
refugee and returnee information systems, which can be used as a basis for policies aimed 
at facilitating refugees return and sustainable reintegration in the areas of origin.   
 
Iraqi returnees, circular migrants and members of the receiving communities hold key 
information about conditions in their home areas and opportunities and challenges for 
return, which could be incorporated into more formal returnee information systems. In 
the absence of accurate and reliable institutional information, some Iraqis in Syria and 
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Jordan have developed informal information systems based on the use of modern 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) and their transnational mobility and 
social networks.  However, such ICTs are not accessible to all and their usage depends on 
refugees’ socio-economic background, computer skills and legal status in host countries.  
 
The information which refugees acquire through these informal systems and their positive 
or negative return experiences have a strong impact not only on their own decision to 
return, but also on the perceptions and expectations of other refugees who hear their 
accounts. It could be argued that information provided by refugees may not be 
completely reliable, since they may provide a subjective assessment of their post-return 
experiences or they may lie to achieve material gains. Nonetheless, as the beneficiaries of 
assistance programmes, Iraqi refugees have the right and responsibility to be informed 
and to cooperate in generating and disseminating crucial knowledge and information 
which facilitate their return and socio-economic reintegration in safety and dignity.   
 
The design and implementation of humanitarian and development interventions should be 
an inclusive process involving states, international actors and the people of war-torn 
societies. This approach reinforces Iraqi nationals' sense of shared ownership and 
participation in knowledge production and in key decision-making processes and 
therefore helps to redress repressive and inequitable power relationships and consolidated 
patterns of external aid dependency.  
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The case of Iraqi refugees’ return from Syria and Jordan lends itself well to exploring a 
number of theoretical and empirical questions. What are the links between transnational 
migration and nation-state and region building? What does the existence of non-
conforming actors tell us about the nature of regimes and about the interaction between 
international regimes and states’ power and interest?  What roles do information and 
communication play in migration and refugee governance? What is the relationship 
between return migration and transnationalism in situations of protracted refugee 
displacement? These questions have guided the empirical analysis in this thesis, and were 
investigated through the development of a multi-disciplinary explanatory framework that 
combines conceptual and theoretical tools from International Relations and Migration 
Studies.    
 
The key research findings and arguments of this thesis are presented below. Section two 
discusses the links between transnational migration and regionalism and argues that in the 
Middle East transnational migration has been a driver of nation and region building. 
Section three examines the interaction between the international refugee regime and the 
national Syrian and Jordanian systems and offers broader theoretical conclusions about 
the impact of geopolitics on regime emergence and implementation and about cases of 
actors’ non-adherence to international regimes. Section four discusses the use of 
knowledge, information and communication as management tools in the Iraqi 
displacement and its implications for understanding the governance of forced migrants. 
Section five uses the evidence on Iraqis’ return and transnational livelihoods between 
Iraq and neighbouring Syria and Jordan to highlight the transnational nature of return in 
situations of protracted refugee displacement. Section six considers the strengths and 
limitations of the study and section seven offers conclusions and suggestions for future 
research.  
8.2 Transnational migration and regionalism in the Middle East 
Studies of regionalism in the Middle East should not make the mistake to apply a narrow 
definition of regional integration derived from the European integration model, based on 
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inter-state and inter-governmental cooperation in economic and trade issues, to assess the 
level of regional integration in the Middle East (Fawcett, 2005). This is not to suggest 
that economic and political dimensions are completely irrelevant analytical concepts to 
understand region building in the Middle East or in other regions, but to stress the need to 
apply the broader definition of regionalism, including forms of ethno-cultural and socio-
linguistic cohesion, and pre-modern nation-state patterns of interaction among peoples - 
and not exclusively among states- to assess the level of regional integration in different 
contexts.    
 
It may be true that the Middle East is less economically and politically integrated than 
Europe and that most attempts at creating regional organisational structures and 
institutions have been complicated by inter-governmental disputes and distrust (Barnett, 
1993). A cursory scrutiny of the Middle Eastern experience, however, reveals that 
patterns of regional integration have been characterised by more spontaneous societal 
processes facilitated by continuous transnational population movements and encounters 
as well as economic and political exchanges. Transnational migration, both in its 
voluntary and involuntary forms, has indeed played an historical role in nation-state and 
region building in the Middle East. Transnational labour migration has been a powerful 
driver of regional economic integration documented since the 1980s (Keely and Saket, 
1984; Samha, 1990; Thiollet, 2011; Shah, 2012).  The continuous flows of labour and the 
associated economic remittances generated by migrant workers have been a driving force 
of regional economic development (Shafik, 1998). The importance of labour migration 
for Arab economies lies in the differences in factor endowments across the region and in 
the adoption of specific development policies by both the oil-rich labour-importing and 
oil-poor labour-exporting countries in the Middle East (Shafik, 1998).  
 
Transnational migration has also facilitated regional socio-cultural and linguistic 
cohesiveness in the Middle East. High levels of social and cultural cohesion derive from 
the historical nomadic and tribal lifestyle of local societies, where highly mobile peoples 
have built transnational social spaces of identification based on kinship, ethno-cultural, 
linguistic, and religious identities (Matar, 1997; Batatu, 2004; Chatelard, 2008; 2009; 
2010). Feelings of belonging to transnational Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic communities 
have developed throughout the centuries and have resisted and transcended processes of 
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modern nation-state formation (Shami, 1993; 1996) informing geographical trajectories 
of past and present migration movements (Suhrke, 1999; Chatty, 2010).  
 
The transnational nature of Middle Eastern societies is also the product of the systematic 
use of population displacement as a nation building and governance tool by regional 
governments. In the Middle East, as in other regional contexts, population displacement 
has been among the key instruments of nation-state building.  The evidence presented in 
this study demonstrates how the transnational nature of the Iraqi society, for instance, has 
changed along with the ethno-religious and political groups that were included and 
excluded by different regimes from the Iraqi polity in different historical periods. The 
numerous and overlapping episodes of population displacement and return to Iraq have 
materialised into the dispersed and de-territorialised character of the Iraqi polity, 
requiring the present Iraqi governments to adopt an integrated approach to tackle the 
internal and external displacement problem as a case of multiple and interrelated 
displacement (Van der Auweraert, 2011).  Current refugee and migration trends in Iraq 
and in the rest of the region are a continuation, and partial amplification, of past 
migratory movements, which overlap and mix with more recent patterns of human 
mobility and circulation within and without the Middle East (Chatelard, 2010). 
 
At an international level, developed countries have increasingly narrowed their 
understanding of responsibility towards the massive flows of refugees and IDPs 
generated by natural, man-made disasters and conflict in the Middle East and in other 
countries in the global South. Northern governments apply the principle of refugee 
'burden-shifting' rather than 'burden-sharing' through the funding and implementation of 
policies of containment, regionalisation and internalisation of refugee crises in their 
regions of origin (Harvey, 2000; Bailliet, 2003). 
 
The propensity of developed countries to exclude immigrants and deny asylum seekers 
access to their territories stands in sharp contrast with the huge efforts made by 
developing countries to deal with the problem of massive regional refugee movements. 
Most refugee generating countries are located in Africa and Asia. Their neighbouring 
countries do not have sufficient material resources to cope with the arrival and 
resettlement of significant numbers of people. In many circumstances, neighbouring 
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countries of asylum have not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees. Refugees living in these countries are not granted 
refugee status and their legal status is generally regulated through temporary permits of 
stay granted on humanitarian grounds. Due to the lack of resources, institutional capacity 
- and political will - to provide protection and assistance to large numbers of forced 
migrants, host governments have hardened their attitudes towards refugee inflows and 
adopted strict immigration and asylum policies to prevent refugees from being integrated 
into host societies (Turton and Marsden, 2002). This has prompted academic and policy 
debates over whether the provision of protection and durable solutions to refugees and 
IDPs should be regarded as a global or as a regional good, and whether the international 
refugee regime is an effective instrument to promote inter-state cooperation and ensure 
the equitable sharing of responsibility and costs for the solution of refugee problems 
(Betts, 2008; 2009). The next section discusses the uneasy cooperation between the 
international refugee regime and the Syrian and Jordanian national migration systems, 
and takes this case study as the empirical base to infer some conclusions about the impact 
of international and regional geopolitics on regime formation and transformation and the 
relationship between regimes and state power and interests.  
8.3 The uneasy cooperation between international and national 
regimes 
Iraqis’ return and transnational livelihoods between Iraq, Syria and Jordan result from the 
uneasy interaction between the international refugee regime and national migration 
regimes, which have yet to reach an agreement on a common legal framework for durable 
solutions to the Iraqi displacement. The Iraqi refugee problem in the region is not 
addressed in international multi-lateral agreements or regional legal refugee protection 
frameworks.  The Iraqi displacement in Syria and Jordan is governed through national 
migration policies and practices. Not having signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, the 
Syrian and the Jordanian governments do not grant refugee status to Iraqis. Having 
limited resources to provide protection and assistance to high numbers of forced migrants 
in their territories, the host authorities, treat the Iraqi people as ‘guests’, ‘temporary 
residents’, or ‘migrants with special humanitarian needs’ and have incorporated selective 
mobility in their management of the Iraqi displaced with the ultimate aim to promote 
their return or resettlement elsewhere.  
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The Syrian and the Jordanian governments have handled the Iraqi refugee problem by 
complying with international refugee principles and operational norms only to the extent 
that enabled them to shift the economic costs and political responsibility for the 
protection and assistance of the Iraqi displaced to the international actors enforcing the 
regime. At a national level, however, this has not prevented the two host states from 
managing the Iraqi displacement problem following local knowledge and traditional 
normative structures, which derive from the historical experience of the two host states 
with population displacement in the region and their conventional interactions with 
previous forced migration flows generated by Iraq and other neighbouring states. Arab 
states’ attitudes and policies towards refugee problems in the region are also driven by 
national security concerns and by an awareness of the impact of forced migrants’ long-
term presence and cross-border livelihoods on the socio-economic and political 
development of the home and host societies.  
 
Given these regional and local specificities, how does this case study advance theoretical 
understanding of the interaction between international and national regimes?  What does 
the existence of state actors who refuse to join an international regime tell about the 
relationship between international regimes and state power and interests?  
 
Regime theory, as it has been designed and applied by neo-liberal institutionalists, 
focuses on explaining the factors that lead to inter-state cooperation, when and why states 
form regimes and the circumstances under which regimes persist, undergo 
transformations or disappear (Krasner, 1983; Keohane and Nye, 1989).  This intellectual 
work is essential to predict states’ behaviour and to find ways in which states can work 
together in order to achieve pacific and mutually beneficial goals, thereby promoting 
regional and international communities.   
 
The empirical case presented in this study raises a number of questions which, to be 
answered, require regime theory to expand its explanatory power to cases of non-
adherence and resistance to international regimes.  Why do some actors refuse to join 
international regimes? What does the existence of non-conforming actors demonstrate 
about the nature and role of regimes? Does it mean that regimes are just a function of 
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state power and interests and have no independent causal impact on states’ behaviours?  
Or does it indicate the weakening of a regime?  
 
This study argues that actors’ interaction with a regime is not solely explained in terms of 
power-balance among states or in terms of absolute and relative gains as structural realist 
and neo-liberal perspectives would sustain (Grieco, 1988; Keohane and Nye, 1989; 
Mearsheimer 1994). The ability of a regime to influence actors’ behaviour also depends 
on the degree of actors’ adherence to and acceptance of the principles and norms 
promoted by the regime as a collective good. Actors’ refusal to accept the principles, 
operational norms and procedures of a specific regime may be caused more by their 
different moral and political stance on specific geopolitical issues and disputes. Actors’ 
non-alignment with certain regimes may be linked to cognitive factors (Jönsson, 1995) 
such as diverging identities and historical experiences as well as to power politics and 
rational calculations of self-interest.  Regimes are social institutions (Young, 1980; 
1989), negotiated by human actors holding very different cultural and social value 
systems (Hurrell, 1995).  National actors’ identities, experiences, and moral stances in 
specific time periods and geopolitical contexts affect their interaction with other actors 
within and outside international regimes.  
 
The geopolitical context and historical events in the Middle East, for instance, greatly 
affected the formation of the international refugee regime and its interaction with the 
Syrian and Jordanian national normative systems for the past six decades. The 
international refugee regime was established in 1948 by the western powers to resolve the 
problem of the Jewish refugees generated in Eastern Europe during World War II.  The 
resolution of the Jewish refugee crisis in Europe involved the creation of the state of 
Israel in 1948, the related flight and expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Arab 
Palestinians from their homeland and the escalation of the First Arab-Israeli conflict.  In 
this geopolitical context, the Syrian and the Jordanian governments and other Arab states 
parties in the conflict refused to ratify the 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol, which 
they regarded as an instrument to oblige them to accept the newly established state of 
Israel and to take formal responsibility for providing a durable solution for the Palestinian 
refugees through their permanent integration in their territories. 
 
193 
 
 
 
 
The international refugee regime, therefore, exhibits the characteristics of a de facto 
imposed order (Young, 1980) established by western powers with neither the direct 
participation of subordinate actors in relevant negotiations nor their explicit consent. The 
lack of inclusive negotiations and the absence of a unanimous formal consent from the 
actors in the international community has undermined the legitimacy of the regime. Arab 
states did not accept this imposed normative order because they were not persuaded by 
the western neo-liberal discourse that the international refugee regime was designed to 
equitably share the responsibility and costs of delivering collective security and goods in 
the form of protection and durable solutions for refugees worldwide. They perceived the 
regime as a less benevolent, hegemonic and discriminatory system delivering refugee 
protection according to Eurocentric particularistic principles and interests rather than 
cosmopolitan values of humanitarianism and universal human rights (Hathaway, 1997; 
2003; Cox, 1983, Keeley, 1990). The absence of a sense of community of values, moral 
concerns and shared identity and goals among different actors, undermines patterns of 
spontaneous and voluntary cooperation (Jönsson, 1995; Hurrell, 1995).   Patterns of 
interaction between international and national normative systems in the Middle East are 
marked ‘by powerful reactionary forces that reject western-style models and practices of 
governance’ (Fawcett 2005: 206), especially when these are imposed on developing 
societies through more or less coercive methods (Young, 1980). 
 
The dominant actors can pressure non-conforming subordinate actors into complying 
with the dictates of the regime relying on their greater power capabilities and using a 
carrot and stick method.  Power, in its multifarious forms, has undoubtedly a critical role 
to play in the enforcement of international regimes, especially those emerging as 
negotiated and imposed orders (Young, 1980).  The weak position of subordinate actors 
at the negotiation table obscures their alternative claims and principles and exposes them 
to pressures from dominant actors to follow the requirements of the regime, or pay the 
consequences of their non-conforming actions.  
 
However, the maintenance of the international regime entails material and moral costs for 
the dominant actors, who may not always have the resources to persuade non-conforming 
states and influence their performance at a national level (Young 1980). The increasing 
complexity of regimes (Alter and Meunier, 2009; Betts, 2010) allows states to employ 
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cross-institutional strategies such as regime shifting, forum shopping and strategic 
inconsistency (Helfer, 2009; Alter and Meunier, 2009) in order to avoid compliance with 
regimes that are perceived as an illegitimate imposition. 
 
The Syrian and Jordanian behaviour with respect to the international refugee regime can 
be seen as a form of non-conformist strategy, whereby states comply with international 
principles and operational norms only to the extent that this enables them to shift the 
financial and political responsibilities of providing refugee protection at the international 
level, without formally adhering to the international regime and without incorporating 
international principles and norms into their national normative systems. At the national 
level, however, the Syrian and Jordanian behaviour continues to be informed by a 
combination of calculations of the political and socio-economic costs and gains and by 
local historical political identities, socio-cultural norms, and roles which derive from 
actors’ past and present experiences with forced migration realities in the region and 
conventional bilateral relations with Iraq, with other neighbours (Barnett, 1993), and with 
the UNHCR, the US and other key international players in the region (Schencker, 2003; 
Hinnerbusch, 2006). The ultimate outcome of the uneasy interaction between 
international and national regimes is disagreement and the lack of effective cooperation, 
leaving refugee populations in the Middle East, and in other regional contexts, without 
institutional assistance and viable political solutions to their predicament.  
 
Understanding the interaction between national and international regimes demands a 
flexible and inclusive explanatory framework, which takes into account traditional 
power-politics and strategic interests, but also the historical and geopolitical context of 
regime formation and implementation, and the identities, experiences and socio-cultural 
beliefs of the state and non-state actors engaged with a given regime. 
8.4 Information and communication as migration and refugee 
governance tools 
This thesis has investigated the role of information and communication in the context of 
Iraqi refugees' return from Syria and Jordan. It has found a conspicuous lack of 
institutional information about conditions inside Iraq and about return and reintegration 
assistance provided by the Iraqi authorities and international aid agencies for the Iraqis 
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who wish to return. In the Iraqi displacement context, this lack of information is partly 
due to the limited institutional presence and operational capacity in Iraq as well as to 
problems of cross-institutional communication, information-sharing and cooperation.  
The findings also suggest that the provision of information, or the lack thereof, is a 
governance tool adopted by institutional actors to manage the displaced populations.  
 
The Foucauldian concept of governmentality (Foucault, 1991) proved to be a useful 
analytical tool to investigate how communication and information can be instruments of 
migration management, strategies of remote control adopted by state and non-state actors 
in order to influence and guide the decisions and migratory behaviours of displaced 
people. In the Iraqi context, the analysis of the information generated and disseminated 
by state authorities and international organisations through official means including 
reports, posters and leaflets about voluntary return assistance and counselling sessions 
with UN protection officers, reveals the techniques of self-discipline or self-government 
devised by these powerful institutional actors to manage the Iraqi forced migrants.  
 
 The translation of refugees lived experiences into standardised cartographic, statistical 
and textual data constitute acts of management and social surveillance and enact unequal 
and asymmetric power relations between the refugees and institutional actors who use 
these techniques of power to govern displaced populations often resenting and resisting 
these practices as culturally inappropriate (Hyndman, 2000; Hyndman and Mountz, 
2007). Humanitarian discourses and practices tend to deprive refugees of their 
historically and culturally diverse identities and agency and construct them as helpless 
and voice-less victims unable to take self-sufficient decisions (Malkki, 1995; 1996). The 
'victimisation' of refugees legitimises the design and implementation of policies and 
practices that relegate refugees into the role of passive recipients of humanitarian and 
development interventions planned and implemented, without their direct participation 
and consent, by ‘expert’ foreign interveners (Barakat, 2008; Barakat and Milton, 2010). 
 
In the Iraqi refugee context the asymmetric interaction between the Iraqis and 
humanitarian agents often translated into UN case workers extracting personal 
information from the migrants in order to assess the credibility of their claims and their 
eligibility for return assistance, without providing them with useful information and 
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advice about return and reintegration assistance. According to the paternalistic 
humanitarian reasoning, refugees’ increased awareness of eligibility criteria and other 
internal guidelines would prompt the migrants to engage in potentially harmful acts for 
themselves and those working with them, by manipulating the aid system or making false 
statements in order to obtain resettlement or more financial and material assistance 
(Saltsman, 2012). The lack of institutional transparency and clarity was a strategic 
management choice that limited refugees’ control over their conditions and options 
available to them, thereby limiting their ability to take decisions and devise alternative 
solutions to their problems. These ambiguous governmental practices added to the stress 
of refugees who had often already suffered traumas and human rights violations. Previous 
research has highlighted how state and non-state actors can manipulate forms of 
knowledge and information to influence migrants’ perceptions, decisions and migratory 
projects (Walsh et al., 1999; Pécoud, 2010). Hyndman and Mountz (2007) have 
documented the strategic 'absence' of authorities as a technique of refugee control and 
exclusion through the systematic positioning of the migrants outside official assistance 
channels, or through the maintenance of zones of legal ambiguity and uncertainty.   
 
The Iraqis in Syria and Jordan have reacted to the absence of institutional information 
and advice by developing informal information and communication systems to generate 
personalised information on challenges and opportunities for return. Iraqis’ information 
and communication systems are often based on the use of modern information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), but also on their transnational mobility and social 
networks. Phone calls play a crucial role in the establishment, maintenance and 
transformation of migrant transnational social relations (Vertovec, 2004). The increasing 
availability in Iraq and in neighbouring host countries of new and affordable 
communication and information technologies, especially mobile phones and internet 
services, has enabled the migrants to reach beyond their physical location and become 
members of transnational communication networks and to participate in the socio-cultural 
life and politics linking home and host societies (Chatelard, 2010).  Similarly to other 
refugee contexts, the information acquired through informal social networks contributes 
to raising refugees’ expectations about their post-return experience (Koser, 1993; 1997; 
Walsh et al., 1999; Turton and Marsden, 2002). In the Iraqi case, migrants’ growing 
awareness of the politicisation of information produced and disseminated by the media, 
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led most participants to filter and cross-check the news they received from national and 
international satellite TV channels with information produced through more independent 
systems, such as personal visits or email and phone communications with family and 
friends in Iraq. By engaging in cross-border movements and paying or receiving periodic 
visits to and from the home country, the Iraqi refugees accessed resources unattainable 
through permanent settlement in the home or host countries, and acquired personalised 
information that allowed them to make decisions, plans, and prepare for return.  
 
Despite the legal and socio-economic uncertainty and constraints experienced in host and 
home countries, the Iraqis have nevertheless actively engaged in processes of generation 
and dissemination of knowledge and information on challenges and opportunities for 
return, instead of passively and uncritically receiving it from institutional sources. They 
have reclaimed their right of shared ownership and participation in decision-making 
processes that affect their lives and have attempted to transform repressive governmental 
structures and practices that relegate forced migrants to the role of passive and dependent 
receivers of external “expert” knowledge, information and assistance. 
 
The research therefore confirms the findings of recent research (Wall, 2011; Iaria, 2011; 
Wilding, 2012; Danielson, 2012) highlighting that the global spread of user-friendly and 
affordable information and communication technologies has led to the growing 
engagement of generic groups or communities of people in the development and 
provision of mass information and communication services, as an alternative to 
traditional service providers. These changing patterns of ICTs usage are increasingly 
challenging existing power relations and operational approaches in the humanitarian and 
development world, where “expert knowledge” is no longer the remit of a small group of 
technocrats and practitioners, but it is increasingly with the general public and the 
beneficiaries of humanitarian and development programmes (Currion, 2011; Iaria, 2011). 
Institutional actors have acknowledge the importance of refugees’ informal information 
and communication systems but have yet to improve their operational approaches by 
making their policies and practices more transparent and accountable to their 
beneficiaries, and by incorporating refugees’ spontaneous information and 
communication systems into official return assistance programmes, which could 
maximise the participation of returnees and members of receiving communities as 
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information agents. 
8.5 Transnational migration and sustainable return  
In recent years, the spontaneous returns and transnational livelihoods of displaced 
populations in situations of conflict and post-conflict in the global South have attracted 
academic and policy attention (Bakewell, 2002; Hammond, 2004; Black and Gent, 
2006a; Horst, 2006; Stepputat, 2006; Monsutti, 2008, 2010).  This thesis contributes 
important empirical evidence to the growing body of knowledge on the nature and 
dynamics of return in the context of the Iraqi refugees displaced to Syria and Jordan after 
2003. The findings offer a deep insight into the relationship between refugees’ return and 
transnational migration.  
 
Traditional perspectives see return as the natural conclusion of the migration experience 
and define it as a one-way movement of emigrants back to their homelands followed by 
their permanent resettlement in the home communities. This sedentary and permanent 
conception of return informs return and reintegration polices, which consider migrants’ 
secondary movements and circular migration after return as an indicator of failure of the 
return experience. However, a growing body of empirical evidence produced by 
transnational migration scholars (Koser, 1997; Faist, 2000; Al Ali et al., 2001; Black and 
King 2004; Carling, 2009), including the findings of this thesis, challenge state-centric 
and sedentary perspectives and demonstrate that return is a complex psychological, social 
and physical process that occurs over a long period of time and entails various degrees 
and modalities of cross-border mobility, transnational livelihoods and networks 
connecting the migrants to host and home societies. In the Iraqi case, the lack of 
resettlement opportunities and difficult living conditions in neighbouring host countries 
influences refugees’ decision-making processes and migratory plans. Iraqis' return 
depends on migrants’ varying degrees of willingness and readiness to interact with the 
socio-political and economic transformations occurring in areas of return (Cassarino, 
2004). The legal and socio-economic obstacles faced in home and host countries factor in 
forced migrants’ ability to mobilise resources before and after return.  
 
For many returnees, going back ‘home’ is actually a return to areas other than their place 
of residence before flight. Migrants' notion of 'home' may have more than one local 
199 
 
 
 
 
referent and the original home may become a myth, a place of nostalgia compared to 
other more practical homes (Al Rasheed, 1994; Zetter, 1999). Transnational livelihoods 
have a profound impact on migrants’ identities, educational and social statuses and their 
relationship with the areas of origin (Kivisto, 2001; Vertovec, 2001). It has been 
suggested that the term reintegration could be replaced with the term integration, which 
denotes the fact that migrants return occurs in the face of substantial changes in the 
economy, society and the environment as well as substantial changes in themselves 
(Hammond, 2004). 
 
Refugees’ potential and commitment to return and engage in developments at home is 
affected by the social, economic and political changes that have occurred in Iraq during 
their absence as well as their own pre- and post-flight conditions. Those with enough 
financial and material assets optimise life in exile and turn it into an opportunity to 
acquire skills and experience that they could employ to facilitate their post-return 
integration and their participation in Iraq’s reconstruction. Repatriation, however, rarely 
results in the achievement of full citizenship rights. Transitional governments face great 
challenges and are seldom able, or willing, to grant returning refugees their fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Post-war economies and receiving communities have limited 
absorptive capacity to integrate returnees and meet their demands for basic services, 
employment and development opportunities. The institutional neglect of the needs and 
aspirations of the Iraqi returnees increases their vulnerability and threatens the 
sustainability of their return inducing some to re-migrate.  
 
Forced migrants react to institutional policies and interventions by juggling with official 
immigration and asylum statuses in order to enhance their freedom of movement and 
engage in transnational mobility and livelihoods as alternative solutions to their 
protracted displacement. Transnational mobility and livelihood strategies enable the 
forced migrants to remain physically and emotionally close to their families and social 
groups back home, regularly and directly assess the security situation and explore return 
and integration opportunities. Through cross-border mobility and transnational practices 
the refugees also access resources and income generation opportunities while interacting 
with the socio-political and economic realities in both home and host societies through 
the multi-directional flow of human, social and economic capital.  
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A precautionary measure adopted by most unassisted returnees is renewing their 
residence permit before their departure to Iraq. Holding a valid residence permit allows 
them to re-enter Syria and Jordan at any time, without facing immigration restrictions and 
without being charged expensive entry-visa fees.  Some Iraqi families reside in Syria and 
Jordan while members of the family, generally males, go to Iraq to work and send/bring 
money back.  Some other families have permanently resettled in Iraq and regularly visit 
Syria and Jordan to undertake medical treatment, run businesses and rest from the hard 
living and work conditions in Iraq. Some refugees visit Iraq to collect pensions, rents and 
check on their properties and businesses. Transnational mobility and livelihoods, thus, 
become a precondition for refugees’ sustainable return and integration in societies 
undergoing post conflict economic reconstruction and socio-political transformations. 
These findings support previous calls for the incorporation of legal transnational mobility 
opportunities into official refugee return and reintegration assistance projects (Crisp et al., 
2009; Long, 2010).  
 
The international refugee regime has acknowledged the importance of Iraqis’ 
transnational mobility and livelihoods between Iraq and the neighbouring countries of 
asylum (Crisp et al., 2009). Yet the policies of UNHCR and western donors are still 
informed by a permanent and sedentary conception of return as a durable solution that 
impedes the provision of adequate protection and assistance to the Iraqi refugees. Future 
research needs to further explore refugees’ experiences after return and their transnational 
mobility and livelihoods in order to increase knowledge and understanding of the nature 
and dynamics of return migration to conflict or post-conflict societies and to inform more 
effective policies and interventions aimed at facilitating the safe and sustainable return of 
refugees. 
8.6 Research challenges and limitations 
The strength of this thesis rests with its multi-disciplinary research methodology which 
allows bridging micro- and macro explanations of the causes and nature of return of Iraqi 
refugees who found refuge in Syria and Jordan after the 2003 US-led occupation of Iraq. 
The result is a multi-level explanatory framework that combines the analysis of the 
regional geopolitical context and the national and international migration and asylum 
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regimes shaping Iraqi refugees’ displacement and return, with a micro analysis of Iraqis’ 
decision-making processes, experiences and reactions to external interventions and 
structural factors that influence their decision making processes and actions. The 
knowledge generated by this thesis seeks to inform recent academic and policy debates 
on displacement and return migration to conflict or post-conflict situations in the Middle 
East.  
 
Yet, one of the main challenges and limitations of the thesis has been the persistent lack 
of political stability and security in Iraq which, not only has complicated Iraqi citizens’ 
return in safety and dignity, but has also prevented this research from gathering first-hand 
data inside Iraq about the return and reintegration experiences of Iraq's forced migrants. I 
attempted to overcome this problem by conducting an extended period of fieldwork in 
Syria and Jordan, two of Iraq’s neighbours and the main recipient countries of the Iraqis 
displaced by the last conflict. Semi structured interviews and prolonged field 
observations of Iraqis’ living conditions and transnational activities between the home 
and host countries were fundamental to generate in-depth qualitative data about the 
experiences of externally displaced Iraqis who tried to return and reintegrate into war-
affected home societies and who, for a host of reasons, decided to re-migrate to Syria and 
Jordan. Nonetheless, this remains a relatively weak substitute for first hand evidence and 
information on the return experience within Iraq itself. 
 
More precisely, the degree and modalities of transnational activity among returning 
refugees are conditioned by structural inequalities such as their position within past and 
present political power structures, their socio-economic status, age, ethnicity and religion, 
pre and post-flight circumstances that affect their access and mobilisation of resources 
before and after return. The Iraqi participants interviewed in Syria and Jordan are a group 
of refugees who could mobilise the necessary resources, connections and support 
mechanisms to pursue mobile and transnational lifestyles after return. As will be 
discussed in further detail in the following section, future studies will need to expand the 
investigation to returnee areas in central and southern Iraq and explore the experiences of 
Iraqi returnees who may be less, if at all, transnationally active.  
 
In addition, it is important to note that the sample of participants for this study is not 
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statistically representative of the entire Iraqi refugee populations in Syria and Jordan or 
generalisable to other displacement crises. A more comprehensive study of Iraqis' return 
migration experiences and future trends would need a larger sample and greater 
operational support in the data collection. Moreover, the qualitative data are time and 
context-specific and do not cover the period of internal crisis in Syria that started in 
March 2011 and has influenced Iraqis’ living conditions and their decisions and dynamics 
of return. The thesis nevertheless holds the potential to increase theoretical understanding 
of the interaction between refugee return and transnationalism, by illustrating how under 
specific structural constraints, refugees' transnational livelihoods and social networks 
have emerged as spontaneous mechanisms to achieve security and future development 
opportunities.  
 
Observations of Iraqis’ transnational livelihoods and activities, however, did not produce 
sufficient evidence in order to make generalisations on the transnational political 
engagement of Iraqis in Syria and Jordan. The investigation of Iraqi refugees’ 
transnational political activism and their involvement in the post-2003 Iraqi national 
political dialogue and reconciliation process was one of the original aims of this research, 
which proved to be impossible to achieve due to the political sensitivity of the topic and 
the general atmosphere of censorship, control and restrictions imposed on this specific 
research aspect by both home and host governments, and consequently by international 
humanitarian and development agencies.   
 
Moreover, due to time and budget constraints, as well as with logistical problems with 
Syrian and Jordanian entry and exit visas, field observations of Iraqi refugees’ 
participation in the 2010 out-of-country elections could only be conducted in Syria. 
Depending on improvements in the political situation in Syria and on the ability to carry 
out independent research with the necessary institutional support, future research could 
explore the extent and manners in which Iraqi displaced in Syria, Jordan and other host 
countries in the Middle East, engage in transnational political activism and influence 
critical socio-political and economic developments at home that have a direct impact on 
their present lives and plans to return.  
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8.7 Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
This multi-disciplinary research employs conceptual and theoretical tools developed in 
International Relations and Migration Studies to explore the causes and nature of return 
in the context of the Iraqis displaced to Syria and Jordan after the 2003 US-led war in 
Iraq.  
 
At a macro level, the study sheds light on the impact of the geopolitical context on the 
emergence and implementation of specific international regimes, and on the causes of 
actors’ non-adherence to regimes. It aims to do this through analysis of the interactive 
normative and legal environment that governs Iraqis’ displacement and return from Syria 
and Jordan.  The migration and refugee regimes operating in the Middle East are highly 
dynamic, yet scarcely researched and understood, beyond the case of Palestinian refugee 
governance in the region (Plascov, 1981; Aruri, 2001; Morris, 2004; Peled and Rouhana, 
2004; Dumper, 2006; Richter-Devroe, 2013). More research is needed to further 
knowledge and understanding of Arab states’ policies and practices towards non-
Palestinian refugee populations in their territories. A potential follow up study could 
investigate the level of consistency of the international refugee regime and Jordanian 
migration and asylum policies with respect to two different but concomitant displacement 
problems in the same region and country. It would be interesting, for instance, to 
investigate the policies and practices adopted by the international refugee regime and the 
Jordanian authorities to simultaneously address the Iraqi protracted displacement and the 
more recent Syrian refugee problem in Jordan.  
 
In this thesis, a comparative perspective has guided the empirical analysis and discussion 
of the regimes and geopolitics that shape the Iraqi displacement and return from Syria 
and Jordan; and the exploration of Iraqi refugees’ transnational livelihoods and 
information and communication systems in the two host countries. Syria's and Jordan's 
socio-economic and political systems have developed in different directions and their past 
and present relations with Iraq and with western states are complex and often diverging 
(Bin Talal, 1993; Perthes, 1997; Lasensky, 2006; Hinnebusch 2006). These structural 
commonalities and differences affect the Syrian and Jordanian reception and interaction 
with the international refugee regime and their policies and practices towards migrant and 
refugee communities in their territories. A similar comparative approach could be applied 
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to investigate the interaction between the international refugee regime and the national 
asylum and migration regimes adopted by other states non-signatory of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol in other regional contexts. The uneasy interaction 
between the international refugee regime and the Syrian and Jordanian national migration 
and asylum systems is emblematic not only of the burden-sharing dilemmas in refugee 
protection and management that exist in the Middle East but also in other regions in the 
global South that share with Middle Eastern countries the experience of western 
imperialism and colonialism.  In South and South East Asia there are various states (e.g., 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, and Thailand among 
others) which do not adhere to the international refugee regime and are among the top 
refugee-producing and receiving countries in the world. It would be interesting to 
compare the historical and geopolitical causes and dynamics of these neighbouring states’ 
non-adherence to the international refugee regime; to explore differences and 
commonalities between the national and regional asylum and migration management 
regimes that they have adopted to deal with displacement problems in their territories; 
and the extent and mode of interaction between their national migration and asylum 
legislation and policies and international refugee norms and procedures. A comparative 
analytical approach would also be useful in exploring the impact of contextual factors and 
external interventions on the living conditions, decision-making processes and migratory 
behaviours of refugee populations in these countries. 
    
At a micro-level this research generates critical empirical evidence about refugees’ 
agency, their reactions to and direct involvement in shaping the normative and physical 
environment in which they live by adopting transnational livelihoods before and after 
return as an alternative solution to their displacement. The findings on Iraqi refugees’ 
independent transnational mobility and livelihoods before and after return lend crucial 
empirical evidence to policy recommendations for the incorporation of legal mobility 
opportunities in traditional refugee protection and assistance policy frameworks. Future 
studies could continue increasing empirical knowledge and conceptual understanding of 
the interaction between return and transnationalism by collecting qualitative and 
quantitative data about the post-return transnationalism of returnees in Iraq and in other 
conflict-affected countries in the global South.  Another multi-sited and comparative 
research project could also look at the experiences of Iraqi individuals and families who 
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resettled to the United States, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Norway and the UK after 2003, 
and then embarked on the return process, with or without institutional assistance.  It 
would be worth observing more closely the impact of their legal status in western host 
countries on their decisions to return, and on the scope, nature and material 
manifestations of their transnational mobility and lives between home and host societies.   
 
An additional knowledge gap that could be filled by future studies regards the various 
host communities in which Iraqi refugees’ everyday lives unfold. Most academic and 
policy studies of the Iraqi protracted displacement in the Middle East, including this 
research project, have mostly focused on the living conditions of Iraqi refugees in host 
countries and their interactions with host authorities and international aid providers. In 
contrast, there is a dearth of in-depth qualitative knowledge regarding the relationship and 
the daily interactions between the Iraqi forced migrants and their hosts as well as 
members of other migrant communities in countries of asylum in the Middle East and in 
western host societies. In the Middle Eastern context, in order to understand Iraqis’ 
experiences of displacement, it is crucial to explore the ways in which their Jordanian, 
Syrian and Egyptian hosts have received, perceived and reacted to the protracted presence 
of Iraqi forced migrants in their communities. This approach highlights the importance of 
re-embedding refugee-host relations in the history of conflict and displacement in the 
region. 
 
Another key finding of this study concerns the importance of Iraqis’ informal information 
and communication systems that allow them to take informed decisions and prepare for 
their safe and sustainable return. The thesis demonstrates the changing power relations 
between on the one-hand institutional actors using information and communication as 
migrant and refugee governance strategies, and on the other the refugees who challenge 
the institutional monopoly on knowledge, information and communication by relying on 
informal information and communication systems based on the use of ICTs and on 
refugees cross-border circular migration and livelihoods. The usage of information and 
communication technologies among members of migrant and refugee communities is an 
emerging multi-disciplinary research area. Most empirical research on this topic has been 
carried out in western host societies where information and communication infrastructure 
and facilities are more developed. However, the rapid development and expansion of 
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high-speed Internet or broadband infrastructure in a number of Middle Eastern, Asian, 
Pacific and African countries, facilitated by deregulation and privatisation of 
telecommunication markets, is driving changing patterns of local ICTs usage that warrant 
further study. Further multi-disciplinary research will increase knowledge and stimulate 
academic and policy debates over the role of new information and communication 
technologies in processes of production, diffusion and democratisation of knowledge and 
information in conflict situations and displacement crises. Future studies could produce 
particularly interesting findings regarding the impact of the diffusion of user-friendly and 
affordable ICTs on changing power relations and interactions between members of 
migrant and refugee groups and national and international institutions and humanitarian 
and development assistance providers.  
 
Refugees hold key information about their homeland that can be used as a basis for 
planning, programming and resource mobilisation prior to return. The observation of 
refugees' cross-border activities and the collection and analysis of the personalised 
information they acquire during their visits to Iraq may be critical in planning and 
implementing sustainable return and reintegration programmes. As the beneficiaries of 
repatriation programmes, it is in their interest to participate in assessments of their needs, 
establishing the modalities of their return and determining the conditions of sustainable 
socio-economic reintegration. One of the central findings and messages of this thesis is 
that forced migrants are experts of their own circumstances and potential key 
development actors and should not be constructed as passive recipients of external 
information and assistance. Given refugees’ strong need and desire to rehabilitate, 
develop personally and professionally, and offer their offspring a safer and prosperous 
future, their decision to return and their commitment to re-building their war-affected 
societies will ultimately depend on the restoration of national security and stability and on 
the availability of sustainable reintegration opportunities. 
 
The findings of this thesis debunk bureaucratic stereotypes and academic assumptions of 
refugee return as a permanent and sedentary experience; pose theoretical and empirical 
questions concerning the interaction between international and national migration and 
asylum regimes in specific geo-political and historical contexts; and promote the 
incorporation of academic research findings into evidence-based policy frameworks for 
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sustainable solutions to the Iraqi protracted displacement.  Although there is little chance 
that the findings produced by this doctoral study will directly or indirectly inform more 
effective and fair return and reintegration assistance policies - let alone influence the 
decisions and actions of the key actors in the national political dialogue and 
reconstruction process in Iraq - this remains the driving force of this research project. 
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Appendix I – Interview questions for Iraqi participants 
Migratory trajectories and livelihood strategies 
1) When did you leave Iraq?  
2) What was your habitual place of residence in Iraq? 
3) When did you arrive in Syria/Jordan? 
3) Did you arrive directly to Syria/Jordan or did you arrive from another country? 
4) Why did you leave Iraq? Were you forced to leave or did you leave voluntarily? 
5) Why did you choose to come to Syria/Jordan? 
6) Are you here alone or with family, friends, other? (to follow up) 
7) What do you do here: work, study, undergo medical treatment, other?  
(to follow up) 
8) How do you survive here? 
9) How's life in Syria/Jordan? 
10) Do you have extended family members here in Syria/Jordan? 
11) Do you have Syrian/Jordanian friends? 
12) Have you ever left Syria/Jordan?  Where to?  
13) How many times did you leave and re-enter Syria/Jordan?  
14) What was the purpose of the travel? 
 
Information on return and reintegration opportunities  
15) Before going back did you have any information about the security situation  
      and socio-economic opportunities in Iraq and more specifically in your home  
      area?  
16) Where did you get this information from? (to follow up) 
17) In your opinion, to what extent and how the information you receive affects your 
decision to return to Iraq? 
18) Did you go back to Iraq? 
19) How many times have you been to Iraq?  
20) How did you go? 
21) Where did you go? 
22) Why did you go?  (Visit relatives, business, check properties, assess the  
       situation back home etc.) 
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23) How long were you there for? 
24) Have you had any problems in re-entering Iraq? 
25) What did you find there?  
26) Have things changed since last time you were there? (to follow up)  
 
Future life projects 
27) Why did you come back to Syria/Jordan? (to follow up) 
28) Are you planning to go back to Iraq? (to follow up) 
29) Do you want to go back to Iraq permanently? (to follow up) 
30) When do you plan to go back?  
31) Why do you want to go back? 
32) What documents do you have and what documents will you need when you are back 
in Iraq? 
33) Will you receive any help or financial assistance to return and rebuild your life  
      in Iraq? (to follow up) 
34) Do you know any organisation or institution that is providing assistance to  
      Iraqi people who want to return to Iraq? (to follow up) 
35) Do you know the Protection Assistance Centres and the Return and Integration 
Centres?  
36) Did you visit these centres? What services do they provide? (to follow up) 
37) Do you have family and friends waiting for you over there? 
38) Will you go back to your home town or another area? (to follow up) 
39) Will you go back alone or with family members, friends others? 
40) What do you plan to do when you are back in Iraq? (to follow up) 
41) Will you go back to your old job and life style? (to follow up) 
42) What are your plans for the future? 
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 " لعودة إلى العراقا تحديات وفرص"حول موضوع   مقابلةي العلى المشاركة ف موافقة
 
تحديات "حول موضوع  أوافق على المشاركة في مقابلة مسجلة                                                    أنا
 لا لأغراضوأنها لن تستخدم إ و أفهم أن نتائج المقابلة ستكون سرية ومجهولة المصدر" لعودة إلى العراقا وفرص
 .البحث المذكور
 
وأيضا قدرتي على سحب تصريحاتي  على تغيير أي جزء من تصريحاتي المسجلةوأقر بأن لدي القدرة 
 وستكون سرية ومجهولة المصدرعلى الاستبيان  وأنا أفهم أن إجاباتي. من المقابلة في أي وقت تيومشارك
  .الدراسةهذه  ستخدامها حصرا لأغراضلايمكن إستنساخها 
 الأمم المتحدة للاجئين  لى مساعدة مفوضيةي عحصول في ؤثرعلى الإطلاقت وأعترف أن مشاركتي في البحث لن
 .هاوخدمات
 
 .عند طلبيبغية الاطلاع على نتائج الدراسة  بي  لكي يتم الاتصال يرقم هاتف/  عنوان بريدي الإلكترونيأزودكم ب
 
 ٠٩٥٤٦٩٥٤٦٢الجوال   رقمياريا على نسة فانيسا الآبأستطيع الاتصال  ني أيضا أنأنني على علم 
 .هدا البحثإذا كان لدي أي أسئلة أو قضايا أخرى تتعلق ب ، ku.ca.xessus@airaI.V البريد الالكترونيبو أ
 
            مشارك البحث  يعتوق                                                          تاريخ
 
      ريد الإلكترونيعنوان الب
 
    هاتفال رقم
 
 
         تاريخ                                       توقيع الباحثة   
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INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
"Challenges and opportunities for return to Iraq" research project 
 
 
I                                agree to participate in a tape-recorded interview on "Challenges and 
opportunities for return to Iraq". I understand that the results of the interview will be 
confidential and anonymous and only used for the purposes of the above mentioned 
research project.  
 
I accept my ability to change any part of the recorded data if I wish, and also my ability 
to withdraw my statements and participation from the interview at any time. I understand 
that my responses will be anonymous and confidential, should any of my statements be 
reproduced and submitted to be exclusively used for the purposes of the study.  
Moreover, I acknowledge that my participation to the research will not affect in any way 
whatsoever my access to UNHCR assistance and services. 
 
I provide my email address/ telephone number in order to be informed about the results of 
the study if I request them. I also understand that I can contact Miss Vanessa Iaria at the 
following Tel. No. 0954695832, or Email V.Iaria@sussex.ac.uk, if I have any questions 
or further issues regarding the research project. 
 
Research participant's signature     Date    
       
Email address 
 
 Phone No. 
 
 
Researcher's signature                                                         Date        
 
